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The Wild Lands of Gotham: City and Nature in Jamaica Bay, New York, 1880-1994 
Eric James Fauss, PhD 
University of Connecticut, 2014 
 
 This dissertation examines conflicts over Jamaica Bay, a 25,000-acre estuarine 
lagoon bordering southern Brooklyn and Queens that at the end of the nineteenth 
century was one of the largest undeveloped areas in New York City. Determining the 
relationship between city and nature was the central conflict in the bay’s history. While 
activists, developers, and officials sought to transform the bay into parks, suburbs, and 
a port, local residents fought to maintain their homes in what they envisioned as the 
Venice of New York—an unconventional hybrid space of city and nature. 
By examining the interplay of competing conceptions of Jamaica Bay over its 
history, this study will show how both elite and working class New Yorkers were able to 
exercise power over the bay’s development and the complex ways in which its spaces 
were understood. Tensions peaked in 1969 with the creation of Gateway National 
Recreation Area, one of the first urban sites run by the National Park Service dedicated 
to preservation and mass recreation. As they had done before, elites invoked class-
based arguments against residents’ use and care of the bay but the changing politics of 
the 1960s reversed the dynamic, leading to the bay’s inhabitants winning the right to 
continue living within its spaces. The victory of Jamaica Bay’s residents codified their 
vision of a hybrid space, forcing Gateway’s administrators to approach the 
conceptualization of their park in novel ways. 
  
 
 
The Wild Lands of Gotham: City and Nature in Jamaica Bay, New York, 1880-1994 
 
Eric James Fauss 
 
 
B.A., State University of New York at Potsdam, 2005 
M.A., University of Connecticut, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at the 
University of Connecticut 
2014  
  
 
 
Copyright by 
Eric James Fauss 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014

! iii!
Acknowledgements 
I could not have done this dissertation alone. Many people and institutions helped 
me with my research. Funding from the UConn History Department, Graduate School, 
and Humanities Institute supported a number of my trips to archives. The staff at 
Gateway National Recreation Area were particularly patient and helpful as I browsed 
their library. I owe special thanks to Barbara Toborg of Broad Channel for introducing 
me to her community and the resources of its historical society. 
 My committee was invaluable throughout the dissertation process. Nancy 
Shoemaker’s careful reading and trenchant comments were instrumental in helping me 
clarify my analysis and polish my writing. I am especially grateful to Matthew McKenzie 
for pushing me to take the intellectual chances I did. Helen Rozwadowski’s unique 
historical perspective helped me think about the spaces of Jamaica Bay in new ways. I 
also extend my thanks to Christopher Clark for serving as an outside reader. Out of 
everybody at UConn, I owe the greatest debt to my advisor, Peter Baldwin. Peter went 
above and beyond the call of duty with uncommon patience to help me with matters 
practical and intellectual. He never lost sight of my potential, and always challenged me 
to meet it. I could not have asked for a better mentor. 
 Besides my committee, numerous members of the UConn history community 
helped me in various ways. Jamie Eves and Brendan Kane were always willing to listen 
to my ideas and concerns and provide encouragement, along with fellow current and 
former graduate students Antonio Hernández-Matos, Lauren Madak, and Thomas 
Westerman. Michael Neagle deserves special thanks for his extensive work helping me 
! iv!
refine my ideas and prose, and I am deeply appreciative of Dominic DeBrincat and 
Catherine Thompson’s aid with preparing for my dissertation defense. 
 Last but not least, my family has been an unwavering source of support and love 
throughout the past nine years. I am grateful that the encouragement of my parents and 
in-laws was always with me. My sister, Rachael Fauss, and brother-in-law, Nathan 
Stodola, were among my most important supports, letting me crash at their apartment 
for weeks at a time while I conducted research in New York City. Final thanks go to my 
wife, Stephanie Fauss. Her place beside me on this journey was a constant comfort and 
inspiration. I dedicate this work to her, because nobody else better understands what it 
took to finish this dissertation. 
  
! v!
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter One 
 
 
 
Chapter Two 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
 
 
 
Chapter Six 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
“A Picturesque Venice”: Recreational 
and Residential Development, 1880-
1920 
 
The “Wonder Harbor of the World”: The 
Jamaica Bay Port Scheme, 1905-1938 
 
An “Expanse of Forbidden Water Dotted 
with Dreary Marshes and Lonely 
Islands”: Jamaica Bay Becomes 
Polluted, 1880-1938 
 
“A Strange Corner of Primitive 
Romance”: Robert Moses and Jamaica 
Bay, 1930-1960 
 
“An Ecological Fort Knox”: The Struggle 
For Gateway National Recreation Area, 
1960-1972 
 
“The Leavings of a Throw-Away 
Society”: Jamaica Bay and Gateway 
National Recreation Area, 1972-1994 
 
“A Tableau of Damage, Destruction, and 
Grief”: Hurricane Sandy and the Future 
of Jamaica Bay 
 
1 
 
18 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
 
 
131 
 
 
 
168 
 
 
 
200 
 
 
 
208
  
! 1!
Introduction 
The first time I visited Jamaica Bay I arrived by subway. I still vividly remember 
the journey, which gave me a unique perspective on the bay and its place in New York 
City. I boarded the A train in Harlem, Manhattan—one of the most densely populated 
urban areas in the United States. The key moment came when the tracks met the bay’s 
shore, where they connected with a trestle suspended above the water: I was suddenly 
surrounded by nature, no longer able to see the ground or the city, only the bay, the sky, 
marshes, and birds. When I left the subway at my destination, Broad Channel, the only 
remaining settlement within the bay, the paved streets and densely built homes once 
more reminded me that I hadn’t left the city, but my journey told me otherwise, along 
with the smell of salt and decay that met me as soon as I stepped off the car. 
The conceptual tension I felt, emerging from the ways in which American culture 
taught me to think about the relationship between cities and nature, doesn’t seem to 
bother Broad Channelites. While they relish the urban amenities of their community—its 
connection to the subway, public library branch, school, and neighborhood park—the 
bay continues to play an important part in their daily lives. This can be seen in the 
pages of the guestbooks for events held by the Broad Channel Historical Society, where 
visitors are asked to record a fond memory of the time in their community. Virtually 
every resident mentions the bay. For instance Margaret Wagner, a lifetime Broad 
Channelite, recounted how she remembered “waiting for mom to say it was warm 
enough to jump in the canal… crabbing, fishing waterskiing + just walking in the mud!” 
Thomas Brody, who moved to the community in 1993, greatly valued the “breathtaking 
! 2!
view.” Peggy Knagel, a resident since 1929—told of “days in boats, at the beach” and 
how the community was “a beautiful place to grow up” and grow old.1 
 
Figure 1. Airplane and the New York skyline from the shore of Ruffle Bar island, 
Jamaica Bay, NY. 2012 photo by the author. 
 
 Others find the current relationship between city and nature in Jamaica Bay 
unsettling. Surrounding Broad Channel is Gateway National Recreation Area (NRA), 
which along with Golden Gate NRA was the first major foray of the National Park 
Service into an urban area since the organization took over administration of sites in 
Washington DC. From Gateway’s creation in 1972, many have found the very idea of an 
urban national park to be paradoxical. A 2007 competition called “Envisioning Gateway,” 
sponsored by the Van Allen Institute, a nonprofit organization dedicated to architectural 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 “Guest Book, Broad Channel Historical Day, November 3rd, 1996,” Folder: Historical 
Days, 1996-2008, Papers of the Broad Channel Historical Society, Queens Public 
Library, Broad Channel Branch, Broad Channel, NY; “Guest Book, Broad Channel 
Historical Day, October 11, 1998,” Folder: Historical Days, 1996-2008, Papers of the 
Broad Channel Historical Society, Queens Public Library, Broad Channel Branch. 
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design, demonstrates how these concerns continue into present day. The organizers 
challenged entrants to completely reimagine Gateway; winners were chosen based on 
their ability to create “powerful, transforming proposals that inspire new ways of thinking 
about not only the role of national parks relative to an increasingly urbanized national 
landscape, but the ways in which thriving cities and complex ecosystems can co-exist 
and enrich each other.” Although the competition produced new designs for Gateway’s 
sites, the goals chosen by organizers were little different from those outlined in the 1979 
General Management Plan, which has been the key policy document shaping the park’s 
development to date. As well intentioned as this sort of competition may be, the 
fundamental tension within Gateway’s spaces remains.2 
The space of Jamaica Bay as it is today is the result of its unusual history. Unlike 
so many places in which developers and officials managed to dictate the terms of 
development, in Jamaica Bay, the original inhabitants—the ancestors of the Broad 
Channel Community—successfully defended their claims to its space. Elite visions of 
the bay that followed familiar cultural scripts, from those of the bay as a park to a port to 
a suburban neighborhood, have had to coexist with the unconventional conception of 
the bay possessed by its residents, forcing the tensions between city and nature to be 
reconciled in novel ways. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2 “Competition Logistics: Programme Requirements,” Van Allen Institute, 
http://www.vanalen.org/gateway/logistics_prog_req.php; “Envisioning Gateway: Online 
Exhibition: First Prize,” Van Allen Institute, 
http://www.vanalen.org/gateway/exhibition_firstprize.php; National Park Service, 
“Gateway National Recreation Area General Management Plan,” August 1979, Gateway 
National Recreation Area Cultural Resources Library, Staten Island, NY. 
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Jamaica Bay is a 25,000-acre estuarine lagoon, where drainage from 85,000 
acres of Long Island’s Harbor Hill moraine meets Lower New York Bay. Though most of 
the bay consists of open water with a mean depth of thirteen feet, it is also home to 350 
acres of mudflats, 1,451 acres of salt marsh, and smaller areas of upland. The bay is 
ecologically diverse, with an abundance of plant and animal species—terrestrial and 
aquatic. As the meeting point between the New England and Long Island coastlines and 
the mid-Atlantic shore, it hosts numerous migrating species of animals that stop to 
feed.3 
Human action has substantially transformed Jamaica Bay and damaged its 
ecological richness. Dredging throughout the twentieth century has increased the bay’s 
mean depth from three to thirteen feet, resulting in substantial alterations in water flow—
namely a thirty-three day residence time versus eleven before the dredging.4 Much of 
the sand pumped during these operations was used as fill: the Army Corps of Engineers 
estimates that 1,400 acres of marsh have been destroyed since 1924.5 A variety of 
sources continue to pollute the bay: sewage treatment plants, Kennedy Airport’s 
runways, three capped landfills, and storm drains contribute organic matter, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 US Fish and Wildlife Service, “Jamaica Bay and Breezy Point,” in Significant Habitats 
and Habitat Complexes of the New York Bight Watershed (Charlestown, RI: US Fish 
and Wildlife Service, 1996), http://nctc.fws.gov/resources/knowledge-
resources/pubs5/web_link/text/jb_form.htm. 4 Residence is the average amount of time a particular collection of water molecules 
spends within a space before going elsewhere: see David Bice, “Residence Time,” 
Exploring the Dynamics of earth Systems, 
http://www3.geosc.psu.edu/~dmb53/DaveSTELLA/modeling/ch2.4.html. 5 “Jamaica Bay Marsh Islands,” US Army Corps of Engineers, 
http://www.nan.usace.army.mil/Missions/CivilWorks/ProjectsinNewYork/EldersPointJam
aicaBaySaltMarshIslands.aspx. 
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hydrocarbons, and heavy metals. Diminished water circulation has concentrated this 
pollution and resulted in toxic levels of chemicals and reduced oxygen content in the 
bay’s depths, hurting wildlife. Finally, urban development continues to threaten the 
remaining open uplands and marshes along the bay’s shore.6 
 
Figure 2. Map of Jamaica Bay. From Edward M. Grout, Improvement and Development 
of Jamaica Bay and the Water Front of the City of New York Other than that of 
Manhattan Island : Being a Communication Addressed to the Commissioners of the 
Sinking Fund of the City of New York (New York: Martin B. Brown Press, 1905). 
 
The bay’s physical spaces are a palimpsest of its history, a visual record of the 
efforts of developers, officials, activists, and local residents to shape it to their wills. 
Starting in the far southwest, there were once many islands and marshes, most 
infamously Barren Island—home to noxious rendering plants—but they were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6 US Fish and Wildlife Service, “Jamaica Bay and Breezy Point.” 
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consolidated to build the City’s first municipal airport, Floyd Bennett Field. Now part of 
Gateway, Floyd Bennett hosts a variety of environmental education programs and its 
runways still see limited use. Just to its west on the northern shore of the bay’s inlet is 
Marine Park, once a stretch of marsh, now a residential neighborhood and park. Next to 
Marine Park is the famous Coney Island, which was never considered part of the bay 
but nonetheless influenced its development. Proceeding clockwise from Floyd Bennett 
along the shore, one comes to Mill Basin, now a residential neighborhood, its 
bulkheaded shores one of the few parts of the bay successfully transformed by a project 
to turn the bay into a gigantic harbor. Once, one would have found a small resort and 
scattered industry on two small islands: Mill Island and Bergen Island—home of Bergen 
Beach. 
Next, Paerdegat Basin, yet another remnant of the port project, home to a sewer 
outlet that for years dumped untreated effluent into the bay. Then, the neighborhood of 
Canarsie, once a resort that had designs to rival Coney Island. Abutting Canarsie is 
Howard Beach, a neighborhood of small single-family homes; in the past it was a 
collection of vacation enclaves, including the famous settlement of Ramblersville, whose 
houses built on pilings were the beginning of what was known as the Venice of New 
York. Between Canarsie and Howard Beach is a landfill, Spring Creek—named after the 
basin it abuts—an unfortunate relic of the City’s efforts to build parkland along the bay’s 
northern shore. 
Continuing round, one reaches Kennedy Airport, once known as Idlewild: here 
was yet another resort that had a golf course and grand hotel, as well as a small 
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collection of settlements. Finally, the Rockaway Peninsula: known now for its housing 
projects and the insular Breezy Point Cooperative, the Rockaways was once a favorite 
summer getaway for New Yorkers of all stripes, its sandy beaches renowned. The 
Marine Parkway Bridge then comes full circle. 
This dissertation examines conflicts over the shaping of Jamaica Bay from 1880-
1994. At the end of the nineteenth century, Jamaica Bay offered something that rapid 
urbanization was making dear: an open space of nature. The bay was unique in that 
after 1898 it was one of the largest undeveloped spaces within the nation’s most 
populous city. Determining the proper relationship between the city and nature in 
Jamaica Bay has been the central conflict in its history. Four main actors fought for 
control of the bay’s spaces: officials at all levels of government, developers, activists, 
and the bay’s working-class residents. While officials, developers, and activists sought 
to reconcile city and nature by transforming the bay into familiar forms like parks, ports, 
and suburban neighborhoods, local residents struggled to maintain their homes and 
codify Jamaica Bay as an unconventional hybrid space—the Venice of New York, a 
vision born of their experiences living and working within it. For decades elites invoked 
class in order to delegitimize residents’ use of the bay, but the changing politics of the 
1960s reversed the dynamic, allowing inhabitants to question elite claims to stewardship 
and ultimately keep their homes, solidifying their vision of the bay as both city and 
nature. 
Nature in Jamaica Bay was valued in two ways: as natural resources that could 
be exploited for profit, and as a resource in and of itself. Until the bay became polluted, 
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commercial and recreational fishers harvested fin and shellfish in its waters, which 
officials in turn envisioned as shipping channels and an outlet for sewage. Developers 
saw the potential for building atop the bay’s uplands and marshes, which could be filled 
and constructed with factories, as well as suburban homes that offered their inhabitants 
a natural setting. Finally, the bay’s natural spaces were seen as ideal sites for parkland 
where nature could be enjoyed through recreation. 
Changes in American culture influenced the way nature was understood and 
valued within Jamaica Bay. Although developers and many officials viewed the bay’s 
resources to be granted by providence, that to not exploit them would leave it a 
wasteland—literally wasted land—this view would be challenged by the rise of the 
conservation movement in the nineteenth century.7 Conservationists portrayed the 
natural world as fragile and in need of preservation by humans through careful 
management; this conception gained prominence in the 1930s when Robert Moses 
sought to develop the bay into a park, arguing that the area’s open spaces needed to be 
preserved, and would also be important during the creation of Gateway National 
Recreation Area.8 The ethos of conservation gave officials and activists an important 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7 For more on the desire to dominate nature, see Max Oelschlaeger, The Idea of 
Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1991). 8 Samuel Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive 
Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959) 
is considered the classic text on the conservation movement. Early historiography 
emphasized the idea of conservation as promoting “wise use” in contrast with 
preservationism—setting spaces aside for their beauty. The classic text on 
preservationism is Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 4th ed. 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). Recent interpretations deemphasize this 
distinction, like Christopher Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature and the Rise 
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weapon in the struggle over the bay’s spaces, allowing them to depict certain uses as 
harmful and ignorant; these assumptions had an element of class bias within them due 
to the elite status of most conservationists and officials.9 Being in an urban area 
intensified these conflicts due to the number of and diversity of groups making claims 
and having claims made on their behalf to the bay’s spaces. 
In the post-World War Two era, environmentalism emerged in the United States, 
producing important changes in the way the bay was valued and viewed. 
Environmentalism differed from conservationism in three main ways: first, it was a mass 
movement, not primarily confined to elites; second, it acted on behalf of a wider variety 
of spaces and environments than wilderness-focused conservationism; third, it 
encompassed a wide variety of concerns, from pollution, to sprawl, to environmental 
justice. Although some conservationists adapted their ethos, the older ideology of 
conservation continued to exist.10 Environmentalism was a key force behind the push to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
of Environmentalism in Twentieth Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2012), which considers conservationism to be more defined by elite 
concerns over wilderness which. This study is greatly influenced by Sellers’ 
understanding of conservationism and environmentalism. 9 For class and conservation, see Karl Jacoby, Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, 
Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2001); and Louis S Warren, The Hunter’s Game: 
Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1997). 10 Environmentalism has an extensive historiography. On the differences between 
environmentalism and conservationsim, see Samuel Hays, Beauty, Health and 
Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). While Hays considered environmentalism to be 
motivated by consumption, Hal Rothman, The Greening of a Nation?: Environmentalism 
in the United States Since 1945 (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 
1998) and Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American 
Environmental Movement (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005) emphasize the role of 
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create Gateway National Recreation Area, particularly among those who sought to 
make the park a space of mass recreation. Gateway’s 1979 General Management Plan 
was also strongly influenced by environmental thinking, in particular its 
conceptualization of the park as a hybrid space of city and nature defined by its 
ecological connections. 
While conflicts over Jamaica Bay played out as conventional legal and political 
battles, one of the most important ways that actors exercised power over development 
was through shaping how the bay’s spaces were conceptualized; this included defining 
the space as it was, and how it would be. To support the utilization of the bay’s 
resources, developers and officials portrayed the bay as virgin wasteland. To create a 
sense of place, the bay’s residents imagined their community as the Venice of New 
York. To delegitimize inhabitants’ use of the bay, activists and officials depicted it as 
polluted. Finally, developers and officials released descriptions and graphics of the bay 
transformed according to their wishes. 
This dissertation will draw upon the ideas of theorist Henri Lefebvre because they 
provide a unique way for understanding the power of, interaction between, and 
contestation of conceptions of space. According to Lefebvre, space is not mere 
dimensionality or a container where action takes place but a lived reality within the 
social sphere. Lefebvre argues that space is created in three ways; all three methods 
can be at play within a single place, leading to multiple meanings that compete for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
changing modes of production. Recent literature has attempted to get beyond this 
debate: see Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the 
Rise of American Environmentalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and 
Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible. 
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influence. First, space is created through use—everyday activities like work and 
residence; this way of shaping space was particularly important to the inhabitants of 
Jamaica Bay. Second, space is made through representation, like the visual images on 
maps, charts, and legal documents; this was an important tool of developers and 
officials, an example being when the New York City Department of Docks created plans 
to turn the bay into a port and included the image of the transformed bay on official city 
maps. Third, space is produced through imagination: as opposed to visual 
representations, imagination dwells primarily in the realm of the symbolic and 
associational. An example would be depicting the bay as polluted: as opposed to 
offering an objective measure of levels of pollutants, this conception is loaded with 
associations of unsavoriness and decay; all actors were able to exercise power in this 
manner.11 
While the concept of nature and its relationship with humanity has been 
extensively studied and unpacked in a variety of ways and contexts, nature in cities has 
received significantly less attention. Recently, environmental historians have been more 
willing to consider complex formulations of the interface of nature and culture, although 
significant controversy remains on the wisdom of embracing relativistic concepts like 
hybrid environments.12 Groundbreaking works by Matthew Klingle, Ari Kelman, Michael 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1991), 26–33. 
Lefebvre uses different terminology: spatial practice, representations of space and 
representational space versus use, representation, and imagination. 
12 Raymond Williams, “Ideas of Nature,” in Problems of Materialism and Culture 
(London: Verso, 1980), 67-85 is considered a classic work on the dichotomy of nature 
and humanity. For the hesitation of environmental historians to study urban 
environments, see Martin Melosi, “The Place of the City in Environmental History,” The 
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Rawson, and Christopher Sellers are representative of this new type of inquiry, studying 
the complex interactions of natural systems, human action, and culture within urban 
areas.13 The case study of Jamaica Bay contributes to this growing field by illumining 
the diversity of ways in which historical actors approached the relationship between city 
and nature, with the hybrid conception of Venice demonstrating that people in the past 
were willing to think outside of conventional formulations like city, country, and suburb. 
Jamaica Bay’s history illumines the role of working people in shaping natural 
space—a topic that has received short shrift within environmental history due to 
methodological difficulties and the availability of sources. For example, although A River 
and Its City shows the disproportionate impacts of disease and hydrological engineering 
on members of racial minorities and the working class, Kelman’s exploration of how 
these groups influenced conceptions of space in New Orleans could be better 
developed. In Crimes Against Nature, Karl Jacoby provides a useful model through his 
demonstration of the ways in which working people resisted attempts by “experts” to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Environmental History Review 17, no. 1 (1993): 1–23. William Cronon, “The Trouble 
with Wilderness; Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in Uncommon Ground: 
Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: Norton, 1995), 
69–90 is considered one of the breakthrough works problematizing nature. Richard 
White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1996) is an early influential work that approaches nature as a hybrid space. For 
the turn to hybridity, see Paul Sutter, “The World with Us: The State of Environmental 
History,” The Journal of American History 100, no. 1 (2013): 94–119. 13 Matthew Klingle, Emerald City: An Environmental History of Seattle (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2007); Ari Kelman, A River and Its City: The Nature of 
Landscape in New Orleans (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006); Michael 
Rawson, Eden on the Charles: The Making of Boston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010); Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible. 
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manage natural spaces—actions based on knowledge gained from work.14 Living and 
working within Jamaica Bay gave its working class residents a unique understanding of 
the relationship between city and nature, allowing them to create conceptions of space 
in order to resist competing claims to the bay.  
As the site of one of the first urban national parks in the United States, Gateway 
National Recreation Area, Jamaica Bay’s history sheds light on the changing ways the 
National Park Service approached conceptual dilemmas emerging as a result of the 
organization’s changing role in society. Although political and administrative histories of 
the Park Service have dominated its historiography, works by Linda Flint McClelland 
and Richard West Sellars have begun to explore how park officials conceptualized 
nature within national parks. Because of political controversy and the relative newness 
of the parks themselves, scholars have only recently taken the development of urban 
parks seriously. This dissertation will show that the Park Service’s choice to 
conceptualize Gateway National Recreation Area as a hybrid space of city and nature 
was a radical change for the organization due to its departure from traditional 
conceptions of national parks as spectacular wilderness.15 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14 Kelman, A River and Its City; Jacoby, Crimes Against Nature. Richard White, “Are 
You an Environmentalist of Do You Work for a Living?: Work and Nature,” in 
Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New 
York: Norton, 1995), 171-185, is a classic piece on the importance of work in generating 
knowledge about nature. 15 Linda Flint McClelland, Building the National Parks: Historic Landscape Design and 
Construction (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Richard West 
Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1997). Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, 4th Edition (New 
York: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2010) is considered the canonical work on the National 
Park Service. For the controversy over urban parks, see Ronald Foresta, America’s 
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After many years of neglect, Jamaica Bay itself is now starting to receive serious 
attention by scholars. Sociologist Kristen Van Hooreweghe’s work is the most recent, 
taking a primarily ethnographic approach to studying the bay’s communities and their 
relationship to its spaces. Prior to Van Hooreweghe’s, the most comprehensive work 
done on the bay dated from 1981: historian Frederick Black’s Jamaica Bay: A History. 
Although New York City’s environmental history has been a burgeoning field, the most 
recent environmental history of New York City, Matthew Gandy’s Concrete and Clay, 
fails to consider Jamaica Bay at all. The history of Jamaica Bay is an important part of 
New York City’s overall history because it sheds light on conflicts over nature in the 
city’s relatively unexamined borderlands. As climate change threatens New York City in 
new ways and precipitates events such as 2012’s Hurricane Sandy, understanding the 
complexity of the relationship between nature and the city throughout New York’s 
history will be particularly valuable.16 
Each chapter of this dissertation will focus on a key conception of the bay’s 
space during its history, considering how it was created, how it was challenged, its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
National Parks and Their Keepers (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1984). 
Hal Rothman, The New Urban Park: Golden Gate National Recreation Area and Civic 
Environmentalism (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007) is one of the few 
major administrative histories of an urban national park. 16 William Kornblum and Kristen Van Hooreweghe, Jamaica Bay Ethnographic 
Overview and Assessment (Boston, MA: National Park Service Northeast Region 
Ethnography Program, 2010), 
http://macaulay.cuny.edu/eportfolios/adams2013/files/2013/08/Complete-NPS-
report.pdf; Frederick Black, Jamaica Bay: A History (Washington, DC: Department of 
the Interior, 1981); Matthew Gandy, Concrete and Clay: Reworking Nature in New York 
City (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible is an example of a 
work that considers urban borders in new ways, going beyond traditional depictions of 
suburbanization.!
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implications for the bay’s development, and how it attempted to reconcile the 
relationship between city and nature. Chapter one, “A Picturesque Venice,” begins in 
1880, when the building of a railroad trestle across the bay made access to its interior 
spaces and shoreline easier than ever before. The trestle allowed a resort area focused 
on recreational activities such as fishing and boating and a limited amount of residential 
use to develop. People from every walk of life used these spaces, from rich to poor. 
Houses and hotels on pilings driven into the marsh along the trestle captured the 
imagination of New Yorkers: the conception of the bay as “Venice” was appropriated by 
residents, serving as a creative way to reconcile the liminality of the bay’s settlements—
being between city and nature, land and water. This era lasted until the early 1920s, 
when pollution led officials to issue dire warnings about the bay’s safety, but the idea of 
Venice would persist as a key understanding of the relationship between city and nature 
in the bay. 
Chapter two, “The Wonder Harbor of the World,” highlights the most important 
early challenges to the conception of the bay as Venice. With the addition of Brooklyn 
and the Long Island towns now comprising Queens to New York City in 1898, powerful 
officials eager to profit from these acquisitions gained jurisdiction over the bay. City 
Comptroller Edward Grout put forth a plan to develop the bay into a commercial and 
industrial port in 1905. Officials and businessmen assiduously worked over the next 
three decades to bring about Grout’s vision, but these efforts largely failed. Coupled with 
the representation of the bay’s future as a port was an imagining of the existing space 
as a wasteland: a set of resources just waiting to be exploited; conceiving of the bay in 
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this fashion served to delegitimize the space’s existing users, depicting their activities as 
wasting the bay’s potential. 
Chapter three, An “Expanse of Forbidden Water Dotted with Dreary Marshes and 
Lonely Islands,” highlights the emergence of the conception of the bay as polluted. With 
officials issuing dire warnings about the bay after 1920, the use of its spaces 
significantly changed: illicit drinking replaced fishing as the most prominent recreational 
activity. The settlements would also change, becoming more residential as individuals 
stricken by the Great Depression took advantage of the bay’s cheap rents. These 
developments gave the conception of pollution a moral resonance: officials and 
contemporary observers conflated the bay’s people with its insalubriousness and seedy 
reputation, imagining them as depraved and irresponsible individuals. 
Chapter four highlights the actions of the powerful New York City official Robert 
Moses in Jamaica Bay. Though polluted and damaged, the bay was still considered by 
Moses to be “a strange corner of primitive romance”; this conception once more 
imagined the bay as a wasteland that could be exploited, but in a different way than 
before. The bay was polluted with sewage and squalor, but Moses argued that it could 
be reclaimed from its fallen state—its waters treated, its residents removed. The largest 
remaining community, Broad Channel, fiercely resisted these associations, beginning a 
multi-decade legal battle with the City. Moses set the stage for the final administrative 
regime controlling the bay: that of the National Park Service. 
Chapters five and six detail the creation and administration of Gateway National 
Recreation Area. Conservationists, who imagined the bay as “an ecological Fort Knox,” 
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sought to preserve nature within the spaces of Jamaica Bay by including it in Gateway, 
eliminating its residential communities, and limiting recreational activities. Broad 
Channel resisted and survived, forcing Park Service planners to conceive of the bay as 
not merely nature or city, but as both; its spaces would become a model for how to deal 
with “The Leavings of a Throw Away Society”—a metaphor that powerfully captured the 
unique history of Jamaica Bay and the multitude of changes it has been subject to 
throughout its history. 
The dissertation concludes by highlighting the impact of 2012’s Hurricane Sandy 
on Jamaica Bay. Causing massive damage, Sandy has prompted a reexamination of 
the relationship between New York City and nature. The history of Gateway National 
Recreation Area and communities like Broad Channel suggest that familiar cultural 
forms can often obscure the complex relationships between cities and the natural world. 
Thinking in unconventional ways, being able to transcend simple binaries like city and 
nature, will be crucial in an era of climate change. 
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Chapter One 
“A Picturesque Venice”: Recreational and Residential 
Development, 1880-1920 
 
 Before 1880, Jamaica Bay was used by few save for fishers and farmers. That 
year, the completion of a railroad trestle across its waters opened its spaces to New 
York City’s masses, beginning the bay’s integration into the larger fabric of the City. 
Over the next four decades, thousands of New Yorkers from every walk of life took 
advantage of a series of fishing stations built by entrepreneurs along the trestle and the 
bay’s shore—settlements that possessed amenities such as summer homes, hotels, 
and boat rentals. When recreational fishers perceived a decline in their catch in the late 
1880s, conservationists urged the New York State Legislature to restrict the actions of 
commercial fishers, initiating a short but intense battle over the bay’s future. The 
conservationists succeeded, securing Jamaica Bay as a site of public recreation. 
 As the bay grew into a popular resort, officials and developers attempted to 
harness its spaces for profit. In 1892, the Town Supervisor of Jamaica, Long Island, 
F.W. Dunton, began a scheme to gain possession of the bay’s interior in order to 
develop it for various purposes. Six years later, the consolidation of New York City 
brought new attention to the bay from officials such as City Comptroller Edward Grout. 
Grout argued that the bay was an ideal site for a commercial and industrial port, though 
he did not rule out recreational and residential use as adjuncts. These ambitions led 
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Dunton into conflict with the City, initiating yet another battle over the bay’s future. The 
City won, resulting in the transfer of the administration of the bay to the City’s 
Department of Docks and Ferries. 
 A key aspect of these conflicts was the creation of competing conceptions of 
Jamaica Bay’s space. Dunton conceived of the bay as becoming a “Venice”: the use of 
the European city as a metaphor reflected his ambition to impose a grand suburban 
form upon the bay’s islands. The City’s plans conceived of Jamaica Bay as an urban 
space dedicated primarily to commerce and industry. Both parties declared the existing 
bay to be a vacant wasteland in order to facilitate their plans, yet recreational use 
continued. 
As Dunton and the City faced off, the concept of the bay as Venice took on a life 
of its own among Jamaica Bay’s residents. As opposed to being something imposed 
upon the bay, this conception was an attempt to reconcile the ambiguities of the space’s 
existing form. The communities along the railroad trestle, built on piles driven into the 
marsh, had urban characteristics, yet were within a space of nature: describing them as 
a Venice captured the space’s liminality, being between city and nature, water and 
shore. 
 
Work vs. Play: To 1905 
Before 1880, Jamaica Bay was primarily a place of work. Farmers cut hay in its 
meadows, and local fishers caught finfish and gathered shellfish. Commercial oyster 
farming began in 1868, when the State of New York granted one of the Long Island 
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towns abutting the bay, Flatlands (in what would become Brooklyn), authority to lease 
underwater plots to oyster farmers. Similar authority was granted to Jamaica (in what 
would become Queens) and Hempstead (in what would become Nassau County) in 
1871. By 1885, the New York State Commissioner of Fisheries reported that Jamaica 
Bay’s oyster farms were the best in the state due to the space’s unique ecology that 
allowed for the rapid growth and maturation of oysters. The local variety, known as 
“Rockaways,” were particularly prized for their “exceedingly fine flavor.”1 By 1917, one 
report estimated that they bay’s oyster industry employed 1,500 individuals and that 
close to one million bushels of the mollusks were harvested per year; with each bushel 
worth five dollars, the five million dollar yield made Jamaica Bay’s oyster industry the 
third most valuable in the nation.2 Canarsie was the oyster farmers’ base of operations, 
helping to explain its status in 1880 as the largest settlement on the bay’s shore.3 
Jamaica Bay’s remoteness and easy access to the ocean led to the development 
of a small processing industry. In the decades after the Civil War, entrepreneurs opened 
a number of factories on Barren Island in the bay’s southwest: by 1880, three fish oil 
and four fertilizer works were in operation. The majority of the fish the factories 
processed came from the Atlantic Ocean, yet a small but significant amount came from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Eugene Blackford, Report of the Commissioner of Fisheries of the State of New York 
in Charge of the Oyster Investigation (Albany, NY: The Argus Company Printers, 1885), 
26–28. 2 New York City Bureau of Public Improvements, Report on the Main Drainage and 
Sewage Disposal of the Area Tributary to Jamaica Bay (New York: SL Parsons and 
Company, 1917), 14–15; “Death in Jamaica Bay: Clam Bootleggers Peddle Typhoid,” 
Long Island Daily Press, November 14, 1954. 3  Frederick Black, Jamaica Bay: A History (Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, 
1981), 19–24, 43–45. 
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Jamaica Bay itself—constituting the majority of the commercial finishing in the bay. 
When the menhaden fishery collapsed in the 1890s, eliminating the factories’ chief 
source of raw materials, Barren Island’s industrialists switched to the processing of 
dead animals and other urban refuse.4 As Brooklyn and Queens grew, noxious smells 
and emanations from the island’s factories began to produce complaints from residents 
and sanitarians, culminating in a failed effort by the New York State Legislature to shut 
down the industry in 1900.5 
Barren Island’s odious industries and the class and race of its inhabitants 
became conflated in the minds of New Yorkers, creating a conception of its space as 
being polluted—morally and physically. The connotations of the word “barren” added to 
this understanding: the word denotes sterility and unproductiveness when applied to 
landscapes and mental dullness when applied to people.6 A 1904 Brooklyn Eagle article 
begins by noting how “Barren Island has a queer interest of its own for the Brooklynite.” 
It describes the island’s 1400 inhabitants—the workers and their families—as being 
primarily ”Germans, Italians, negroes and Polacks”; however, it reports with surprise 
that “there may be truth in the remark of a native, ‘Barren Island is not so bad as people 
think she is.’”7 A similar article from 1912 flippantly reports how Barren Island was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4 Ibid., 25–33. 5 “The Barren Island Nuisance,” New York Times, October 19, 1890; “Barren Island Bill 
Vetoed by Van Wyck,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, March 29, 1900. 6 Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “Barren,” http://www.oed.com. 7 “Horse Factories,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, December 1904. 
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apparently “not an ‘abode of ‘terrors,’” implying that most New Yorkers considered its 
inhabitants to be lawless ruffians.8 
In spite of the smells, Barren Island’s industrial development did not impede the 
recreational development of Jamaica Bay. In 1865, the Brooklyn and Rockaway Beach 
Railroad constructed a railway line to the bay’s shore at Canarsie, connecting with 
steam ferries that transported passengers to the Rockaway peninsula—which was 
becoming a popular recreational destination. With the increased traffic, Canarsie grew 
from a quiet fishing and farming village to a small resort itself by 1881. That year, at 
least forty yachts and fifty rowboats were available for hire. Hotels and the opportunity to 
bathe in the calm waters of Jamaica Bay offered additional inducements for visitors to 
skip the trip to the more-distant Rockaways.9 The eastern part of the bay was also home 
to a small resort centered on a hotel at a site called Idlewild—the current location of 
Kennedy Airport.10 
 The biggest boost to Jamaica Bay’s recreational development came in 1880, 
when the New York, Woodhaven, and Rockaway Railroad built a railroad trestle across 
the bay from Glendale Junction to Hammels on the Rockaways in order to draw 
passengers away from the less direct train-to-ferry route.11 Though it was originally 
intended to bypass the bay, the railroad trestle also granted access to the bay’s interior 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8 “Barren Island Not ‘Abode of Terrors,’” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, November 3, 1912. 9 William Fausser, “The Brooklyn and Rockaway Beach Railroad” (unpublished 
manuscript with no pagination, Archive at Queens Library, Queens Public Library, 
Central Branch, Jamaica, NY, 1976). 10 “Roar of Planes May Revive Idlewood, Society’s Orphan,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 
September 9, 1941.  11 Fausser, “Railroad.” 
!! 23!
in a way that had never been possible save for boats.  By 1891, entrepreneurs had 
constructed four fishing stations along the trestle, built on pilings driven into marshes 
within the bay at Broad Channel, The Raunt, Goose Creek, and Beach Channel.12 
Although they started out as crude structures, they eventually included hotels and 
residences. That year, the New York Times noted that thousands of recreational fishers 
traveled to Jamaica Bay, conceiving of it as a “popular resort” due to its amenities and 
the natural features such as the “peculiar formation of sand bars, drains, and small 
channels” that aided recreational fishing.13 
With Jamaica Bay becoming a major resort destination, Robert Roosevelt—a 
former state fish commissioner and uncle of Theodore Roosevelt—and other 
conservationists began to believe that the health of the bay’s fish stock was 
approaching a point of crisis after noticing that their fishing expeditions had become less 
successful in the late 1880s.14 In the first of many instances, conservationists painted 
working class users of the bay as improper stewards of its spaces: rather than blame 
the explosion in recreational fishing, they instead pointed the finger at the bay’s 
commercial net fishermen, whom they believed to be monopolizing the catch. To 
combat the perceived overfishing, New York State Senator Charles Stadler prepared 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12!These names come from the bay’s geographic features as they were understood by 
locals. 13 “Where to Go A-Fishing: A Directory Likely to Be of Service to Anglers,” New York 
Times, June 21, 1891. 14 Biographical Dictionary of the United States Congress, s.v. “Roosevelt, Robert 
Barnwell (1829-1906),” 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=R000428.  
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what came to be an eponymous bill outlawing net fishing in the bay in early 1890. The 
first legislative hearings were held on March 11, 1890.15 
Class tensions suffused public discourse over the Stadler Bill. Supporters of the 
bill starkly juxtaposed commercial and recreational fishers and their supporting interests: 
to them, on the one side was a tiny group of approximately nine fishers, able to 
devastate the bay’s entire fishery with their nets due to its peculiar topography—the 
shallow channels being perfect traps for fish; on the other, thousands of men of 
moderate means in need of recreation and food. They pointed out that the net fishers 
were averaging less than a dollar a day in profits—a “miserable business”—and that the 
only persons benefitting from their activity were the operators of Barren Island’s fertilizer 
factories, who bought the catch. Opponents of the bill argued that it was being 
advanced at the behest of wealthy recreational fishers who wanted to take away the 
livelihood of the humble net fishers. The supporters quickly won out, with the bill being 
signed by Governor David Hill on June 7, 1890.16 
The state’s intervention destroyed the possibility of Jamaica Bay being a place of 
work for commercial fin fishing.17 In spite of the Stadler Bill, Barren Island’s industry 
persisted, although it remained an aberration in a bay that was increasingly becoming a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15 “Anglers Go to Albany,” New York Times, March 11, 1890. For more on the conflict 
between commercial and recreational fishing in instances like the Stadler Bill, see 
Elizabeth Pillsbury, “An American Bouillabaisse: The Ecology, Politics, and Economics 
of Fishing Around New York City, 1870-Present” (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 
2009). 16 "Anglers Go to Albany"; Henry Stanley, “It Is Not Class Legislation,” New York Times, 
May 18, 1890; “Jamaica Bay for Anglers,” New York Times, June 8, 1890. 17!Some commercial fishers continued to use Jamaica Bay as a base of operations for 
trips to the Atlantic, but commercial hook-and-line fin fishing never supplanted 
commercial net fishing: Black, Jamaica Bay, 61-62. 
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recreational destination for New Yorkers. The shellfish industry also continued, but did 
not interfere with recreational fishing, actually bolstering its development through oyster 
farmers providing services to recreational fishers to supplement their incomes. 
Additionally, enjoying fresh shellfish added to the pleasure of an outing at places such 
as Canarsie: local historian William Fausser notes that visitors were “very partial to the 
Jamaica Bay clams” they “consumed in large quantities along with copious amounts of 
lager beer.”18 One year after the Stadler Bill was passed, the New York Times noted 
that the fish were “increasing rapidly” in Jamaica Bay, a development that “has done 
much to better the fishing for the hook-and-line men.”19  
The Stadler Bill reinforced the developing conception of Jamaica Bay as a 
recreational space. Supporters would say that the bill had made Jamaica Bay into a 
“fish park,” a metaphor they had used in describing the bill’s potential benefits: it implies 
a managed, public space of nature, akin to a game preserve.20 It is likely that if the 
commercial net fishing continued, the bay would have become associated with Barren 
Island, creating a conception of the bay as polluted and spoiled, devoid of fish and 
dominated by unsavory types. 
With recreational fishing secured, development supporting this activity continued 
along the bay’s shores. Two years after the Stadler Bill was passed a real estate 
company began developing a resort on the western shore of the bay between Barren 
Island and Canarsie at Bergen Island—a peninsula of land north of Mill Island (presently 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!18 Fausser, “Railroad.” 19 “Where to Go A-Fishing.” 20 “Anglers Go to Albany.” 
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Mill Basin). By 1905, visitors to what had become known as Bergen Beach could enjoy 
commercial bathing, boat liveries, a casino, and a theater. Canarsie possessed similar 
amenities, including Boegel's Oriental Bar and Dance Hall, a casino, fourteen hotels, 
and recreational fishing.21 Additionally, in 1895 and 1896, the City of Brooklyn 
purchased land for a small park at Canarsie, known as Canarsie Beach Park.22 
Development of the bay’s interior would prove far more controversial. To 
developers, the communities that had grown along the trestle must have offered 
tantalizing glimpses of the possibilities offered by the bay’s marshy islands and 
hummocks. Over the next decade, businesspersons moved as quickly as they could to 
exploit these lands, yet would be challenged by the existing residents and officials eager 
to take advantage of New York City’s new acquisitions. 
 
Residential Development: To 1905 
 The consolidation of New York City in 1898, which created the boroughs of 
Brooklyn and Queens out of the former City of Brooklyn and other Long Island 
municipalities, brought Jamaica Bay under the control of zealously development-
oriented officials. Standing in their way were private developers who had been given 
control of Jamaica Bay’s lands by former Long Island towns six years earlier. Individuals 
such as Frederick W. Dunton, businessman and former President of the Town Board of 
Jamaica, sought to transform the bay into a space of private recreational and residential !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21 Black, Jamaica Bay, 38, 47. 22 “Jamaica Bay and the Rockaways Highlights: Canarsie Park, New York City Parks,” 
New York City Department of Parks, http://www.nycgovparks.org/parks/jamaica-bay-
and-the-rockaways/highlights/148. 
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developments serving an exclusive clientele. Both the City and the bay’s insular 
residents would challenge Dunton’s vision of a grand residential “Venice.” 
The leases to oyster farmers were only the beginning of attempts by Long Island 
towns to exploit Jamaica Bay. Although the underwater lands belonged to New York 
State, the bay’s marshes and islands belonged to the towns. Reclamation was a 
particularly attractive project to towns because it allowed the creation of valuable 
developments on lands that were hitherto of little worth. Prior to consolidation, Flatlands 
had sold off twenty-four lots on an island known as Ruffle Bar to private parties. 
Jamaica, in what would become Queens, sold the entirety of its bay lands. The first 
major sale occurred in 1877 with a thirty-foot right of way for the railroad trestle, 
extended to 150 feet in 1880. The remainder was sold in 1892 under suspicious 
circumstances. Dunton arranged a fifty-year lease of the bay’s lands to business 
associate Alonzo E. Smith. Eventually, the lands were transferred directly to companies 
controlled by Dunton. He justified his actions in an 1896 interview with the Brooklyn 
Daily Eagle by noting that the arrangements were carried out with the intention of 
“securing… a larger income to the town of Jamaica.”23 
Dunton publicized his intentions for Jamaica Bay in 1896, proposing the 
development of a variety of sites in and around the bay. The lynchpin of the proposals 
was a shore-to-shore turnpike complete with roadway, bike path, and trolley line, 
providing significantly greater ease of access to the bay’s interior and the Rockaway 
Peninsula from Brooklyn. To build the road, a company was created in 1897, headed by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!23 Black, Jamaica Bay, 56–57; “A New Venice in Jamaica Bay,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 
April 26, 1896. 
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developer P.H. Flynn. Dunton organized a variety of other companies to handle the 
developments: first the United States Land and Improvement Company, which received 
the lands leased to Smith in 1893, then the Co-operative Society of New York and New 
Jersey.24 
 For the northern shore, the plans called for the building of a “summer city” at Old 
Mill Creek near modern-day Howard Beach. At the time, the site—located near the 
northern terminus of the turnpike project—was sparsely populated. Dunton directly 
contrasted his development with Canarsie: instead of working class amusements, the 
resort was to consist of cottages, hotels, and boating facilities in a picturesque setting, 
expanding an existing cluster of vacation homes owned by prominent men such as the 
President of the Bank of the Metropolis Theodore Rogers and County Clerk John H. 
Sutphin.25 
Dunton had grander ideas for the bay’s interior. The scheme called for the central 
islands to be filled in and connected, then improved with standard urban features like 
“flagged sidewalks, curbed streets, loamed, graveled and shaded by trees, as well as 
parks and playgrounds,” in addition to a “water and lighting system.” Upon the islands 
would be erected residences, and grants were to be made to developers to construct 
hotels that met with the company’s “idea of high class property.” The development was 
to be made private, with “but one carriage entrance from the mainland for the whole 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!24 “Road Across Jamaica Bay: This Enterprise Is Contemplated,” New York Times, 
November 13, 1897; “City Comes into the Case,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, November 15, 
1901. 25 “City on Jamaica Bay: Attractive Plans for a Big Summer Resort,” New York Times, 
March 15, 1896. 
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system of islands,” with a “gate keeper” to collect tolls and restrict “disorderly persons.” 
Reflecting the project’s lofty aspirations, Broad Channel was to be renamed Monarch 
Island.26 
Dunton also sought to develop industry in the bay. In 1901, in collaboration with 
other investors, he incorporated a company called the Industrial Federation of America. 
The Federation sought investors for a scheme to establish “woolen, cotton, and textile 
mills of all kinds” as well as associated industries and residential developments on 
Jamaica Bay marshlands—presumably those held by Dunton’s other companies. They 
were to sell stock at fifty dollars per share, with future rental income on the new lands 
promising a “handsome return.”27 
Dunton’s schemes offered a very different conception of Jamaica Bay than the 
existing idea of it being a “fish park,” in essence calling for transforming it into urban and 
suburban spaces linked to the larger fabric of New York City. It possessed recreational 
facilities, but was also heavily residential and even industrial in places. As opposed to a 
public space, it was to be mostly private and exclusive. Urban metaphors dominated, as 
seen with the “summer city” and island development. It is with these schemes that the 
idea of the bay as Venice first emerged: a reporter described them as creating a 
“veritable Venice by the sea.” As seen by Dunton’s plans for Monarch Island, this was 
meant quite literally: the space was to have the character and features of a suburban 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!26 “A New Venice in Jamaica Bay.” 27 “To Reclaim Jamaica Bay,” New York Times, March 14, 1901.  
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neighborhood, albeit a slightly unusual one due to being built on islands like the 
European city.28 
The creation of this new space hinged upon the destruction of the existing 
space—both literally and metaphorically. The articles reporting Dunton’s plans, while 
presenting representations of the future space, imagined the existing space using terms 
like “barren,” “useless,” “worthless,” and “waste meadows.” 29 They downplayed the 
bay’s current use, noting that “even in its present crude condition the bay is visited by 
thousands, but after the reclamation of these islands its attractions will be vastly 
enhanced,” revealing Dunton’s desire to exploit the bay’s resources.30 For those living 
and working at the fishing stations, this conception was far from that which must have 
emerged from their experience: the bay provided their livelihoods, being far from 
useless. It was a space filled with fish and other forms of life, the opposite of barren. As 
groundless as it may have been, in the future, the conception of Jamaica Bay as a 
“wasteland” would nonetheless become an important device for those who sought to 
radically transform the bay. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!28 “A New Venice in Jamaica Bay.” Historians’ thinking about suburbs has been 
dominated by Kenneth Jackson’s seminal work Crabgrass Frontier: The 
Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
Although Jackson’s definition of suburbia as a place where “affluent and middle-class 
Americans live… that are far from their work places, in homes that they own, and in the 
center of yards that by urban standards elsewhere are enormous” continues to remain 
influential, historians like Christopher Sellers have complicated this picture significantly. 
Working class Americans brought different meanings to suburban space, particularly in 
regards to the way nature was used: see Christopher Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: 
Suburban Nature and the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth Century America 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012). 29 “A New Venice in Jamaica Bay”; “City on Jamaica Bay”; “To Reclaim Jamaica Bay.” 30 “A New Venice in Jamaica Bay.” 
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When Dunton began legal maneuvers to secure Jamaica Bay for his schemes, a 
complex battle ensued among his companies, the residents of Jamaica Bay, the City of 
New York, and the railroads. On February 21, 1901, lawyer Rawdon Kellogg, 
representing Dunton, served eviction notices to over one hundred “fishermen, hotel 
keepers and others residing on the islands and meadows of Jamaica.” The residents 
were described as having “erected large boat houses, hotels” and “other extensive 
improvements of considerable value.” Many of them made “a good living for themselves 
and families at fishing and letting out boats to visitors,” reflecting the continuing growth 
and development of the bay’s interior.31 
In the first instance of many over the twentieth century, Jamaica Bay’s residents 
resisted the attempt to remove them from their island homes. On June 5, 1901, lawyers 
representing Theodore Wenk—a wire manufacturer who owned a summer home in 
Broad Channel—convinced a judge to halt the dispossession proceedings.32 Though 
Wenk was a part-time resident, the other residents of the bay had a clear interest in the 
success of his actions. Wenk’s lawyers argued that Dunton’s actions were illegal 
because his company’s leases were invalid: leases were supposed to be made in a 
competitive bidding process, yet Dunton was accused of failing to properly publicize the 
proceedings in order to ensure that few or no competing bids were received. The judge, 
William J. Gaynor—a man who would eventually become the City’s mayor—put the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31 “Suits Brought to Eject Hundreds from Homes,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, April 2, 1901. 32 George Upington, Upington’s General Directory of Brooklyn, New York City, for the 
Year Ending May 1st 1902 (Brooklyn, NY: George Upington, 1902), 971. 
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burden of proof on Dunton, demanding he show cause for his actions. Wenk’s lawyers 
subsequently filed suit to invalidate the leases.33 
With the future of Jamaica Bay in the balance, officials of the City of New York 
had a vested interest in the success of Wenk’s suit. If it failed, the majority of Jamaica 
Bay would be developed according to Dunton’s wishes, greatly restricting the future 
possibilities for the City to utilize the space. Considering these facts, five months later, 
the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York became involved with the litigation, 
joining Wenk’s legal team in the action to invalidate the leases.34 
Suits against turnpike developer Flynn occurred contemporaneously. Two years 
earlier, in 1899, William Kelly, a lawyer who also represented the Long Island Railroad, 
took legal action against Flynn on behalf of Jamaica Bay property owners. Kelly claimed 
that the project would destroy the eastern half of the bay, arguing that the turnpike 
would disrupt the bay’s currents and destroy shore property; it is likely that this 
knowledge emerged from the residents’ experiences living and working in the bay.35 The 
matter was not resolved until December 1902, when the New York Court of Appeals 
ruled Flynn’s actions to have been legal. Moreover, the court considered the suit to have 
been brought solely for the purpose of ensuring that the Long Island Railroad’s Jamaica 
Bay line would have no competition.36 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!33 “Suit to Set Aside Jamaica Bay Leases,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, June 5, 1901. 34 “City Comes into the Case.” 35 “Want to Enjoin Mr. Flynn,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 24, 1899. 36 “Road May Now Be Built Across Jamaica Bay,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, December 22, 
1902. 
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Flynn’s victory was temporary, for the proceedings against Dunton succeeded, 
opening the door for the City to undertake similar action against Flynn. Although lower 
courts ruled against Wenk, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the decision, 
handing down a ruling to set aside the lease of the lands made to Smith in June of 
1902. They ruled that Dunton had acted in collusion with Smith, and that the Town 
Board of Jamaica had lacked the authority to make the lease.37 Corporation Counsel 
George Rives would then sue for control of the remaining lands leased by the Town of 
Jamaica for speculative interests. By 1905, all of the contested leases had been 
captured by the City.38 The people of Jamaica Bay had won, their conception of a 
publically oriented recreational space allowed to continue, yet their allies would soon 
have other ideas. 
With the City’s possession of Jamaica Bay ensured, observers feverishly 
speculated as to its potential. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle declared on the eve of the City’s 
victory that the bay’s lands would “become immensely valuable for wharves and piers 
for business purposes and for pleasure resorts.” The bay also offered “the finest territory 
for a seashore and lake and island park system of any city in the world.”39 Within two 
years, New York City Comptroller Edward Grout would call for the creation of a massive 
commercial and industrial port in Jamaica Bay: a development that would soon 
overshadow all other uses. The conception of Jamaica Bay as a publically oriented !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!37 “Lease Set Aside,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, June 28, 1902. 38 “Jamaica Bay Leases Revert to the City,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, March 21, 1903; New 
York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Thirty-Fourth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1905), 144–149. 39 “Jamaica Bay Leases Revert to the City.”  
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recreational space would nonetheless continue to fascinate New Yorkers in the years to 
come—even as its commercial potential began to be realized. 
 
The Venice of New York 
Dunton’s scheme failed, yet the metaphor of Venice remained in use, albeit 
becoming something altogether different from the exclusive home and hotel-studded 
Monarch Island that echoed the baroque grandeur of Italy. Starting in the first decade of 
the twentieth century, the residents of Jamaica Bay adopted the idea of Venice to 
imagine the bay as it was, although the exact extent of the metaphor’s use cannot be 
ascertained.40 As opposed to an abstraction imposed from without, this conception of 
Venice was an organic development grounded in knowledge gained from the use of 
bay, serving to better define its space outside of the urban/nature binary—which failed 
to adequately capture its essence. It would be understood as a hybrid space, defined by 
its liminality—between nature and city, land and water. 
Jamaica Bay’s Venice encompassed five separate communities in 1905, all 
along the trestle: Ramblersville and Howard Station (also known as Howard’s Landing) 
on the North shore, and Broad Channel, Goose Creek, and The Raunt in the bay. A 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!40 Usage of the term in this particular way first appears in newspaper articles covering 
the bay’s development into a resort: “The Venice of Long Island,” Scientific American, 
May 17, 1902; “Like a Venice on Stilts,” The New York Sun, April 26, 1903; “New York 
Has a Picturesque Venice All Her Own,” New York Tribune, August 2, 1903; “Here Is a 
Little Venice at the Door of Brooklyn,” Unknown Periodical, June 9, 1905, Folder: 
Jamaica Bay Settlements, Vertical Files, Archive at Queens Library, Queens Public 
Library, Central Branch. 
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sixth, Beach Channel, was destroyed in a 1903 fire.41 All of the settlements comprising 
this “Venice” would share distinctive physical features: their most striking attribute was 
that they were “villages on stilts… built on piles and trestles” driven into the marshy 
islands completely submerged at high tide. Most of the buildings were constructed by 
the residents themselves. Instead of streets, “board walks or floats” formed the 
thoroughfares, and boats took the place of cars. 42 A photograph from the era (figure 3) 
refers to a boat as a “gondola,” demonstrating the tenacity and logic of the metaphor. 
 
Figure 3. At Broad Channel—The “Gondola” at the Door. Photograph, 1915. The 
George Grantham Bain Collection. Reproduced from The Library of Congress, 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/90706208/. 
 
Though each site shared similar features, each offered different services. Where 
Ramblersbille was mainly home to fishers, Goose Creek (figure 4) was the place to go 
to simply rent a boat. The Raunt (figure 5) was home to fishing and hunting clubs. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!41 “Here Is a Little Venice at the Door of Brooklyn”; Black, Jamaica Bay, 59. 42 “Here Is a Little Venice at the Door of Brooklyn.” 
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Howard’s Landing had the largest hotel, and Broad Channel and Beach Channel both 
had a wide range of services and accomodations available for fishers.43 
 
Figure 4. Goose Creek, Houses on the Water, Jamaica Bay, NY. Photograph, ca. 1915. 
The George Grantham Bain Collection. Reproduced from The Library of Congress, 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/ggb2004001989/. 
 
 
Figure 5. The Raunt, On the Water. Photograph, ca. 1915. The George Grantham Bain 
Collection. Reproduced from The Library of Congress, 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/ggb2004001988/. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!43 “New York Has a Picturesque Venice All Her Own.” 
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Special attention was paid the residents of this Venice, who were described with 
a mixture of bewilderment and curiosity yet at the same time a certain admiration. One 
article describes them as people who “spend much of their time out in the bay.” They 
are described as “pioneers,” which would make sense considering the spontaneous 
nature of the bay’s settlement. Being right on the water enabled them to “sit comfortably 
on their front porches, fishline in hand, and pull their dinners from the water into the 
fryingpan,” highlighting the supposed ease in which the residents eked a living out of the 
bay.44 The experience of fishing from one’s house may seem somewhat fantastical, but 
photographic evidence (figure 6) shows otherwise. Although the photo was likely 
staged, the activity depicted was nonetheless entirely possible. 
 
Figure 6. At Broad Channel—Fishing at your Front Door. Photograph, ca. 1915. The 
George Grantham Bain Collection. Reproduced from The Library of Congress, 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/ggb2005019846/. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!44 “Here Is a Little Venice at the Door of Brooklyn.” 
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 Although most articles on Jamaica Bay’s Venice depict the space positively, 
there is at least one exception. A 1904 account of a yachting outing to the bay in Forest 
and Stream magazine begins with the author, George E. Crater Jr., meeting at a yacht 
club on the bay’s shore on July fourth to make arrangements for the upcoming trip. After 
securing a pilot for his yacht, the Americus, he and his friend were left with some free 
time. Apart from “the usual refreshment and cigars,” he engaged in a bit of what he 
described as “slumming” and watching people “who seemed to find amusement in 
sitting at tables and eating all sorts of horrors, and drinking the queerest mixtures,” 
showing the precariousness of the space’s respectability and potential for class-based 
criticism.45 
 In spite of its romanticism, the metaphor of Jamaica Bay as Venice reflected the 
power of experience in shaping conceptions of space. As opposed to Dunton, who 
conceived of the bay as a resource to exploit through urbanization, the Venice of the 
bay’s residents attempted to reconcile a space that did not fit well within existing 
metaphors. As the City Department of Docks and Ferries took control of the bay in 1904 
and began to develop it both into a port and a residential resort, the era of Venice would 
gradually fade, but the idea of the bay’s communities as being hybrid spaces of city and 
nature remained well into the twentieth century, forming a key part of their identities.46 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45 George E. Crater, “A Long Island Cruise: A Power Boat Trip from Jamaica Bay to 
Peconic Bay,” Forest and Stream, March 26, 1904. 46 Sarah Wilford, “Jamaica Bay Has More Islands Than Venice,” Long Island Daily 
Press, December 20, 1935; Meyer Berger, “About New York: City Has Its Own Venice 
(in Jamaica Bay),” New York Times, December 18, 1957. Donatella Lorch, “Broad 
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Recreational and Residential Development, 1905-1920 
 With the issue of control over the bay’s islands finally settled, the City found itself 
the landlord to the people of New York’s Venice. Even though plans to completely 
remake Jamaica Bay as a port were soon developed by a commission, the difficulty of 
the endeavor meant that the status quo would prevail for the time being. Seeing greater 
opportunity for profit, the City would eventually grant significant portions of the bay to 
private developers, leading to a gradual shift towards a less publically oriented 
residential space more in line with Dunton’s proposals. 
 In a 1905 speech, New York City Comptroller Edward Grout declared his 
intention to turn the bay into a commercial and industrial port.47 With the process to 
secure the port a decades-long affair (detailed in chapter two), officials decided to make 
the most of their new lands in the interim by acting as landlord to the bay’s residents. 
Although their projects had failed, Dunton and Flynn’s actions produced the most 
significant alterations of Jamaica Bay’s topography seen to date. Utilizing modern 
dredges, work on the turnpike project had commenced from 1899 until stopped by the 
legal proceedings in 1901. Meadows were filled in the vicinity of Broad Channel as well 
as on the northern shore of the bay, providing a number of new spaces to rent out.48 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Channel Battles on for Its Identity and Wins,” New York Times, August 23, 1991 is the 
latest instance of the term used in the press I have found. 47 Edward M. Grout, Improvement and Development of Jamaica Bay and the Water 
Front of the City of New York Other than that of Manhattan Island : Being a 
Communication Addressed to the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of the City of 
New York (New York: Martin B. Brown Press, 1905). 48 Black, Jamaica Bay, 74. 
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 The City’s involvement with the bay increased over time. The duty of 
administering the space was given to its Department of Docks and Ferries. Surveying 
the lands the City had acquired was an important component of the Department’s 
activities, giving it greater knowledge of the potentials and pitfalls of its spaces: this 
process began in 1906. The first leases were granted that year, with 250 permits for 
occupation issued.49 
In 1910, the communities in the bay remained strongly oriented towards 
recreation. That year 435 lots in the bay were under lease, with 343 at Broad Channel, 
sixty five at the Raunt, twenty at Goose Creek, and the remainder on smaller creeks, 
marshes, and meadows. Rents ranged from ten dollars per year to more than one 
hundred dollars, with most falling between thirty and forty dollars. The rent rolls list 
thirty-one clubs, with organizations ranging from gun clubs to fishing and yachting 
clubs.50 Census data reveals 239 people living in these communities year-round, many 
in families. The majority of residents worked as commercial fishers, for the railroad, and 
in the local recreation industry as bartenders, servants, hotel proprietors, and fishing 
guides.51 
The shore of Jamaica Bay would continue to see recreational development at 
sites old and new. In 1907, a Coney Island-like amusement park named “Golden City” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!49 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Thirty-Fifth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1906), 235. 50 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Thirty-Ninth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries of the City of New York (New York: New York City 
Department of Docks and Ferries, 1910), 143–170. 51 US Census Bureau, 1910 US Census, Queens County, New York, population 
schedule, digital image, http://www.heritagequest.com. 
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opened at Canarsie, bolstering the recreational opportunities of this already popular 
resort. It offered a variety of amusements, from a “Ride Down the Niagara” to a 
“Robinson Crusoe” show. An article from that year noted that “a little village of hotels 
and restaurants has already sprung up to meet the demands of the expected visitors” 
and that “yachts and rowboats seemed to be doing a good business.”52 In 1912, a 
scenic railroad opened in Bergen Beach, adding to the amusements already there.53  
Sites around the bay saw similar developments. Barren Island would remain an 
aberration during this period, continuing to serve as a site for refuse disposal, though by 
the end of the 1910s the factories started to decline as automobile traffic replaced 
equine transportation.54 A newly developed site was Flatlands Bay, located north of 
Bergen Beach: beginning in 1909, when the Docks Department granted five permits for 
boathouses, the space would gradually develop into a residential resort, with the city 
issuing 244 permits to companies and individuals for bungalows by 1921.55 
Starting in 1915, the Docks Department began granting leases to development 
companies. The first was to a land developer named Pierre Noel, a front man for a 
company known as the Broad Channel Corporation. The City agreed to a ten-year 
lease—with two possible extensions—of most of the bay’s interior. Noel was to pay 
$15,000 per year for the first three years, gradually increasing to $20,000 per year for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!52 “‘Golden City’ Opens to a Great Crowd,” New York Times, May 31, 1907. 53 Black, Jamaica Bay, 38. 54 Ibid., 25–33. 55 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Thirty-Eighth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1909), 176; New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Fiftieth Annual 
Report of the Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department 
of Docks and Ferries, 1921), 81–82. 
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Broad Channel, and $9,000 for Goose Creek and the Raunt. The company took over the 
existing leases but would also develop new lots to rent. This action was likely taken due 
to the greater amount of income that could be wrought from the companies.56 Once 
more, reporters described the project as a “Venice,” although the meaning of this was 
gradually shifting back towards Dunton’s suburban resort—albeit a more modest one.57 
The trend of consolidating leases continued. The City made a similar agreement 
with the lessees of Ruffle Bar—the inhabited island on the Brooklyn side of Jamaica 
Bay—in 1915. Residents formed the Ruffle Bar Association and entered into a ten-year 
lease with the city. In 1916, the City granted a lease to another developer, the Howard 
Estates Development Company; the Company acquired the lands in order to build 
bungalows near the site of the former Howard’s Landing on the north shore, an earlier 
project of the developer that had burned down in 1907.58 
 The Broad Channel Corporation worked hard to impose order upon the islands of 
Jamaica Bay and turn them into a more conventional suburban form. A 1915 memo to 
residents reveals the Broad Channel Corporation’s aim, which was to create a 
permanent community out in the middle of the bay. The memo begins by noting how the 
Corporation was happy that ninety-nine percent of the residents were cooperating with 
the company in making “a well ordered community of good people living in a livable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!56 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Forty-Fourth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1915), 94. 57 “A Loss to City Seen in Lease of Islands,” New York Times, September 18, 1916. 58  Department of Docks and Ferries, Forty-Fourth Annual Report, 94; New York City 
Department of Docks and Ferries, Forty-Fifth Annual Report of the Department of Docks 
and Ferries of the City of New York (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1916), 94; Black, Jamaica Bay, 52. 
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place,” though it chided a small group who had launched a failed attempt to invalidate 
the lease; they noted that “we will still give the disturbers a brief period to become our 
friends like the rest of the good people residing… if our overtures are rejected, they will 
be eliminated.” 59 As they had done before, the fiercely independent residents of the bay 
were resisting change, though this time they would not be successful. 
The Corporation took numerous steps to make Broad Channel a permanent 
community. The company installed a well, streetlights, and started trash pickup. For 
entertainment, they acquired a “moving picture show.” They also resumed filling in the 
marshes, a process begun by Dunton and Flynn. A 1916 letter to tenants noted how the 
company was pumping sand to “an average height of seven feet above low water-
mark.” The letter noted that “this will make a vast improvement in the appearance, 
usefulness and healthfulness of the Island,” permitting roads to be constructed and 
pipes to be laid. All of these steps were making Jamaica Bay’s island communities more 
suburban and ordered, yet eliminating what made them unique.60 
 In 1917, the Corporation continued their project of transforming the island 
communities, asking for the residents’ cooperation. A letter from that year begins by 
calling to mind the “things to be done to our homes to make them cosy [sic] and 
comfortable for the season of 1917. In one case it may be the building of a porch or an 
extension to the house, a coat of paint or repairing the old rain barrel.” The company !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!59 Broad Channel Corporation to Tenants, August 5, 1915, Folder: The Struggle to Buy 
Our Land, Papers of the Broad Channel Historical Society, Queens Public Library, 
Broad Channel Branch, Broad Channel, NY. 60 Ibid.; Broad Channel Corporation to J. Schoeller, Esq., March 13, 1916, Folder: The 
Struggle to Buy Our Land, Papers of the Broad Channel Historical Society, Queens 
Public Library, Broad Channel Branch. 
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noted that they had made great progress on water mains, so that “if you decide no 
longer to be depending on the ‘old rain barrel’ let us hear from you.” 61 With many of the 
houses already existing before the granting of the lease, residents were to be 
responsible for their houses, so persuasion was the best tool of the company in 
furthering their goals. 
 As seen from these memos, the process of changing the communities was slow, 
the residents resistant. In the eyes of the company, eliminating the uneven edges and 
contours of the land, rain barrels, and tenants with independent streaks helped to create 
community, but it was just these features that made Broad Channel distinctive and 
contributed to the conception of it being like Venice. The Venice of the Broad Channel 
Corporation may have been built on islands, but it was a suburban Venice; most 
importantly, it was a conception to be imposed upon the Bay based on an existing 
cultural ideal, not one that developed from use and everyday experiences. 
 
Conclusion 
The changing understandings of Jamaica Bay from 1880 to 1920 reveal the 
importance of the use and regulation in shaping conceptions of space. F.W. Dunton 
may have thought that he could draw up plans to willfully transform the bay, yet as long 
as thousands made use of the space their experiences would be the dominant factor 
determining how it was conceived of. Experience also led the residents of the bay to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!61 Broad Channel Corporation to Tenants, February 15, 1917, Folder: The Struggle to 
Buy Our Land, Papers of the Broad Channel Historical Society, Queens Public Library, 
Broad Channel Branch. 
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metaphor of Venice in order to capture the space’s liminality and reconcile the tension 
between city and nature within it. 
By 1920, Jamaica Bay was still strongly oriented towards recreation, yet the 
actions of developers were taking its spaces in a very different direction, towards a 
permanent residential space. Permanent residents required services, features that 
would slowly make Broad Channel more conventionally suburban. As they became 
more developed, the bay’s communities would slowly lose their distinctiveness, leading 
to different conceptions of their space. The era of New York’s Venice was ending, yet 
the ideal of a public frontier in the City accessible to all—whether entrepreneurs hoping 
to make it in business or a person simply looking to fish or rent a cottage for a 
vacation—would remain an appealing idea and continue to exist in the hearts and minds 
of New Yorkers well into the twentieth century. 
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Chapter Two 
The “Wonder Harbor of the World”: The Jamaica Bay Port 
Scheme, 1905-1938 
 
 With the legal issues surrounding New York City’s claim to Jamaica Bay settled 
by 1905, businesspersons and officials eager to exploit the City’s new acquisitions 
began to develop grandiose plans for the bay’s future. A scheme to transform the bay 
into a commercial and industrial port quickly rose to prominence, overshadowing all 
other proposed uses for the space among City officials. For over three decades the City, 
in conjunction with New York State and federal authorities, stubbornly worked in the 
face of numerous difficulties to make the project a reality. 
 The port scheme ultimately failed. Intergovernmental cooperation proved difficult: 
mistrust between the federal and City governments led to a perpetual shortage of 
funding due to each side constantly demanding assurances and proof from the other 
that they were fully committed to the success of the project. This state of affairs dragged 
the process of physically transforming the bay’s space out over decades, during which 
the initial luster of the project faded and key requirements like transportation 
connections failed to materialize. In 1938, New York City Park Commissioner Robert 
Moses took advantage of the delays to successfully argue for a new direction for the 
bay, officially ending the City’s commitment to building the harbor. 
 Creating the port was as much about creating and altering conceptions of space 
as it was modifying physical expanses. Existing conceptions were negated through 
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imagining the bay as virgin wasteland, editing out the Venice of New York. Boosters and 
City officials contrasted this “wilderness” with created representations of the space as it 
would be, disseminating bird’s eye views of geometric islands and shores dotted with 
wharves, warehouses and factories on maps and artistic depictions of the future harbor. 
Although these plans failed to come to fruition, the limited work done on the project 
resulted in the most dramatic topographical changes that the bay had seen to date. 
 
An Idea Develops, 1905-1910 
 As appealing as Jamaica Bay was to City officials, the process of developing it 
into a site suitable for commerce and industry was complicated and expensive. Plans 
and studies needed to be created. The magnitude of the changes required to make the 
bay suitable for ocean-going ships necessitated assistance and cooperation from state 
and federal officials, both for funding and for securing development rights. Officials also 
feared that the project would spark a speculative bonanza in the area, leading them to 
proceed cautiously in a way that would discourage damaging price bubbles. 
Developers recognized Jamaica Bay’s commercial potential as early as the 
antebellum period. A local history of New Lots, a former Long Island municipality 
abutting the bay between Flatlands and Jamaica, notes that in 1835 businessman John 
Pitkin envisioned Jamaica Bay as a “transportation center” that would assist his plans to 
build a rival city to Brooklyn called East New York. Though he ended up purchasing land 
for his scheme and heavily promoted it, it came to naught due to minimal development 
along the shores of Jamaica Bay throughout the 19th century. The next serious attempt 
!! 48!
to develop the bay for commerce and industry would not be seen until F.W. Dunton’s 
failed schemes starting in the 1890s.1 
City Comptroller Edward Grout first introduced the policy of actively developing 
Jamaica Bay on November 17, 1905, in a speech before the Commissioners of the New 
York City Sinking Fund. Describing the bay as “a vast territory of unimproved land,” he 
argued that the City should immediately “execute a comprehensive scheme for the full 
development of this property” to “furnish here a centering point for great manufacturing 
interests, which will subsequently produce a large and ever increasing revenue to the 
City of New York.” This first involved settling the remaining legal issues, then altering 
the space in order to make it suitable for development and traffic by filling and 
bulkheading shore lands and dredging deeper channels. Securing railroad linkages was 
the final part of the plan, completing the link between ocean and mainland. Grout 
claimed that railroads were already scheming to build connections to the bay’s shore, 
meaning that the space was ripe for exploitation.2 
Commercial and industrial development was Grout’s main concern, yet this did 
not limit his vision. Using examples of European cities like Amsterdam and Hamburg, he 
hinted that port development could further catalyze the transformations underway in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Alter F. Landesman, A History of New Lots, Brooklyn to 1877 Including the Villages of 
East New York, Cyprus Hills, and Brownsville (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 
1977), 92. 2  Edward M. Grout, Improvement and Development of Jamaica Bay and the Water 
Front of the City of New York Other than that of Manhattan Island : Being a 
Communication Addressed to the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of the City of 
New York (New York: Martin B. Brown Press, 1905), 3, 10. Beginning in 1895, officials 
in numerous communities throughout the United States viewed waterway improvements 
as an economic panacea: see Samuel Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 91-95. 
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East Brooklyn, which was finally growing as a result of recently built transportation 
connections to Manhattan. In the bay itself, he noted that developing its islands would 
enable “a commercial and manufacturing Venice, or a Venice of homes, or both.” 
Grout’s use of the “Venice” metaphor seems to reflect his familiarity with Dunton’s 
schemes as opposed to the contemporary usage of the term, for like Dunton, Grout 
sought to create an urban Jamaica Bay integrated into the larger fabric of the 
metropolis.3 
Grout also sought to transform the way people understood the bay as it was. 
Pointing out that “little or nothing has been done to reclaim what is practically waste land 
and water,” he described it as “virgin territory, where the ideal development may be 
secured without hindrance.” These descriptions ignored the changes the bay was 
experiencing in order to provide contrast with his urbanized proposal, and demonstrate 
his understanding of the bay as a resource to exploit. Depicting the bay as empty also 
downplayed the potential difficulty of removing the bay’s inhabitants—people who had 
successfully resisted Dunton’s eviction notices.4 
 In response to Grout’s call, the New York City Board of Estimate created the 
Jamaica Bay Improvement Commission. From May 1906 to May 1907 the group 
worked, exhaustively considering the benefits and costs of developing Jamaica Bay. 
They also devoted significant time analyzing the necessity of the project in light of future 
economic growth. In 1907, the group reported its findings. Although the commissioners 
ended up agreeing on the importance of having additional harbor space and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 Group, Improvement and Development of Jamaica Bay, 9–10, 15–16. 4 Ibid., 3, 5, 10. 
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suitability of Jamaica Bay for such a site, they split on what form the port would actually 
take, releasing majority and minority reports with different plans. 
All of the commissioners agreed on the necessity of expanding New York’s 
available wharfage. They predicted that by 1915, commerce handled by the Port of New 
York would increase to over one and one-half times that at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. In arriving at this figure, they considered factors such as the 
forthcoming completion of the Barge Canal—a major reconstruction of New York State’s 
canal system authorized in 1903 linking the Hudson River to Lakes Ontario, Erie, and 
Champlain—as well as expected increases in foreign trade. As to the current status of 
New York’s ports, the report notes that Manhattan’s wharves—where most of the City’s 
waterborne commerce was taking place—were already crowded, and transportation of 
goods from the waterfront to railroads and factories was difficult; with Manhattan as 
developed as it was, solving this bottleneck would be very expensive. In light of these 
factors, the authors encouraged officials to look to the outer boroughs. Jamaica Bay 
was elevated above all other possible sites due to it being the largest and possessing 
numerous advantages that would aid development.5 
One of Jamaica Bay’s advantages was its supposed emptiness. The report noted 
that although some entrepreneurs had made “bold” efforts to develop portions of the 
bay—most notably the Rockaways, Barren Island, Canarsie, and Bergen Beach—its 
“vastness” dwarfed these sites, leading to the impression that it was in the “same !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5  Jamaica Bay Improvement Commission, Report of the Jamaica Bay Improvement 
Commission (New York: Martin B. Brown Press, 1907), 7–15; Noble Whitford, History of 
the Barge Canal of New York State (Albany, NY: JB Lyon Company, 1922),!
http://www.eriecanal.org/texts/Whitford/1906/contents.html. 
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primitive condition as when Jasper Denkins and his companions visited this region in 
the last years of the seventeenth century.” The commissioners acknowledged that the 
bay was a popular fishing resort and that the islands had a “comparatively large number 
of inhabitants, especially during the summer months,” yet nothing else is said about the 
Venice described by contemporary writers. Like Grout and Dunton, they imagined the 
bay a space of wild nature, just waiting to be developed. Emptiness implied that 
harnessing the space for commerce and industry could be done easily, without the 
difficulties involved with transforming a developed area.6 
The bay also possessed a number of natural features conducive to a port. The 
Rockaway peninsula protected its waters from the full brunt of the Atlantic Ocean, 
providing shelter from storms: the commissioners described it as a “perfect natural 
harbor.” Water flowed slowly within the bay, meaning that interior channels could be 
easily maintained. The islands and shoreline, when properly bulkheaded and filled, 
would offer extensive area for wharves: up to 100 miles, more than the sum total of that 
already in existence in the City. Shore areas were also flat, making them ideal sites for 
factories due to the ease of building railroad connections. All of these factors made the 
bay an ideal place for development.7 
The site was not without its challenges. The bay’s mouth was a constantly 
shifting environment, meaning that creating and maintaining an entrance channel 
sufficiently deep for ship traffic would be difficult and costly, requiring regular dredging 
and the construction of a complicated jetty system. Legal difficulties also remained: the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6 Jamaica Bay Improvement Commission, Report, 3, 16–17, 21. 7 Ibid., 41–42. 
!! 52!
commissioners learned that the Attorney General of the State of New York considered 
all of the Jamaica Bay lands under water up to the high water mark to be State property, 
a contention with which the City disagreed. Finally, the commissioners determined that 
eminent domain, the compensated expropriation of private property in support of a 
greater public need, would have to be used carefully if it were to succeed. The City 
needed to demonstrate the necessity of its seizures: the commissioners reasoned that it 
would not be possible to prove the immediate need for the entirety of the marshlands 
around the bay’s shore, so such acquisitions would need to be done piecemeal and be 
backed by definite plans. None of these difficulties were viewed as insurmountable, so 
the commissioners included recommendations for overcoming them.8 
The two actual proposals that emerged from all of these considerations were 
strikingly different. The committee’s majority planned for a variety of potential uses: they 
envisioned that while “certain sections could be best developed for the purposes of 
trade [and] manufacture,” others could be developed for “sanitariums and city 
institutions… suburban settlements and villa sites… parks and waterside resorts.” The 
plan placed the commercial and industrial sites on the western and northern shores, 
where railroad connections would be most easily made. It also called for enlarging an 
existing park at Canarsie. On the islands, echoing Dunton’s earlier scheme, it 
prescribed filling and bulkheading to create salable land that was to be connected to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8 Ibid., 41–42, 46–52. 
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mainland by a causeway road. Certain islands could be left isolated for institutions like 
“a seaside home for poor children, a hospital or a penal colony.”9 
The minority report called for Jamaica Bay to be more radically transformed. As 
opposed to the plan of the majority report, which modified the existing features of the 
bay to make it suitable for development, the minority plan completely erased them: it 
called for combining the existing island and hummocks into three large ones, one in the 
west, the other two in the center. The rationale was that a simpler design would cost 
less in the long run, and facilitate the flow of ship traffic. The massive dredging required 
for this process would also enable the reclamation of marshlands around the shore for 
homes and businesses. Apart from this brief mention of residential use, the plan 
focused entirely upon developing the bay for commerce and industry, in particular the 
western island, which would be easily accessible by railroads and deep-ocean 
vessels.10 
The majority report’s plan served as the basis for the City’s actions going forward 
over the next decade. Commissioner of the Department of Docks and Ferries, Calvin 
Tomkins—the chief official initially in charge of the project—committed the City to 
developing a multi-use space appropriate for commerce, industry, and recreation. In 
addition to highlighting the improvements needed to support these developments, the 
report also provided a set of suggestions as to how to proceed. It strongly advised 
caution, asking the City to proceed deliberately in conjunction with other governmental 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!9 Ibid., 52–96. 10 Ibid., 118–144. 
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entities in order to not overextend its finances.!11 The Dock Commissioner would pay 
close attention to these recommendations going forward: scholar Keith Revell notes that 
Tomkins was devoted to the Progressive Era ideal of expertise and planning, that he 
was attempting to consider Jamaica Bay’s development in conjunction with that of the 
wider region. This fact would infuriate boosters, who believed that completing the port 
was ultimately more beneficial than regional planning.12 
Cooperation with New York State and the federal government was secured over 
the next three years. In 1909, the last major legal impediment to the project was 
overcome when the New York State Legislature granted the City possession of the 
bay’s underwater lands for the purpose of developing a harbor; this grant required the 
City or federal government to appropriate funds for the project before the lands could be 
transferred, with the City’s allotment being at least one million dollars. Taking advantage 
of the 1907 Rivers and Harbors Act passed by Congress, which included a provision 
mandating the Secretary of War to survey Jamaica Bay, the commissioners worked with 
the War Department to create a plan. The resulting scheme called for a 1500-foot wide 
entrance channel thirty feet deep, as well as 1000-foot wide main channels thirty feet 
deep on the western and northern shores of the bay. The City was given the 
responsibility of dredging, though the federal government would provide reimbursement 
at the discretion of the Secretary of War, who needed to be convinced that the project !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11 Ibid., 93–96; New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Report on Jamaica 
Bay Improvement (New York: New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, 1910), 
18–20. 12!Keith D. Revell, Building Gotham: Civic Culture and Public Policy in New York City, 
1898-1938 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 58-59. !
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was proceeding apace.13 The federal government was given the option of proceeding 
with the dredging in piecemeal fashion, only funding it to a depth of eighteen feet and 
width of 500 feet until significant progress was made on the overall project. In 1910, 
Congress allocated an initial $250,500, to be disbursed under the stated conditions.14 
Dock Commissioner Tomkins coordinated a variety of actions designed to meet 
the requirements mandated by the federal and state actions, proceeding cautiously in 
order to ensure that the City would be reimbursed. He coordinated with the Board of 
Estimate to appropriate one million dollars to satisfy the State’s requirements to transfer 
its underwater lands to the City, and prepared a map detailing plans for dredging and 
bulkheading. To ensure that the City would not get ahead of the federal government’s 
appropriations of reimbursements, he mandated that only $250,000 (essentially the 
amount hitherto allotted by Congress) worth of dredging and bulkheading be done for 
the time being, and only at sites the Secretary of War considered appropriate. The rest 
of the funds were to be spent acquiring land, but Tomkins demanded that appropriations 
be done in a manner that hindered speculators from profiting from the City’s actions.15 
The desire for caution also permeated Tomkins’ discussion of the specifics of the 
plan. Overall, Tomkins wanted to develop the project “without undue hardship to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13 Congressman Theodore E. Burton, Chairman of the Congressional Rivers and 
Harbors Committee, mandated the cautious approach seen here in order to blunt overly 
enthusiastic boosters of waterway improvements: see Hays, Conservation, 91-95.  14 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Forty-Eighth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries of the City of New York (New York: New York City 
Department of Docks and Ferries, 1919), 24–28; Department of Docks and Ferries, 
Report on Jamaica Bay Improvement, 2. 15 Department of Docks and Ferries, Forty-Eighth Annual Report, 24–28; Department of 
Docks and Ferries, Report on Jamaica Bay Improvement, 1–14. 
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present generation of citizens… which shall tend to retard other needed improvements,” 
leading him to adopt a gradualist approach. In a 1910 progress report he declared:  
There is real danger that the very magnitude of the project and the 
remoteness of its ulterior consequences may engender shallow criticism 
on the ground of impracticability and absence of immediate results. The 
enterprise is at present in more danger from the enthusiastic claims of its 
advocates, however well founded, than from any definite opposition. 
 
Though Tomkins was committed to the scheme and believed it necessary and feasible, 
he envisioned it developing gradually over many years in conjunction with other regional 
sites, which explains his fears. To support his assertion he quoted a New York City 
Board of Trade and Transportation report that regarded the bay as “a possible 
alternative or auxiliary harbor for the Port of New York one or two generations hence.”16 
 Tomkins’s cautions were justified, for boosters were concurrently pushing for the 
improvement scheme in the most enthusiastic manner possible. The most important 
group was the Jamaica Bay Improvement Association, a private group of 
businesspersons and local officials. In late 1907, the Association appointed the 
prominent and well-connected Brooklyn land developer Henry Adolf Meyer as its 
president. Under Meyer, the group undertook activities like publishing a newsletter 
dedicated to reporting on the project’s progress, coordinating meetings with civic 
groups, and arranging speeches by prominent officials such as New York Congressman 
Charles Law. Eventually, Meyer would work his way into the Docks Department, 
allowing the group to directly shape policy.17 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!16  Department of Docks and Ferries, Report on Jamaica Bay Improvement, 7–10. 17 Handbill by The 32nd Ward Taxpayers Association, “Jamaica Bay Improvement Mass 
Meeting,” March 27, 1909, Box 2, Papers of Henry Adolf Meyer, Brooklyn Historical 
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 The Association’s goal was the immediate transformation of Jamaica Bay into the 
envisioned harbor. Their attitude is best encapsulated in a quote from Meyer, found on a 
plaque affixed to Canarsie Pier, one of the project’s successes: it states that “Jamaica 
Bay awaits the touch of the magic wand that will transform it into the Wonder Harbor of 
the World.”18 For Meyer and the boosters, the project was a question of will. To this end, 
instead of embracing the City’s gradualist approach, they heavily promoted the minority 
report’s plan to construct giant islands on the bay’s surface. The group disseminated 
representations of a transformed Jamaica Bay in the form of maps and drawings of the 
port in newsletters and other communications. As representations of space, the images 
were like the magic wand, possibilities to be imposed upon the bay and made real.19 
These actions captured the attention of journalists: on July 2, 1910, Scientific American 
published an artist’s rendering of the bay developed according to the minority report’s 
scheme, depicting it encircled with wharves and factories spewing smoke (figure 7). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Association, Brooklyn, NY; Handbill, “Official Notice: United Retail Grocers Association,” 
February 9, 1909, Box 2, Papers of Henry Adolf Meyer, Brooklyn Historical Association; 
Henry A. Meyer, Looking Through Life’s Window: Personal Reminiscences (New York: 
Coward-McCann, 1930), 158–163. 18 Thomas Waite, “Ripples of Change Flutter on Jamaica Bay,” New York Times, August 
30, 1987. 19 Henry A. Meyer, “Jamaica Bay: Its Advantages and Opportunities,” Jamaica Jinger, 
May 1921, Folder: Jamaica Bay Pamphlets, Vertical Files, Archive at Queens Library, 
Queens Public Library, Central Branch, Jamaica, NY. 
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Figure 7. “Plans For Jamaica Bay,” Scientific American, July 2, 1910. 
The port scheme captured the imagination of journalists in other ways, 
intersecting with the conception of the bay as New York’s Venice. A day after Scientific 
American published its story on the port, the New York Tribune released a feature 
imagining the bay developed into a “novel amusement park” (figure 8). The Tribune’s 
future bay was loosely based on the majority report’s plan, which provided room for 
other uses beyond commercial and industrial development. The image was somewhat 
like the Venice of Italy with its baroque towers, grand bridges, and gondolas, though it 
also featured Ferris wheels alongside wharves and warehouses. Though fantastical, it 
nonetheless demonstrates the continuing popularity and allure of the idea of Jamaica 
Bay as the Venice of New York. 
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Figure 8. “Planning a Novel Amusement Park on the Many Islands in Jamaica Bay,” New 
York Tribune, July 3, 1910. 
 
 In 1910, the Jamaica Bay Improvement Association was ready to declare victory, 
celebrating the recent developments with a dinner honoring Congressman Charles Law 
on May 24. In addition to Law and Meyer, Commissioner Tomkins spoke before the 
group on the progress and promise of the project. The Association presented Law with a 
plaque declaring him the “father of Jamaica Bay harbor,” upon which was pictured the 
minority report’s plan—a fact that probably rankled Tomkins, but was nonetheless in 
typical form for the group. Much had been accomplished in five years, with plans and 
conceptions of the future bay created, yet the celebration would quickly prove 
premature.20 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20 Hon. Charles B. Law: The Champion of Jamaica Bay Harbor, Photograph, May 24, 
1910, Box 2, Papers of Henry Adolf Meyer, Brooklyn Historical Association; “Jamaica 
Bay Plan Considered Assured.” 
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 From 1905 to 1910, officials of the City of New York moved quickly and efficiently 
to develop the newly acquired Jamaica Bay into a space of commerce and industry. 
Before they remade the bay physically, boosters and bureaucrats attempted to effect 
the transformation of conceptions of its space. In their plans the bay’s current uses were 
all but erased, the space reduced to a tract of wild nature. Upon this “blank” canvas was 
painted fantastical designs of a completely transformed bay harnessed to the cause of 
economic growth. Over the next decade the champions of Jamaica Bay harbor would 
find that sheer will and magic would not be enough to make the project move forward, 
as the cautious approach taken by all sides became a liability. 
 
The Project Stalls, 1910-1920 
 During the 1910s, the project to develop Jamaica Bay into a commercial and 
industrial port slowed. The City and federal government took important steps towards 
dredging channels, but little progress was made on facilities like basins and docks. 
Work was only done in areas immediately accessible to the new waterways, creating 
the impression among federal officials that the City was unwilling to meet its obligations 
for the project. The City contended that it was the federal government failing to hold up 
its end of the bargain by improperly constructing the channels. Boosters expressed 
frustration with the slow pace of development, arguing that city officials were defying the 
will of providence with their actions. 
 Despite the celebrations of 1910, no actual physical work transforming the bay 
happened until late 1912. The cause of this delay was an extended back-and-forth 
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between the City and federal government over the plan’s specifics. The negotiations 
nonetheless produced an additional $300,000 of federal funding in 1912, allowing the 
dredging of a 500-foot wide, eighteen-foot deep main channel from Barren Island to Mill 
Basin to finally begin on December 17, 1912. The project was completed in 1913, 
prompting an additional grant of $300,000 by Congress.21 
Caution dominated the City’s actions in the first half of the 1910s. At the end of 
1912, in spite of the start on the main channel and new funding, Commissioner Tomkins 
reported that Mill Basin “is as far as the Jamaica Bay Improvement can go for the 
present, as the New Plan has not been approved north of the entrance… and the filled-
in area cannot be connected with the main land until a channel is provided,” indicating 
his unwillingness to get ahead of the federal government. To mollify critics, he noted 
that “in the meantime the City will doubtless receive some revenue from summer 
cottages, tent privileges, etc., along the filled-in area adjoining the main channel,” 
continuing the Department’s policy of recreational development.22  
Cottages and tents failed to satisfy the Jamaica Bay Improvement Association. In 
a 1912 speech before the Flatlands Property Association, Meyer expressed frustration 
with the City’s progress. He argued that “had Jamaica Bay been owned by a syndicate 
or controlled by a cotorie [sic] of private men, we would long ago have seen it developed 
into what nature has intended it for… but being owned by the City and State, such is not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Forty-First Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1912), 216–17; New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Forty-Fourth 
Annual Report of the Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City 
Department of Docks and Ferries, 1915), 10. 22 Department of Docks and Ferries, Forty-First Annual Report, 216–17. 
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possible,” indicating his displeasure with the gradualist approach.23 Meyer’s language 
once more indicates the desire to dominate nature in the bay for material gain. In 
response, over the next decade Meyer “became more vigilant than ever,” attending 
“scores of hearings,” and brought the matter before “numerous Civic Associations in this 
city.” In 1918, he secured appointment as a Deputy Commissioner in the City Docks 
Department. Meyer would immediately use his influence to take the department in a 
different direction, but in the meantime his impact upon the Department was minimal.24 
The uproar over the slow progress appears to have had an effect. In 1913, Mayor 
William Gaynor sacked Commissioner Tomkins, appointing businessman Robert A.C. 
Smith as the new Docks Commissioner. In a letter to Smith, Gaynor declared “the time 
has arrived when I find it necessary for the full co-operation and help of the Dock 
Commissioner.” Tomkins described his firing as emerging from a “difference of policy 
regarding the port conditions of the city, a radical difference between the members of 
the Board of Estimate, the Mayor, and myself.” The specific issue that precipitated the 
action did not involve Jamaica Bay (it was over port issues in Manhattan), but the slow 
progress there nonetheless must have contributed to Gaynor’s dissatisfaction with 
Tomkins.25 
In spite of the new Commissioner, there was little physical transformation of the 
bay in the remainder of the decade, though the City continued to plan for the future 
harbor. The only major progress in altering the bay was along its western shore: in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!23 Henry A. Meyer, “Remarks before the Flatlands Property Owners Association,” May 
15, 1912, Papers of Henry Adolf Meyer, Brooklyn Historical Association. 24 Meyer, Looking Through Life’s Window, 158, 163–65. 25 “Tomkins Put Out; Smith in His Place,” New York Times, April 3, 1913. 
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1915, the City constructed a 100-foot wide, fifteen-foot deep channel from the main 
channel to the shore at Mill Basin, finally allowing the development of definite plans for 
harbor facilities.26 The new project, which was tentatively approved in 1919, called for 
six piers extending southward to Barren Island, but in order to ensure that the piers 
would be utilized, it required a thirty-foot deep main channel to accommodate deep 
ocean vessels. This stipulation quickly became a sticking point.27 
As it had earlier in the decade, the federal government’s discretion over funding 
conspired with the City’s desire for caution to bring the project to a halt. Though the final 
agreed-upon depth of the channels was to be thirty feet, the provision allowing the 
federal government to withhold reimbursement beyond eighteen feet during construction 
led City officials to fear that dredging for the piers would not be compensated. 
Consequently, the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund passed a resolution in 1919 that 
stated they would only recommend that the Board of Estimate fund the piers when 
appropriate authorization was received from Congress. The resolution was then 
transmitted to the War Department. By the dawn of the 1920s, officials in the City and 
federal governments still had not resolved the matter, with neither side expecting a 
settlement for at least another two years.28 Dock Commissioner Murray Hulbert (who 
replaced Smith in 1918) expressed frustration over the process, noting in a newspaper 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!26  Department of Docks and Ferries, Forty-Fourth Annual Report, 10. 27  Department of Docks and Ferries, Forty-Eighth Annual Report, 24–28; “Expect 
Congress to Act Favorably on Jamaica Plans,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, March 15, 1920. 28  Department of Docks and Ferries, Forty-Eighth Annual Report, 24–28. 
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article that he believed that Congress misunderstood the City’s position; it was only 
asking for the original agreement to be met, not beginning a new project.29 
 After five years of rapid progress, the 1910s were a great disappointment to the 
champions of Jamaica Bay harbor. The agreement between the City and federal 
government created significant uncertainty, leading to years of back-and-forth as the 
two sides sought assurances from each other in order to proceed. Moreover, as 
discussed in chapter one, the Docks Department was acting at what must have seemed 
cross-purposes by continuing to rent out and allow businesses to develop spaces for 
recreational and increasingly residential use. Throughout the 1920s, Henry Meyer’s 
influence on the Docks Department would be seen as the agency attempted to revive 
the beleaguered project. 
 
Waving the Magic Wand: 1920-1931 
 As soon as he was given authority as Deputy Dock Commissioner, Henry Meyer 
used his position to push the Department towards bold action, even if it meant deviating 
from existing policy. After a decade of avoiding “enthusiastic claims,” Meyer’s influence 
led the Department to embrace the minority report’s plan to consolidate the bay’s central 
islands, abandoning its piecemeal approach. In spite of Meyer and other passionate 
boosters like Cyrus Potts, a Queens lawyer who strongly pushed for Jamaica Bay as a 
free-trade zone, the project would still see only incremental progress over the next 
decade. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!29 “Murray Hulbert, Jurist, 65, Dead,” New York Times, April 27, 1950; “Expect Congress 
to Act Favorably on Jamaica Plans.” 
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Meyer was furious with the City’s previous course of action. In the Jamaica 
Jinger, a 1921 booster publication put out by the Jamaica Board of Trade, he excoriated 
the City, noting that while “legal technicalities” could be blamed for the initial delay, it 
was “inexcusable that the City… has not found some way in the past eight years of 
continuing the main channel.” Even as late as the 1920s, the conception of the bay as a 
wasteland continued to be used: Meyer continued to trumpet its numerous advantages 
for industrial development like easy access to railroads, its proximity to Brooklyn’s vast 
pool of labor, the advantage of water transport for receiving raw materials, and the fact 
that the bay was “virgin territory” that enabled its development “to be of such a character 
as to suit the convenience of any business.”30 
 Meyer attempted to use his connections to the private sector to jumpstart the 
languishing project. In 1920, he and other prominent Brooklynites endorsed a plan 
hatched by businessman Alton Greeley for the area from Mill Basin to Barren Island. 
With the existing scheme held up by uncertainty, Greeley proposed to transfer much of 
the responsibility of developing the area away from the City. He would lease the space 
from the City in ten-year increments with ever increasing rents, developing commercial 
infrastructure like piers and industrial buildings. After fifty years, the property would be 
transferred back to the City “clear of all encumbrances.” The proposal came to naught 
thanks to a breakthrough between the City and federal government, yet Meyer’s 
involvement demonstrates his willingness to break with existing policy.31  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!30 Meyer, “Jamaica Bay: Its Advantages and Opportunities,” 6, 12–13. 31 “Greekey Plan Inspected,” New York Times, September 9, 1920. 
!! 66!
 Meyer also attached his name and office to depictions of the future Jamaica Bay 
port that differed from those officially sanctioned by the City. In 1918, he hired a private 
company to create a large graphic that depicted a bay developed roughly according to 
the plans of the minority report (figure 9). The bay’s interior was consolidated into four 
islands: these were covered with warehouses, port facilities, and a “municipal colony” as 
suggested in the Report of the Jamaica Bay Improvement Association. The shorelines 
were dotted with factories and terminal facilities. The depiction was found in booster 
publications like the Jamaica Jinger.32 
 
Figure 9. Harry A. Chandler, “Bird’s Eye View of Jamaica Bay,” February 25, 1918, 
Folder: Jamaica Bay Proposed Harbor, Vertical Files, Archive at Queens Library, 
Queens Public Library, Central Branch. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!32 Meyer, “Jamaica Bay: Its Advantages and Opportunities.” 
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 The representation of space seen in such graphics reveals Meyer’s desire to 
completely remake Jamaica Bay for commerce and industry. Little about the image 
reflected the bay as it was for a majority of New Yorkers in 1918: a recreational and 
residential space inhabited by thousands of people during the summer, dotted with 
marshes and hummocks. The map’s bird’s eye perspective instead emphasizes the 
geometric precision of the sculpted islands and basins: nature completely harnessed to 
humanity’s purposes, regular and planned, an essentially urban space. Every square 
inch of land in and around the bay, save for the park, is dotted with buildings, and the 
bay itself is peppered with ships. Like many boosters, Meyer seemed to believe that if 
the port were built, it would automatically draw the commerce of the world towards it like 
a magnet.33 
 During the 1920s, the City began to reverse its former policy of caution, leading 
to a cascade of events that finally broke the impasse with the federal government. In 
1921, in a marked reversal of previous policy, the City Board of Estimate appropriated 
$685,000 for dredging and construction at Mill Basin and ordered the Commissioner of 
Docks to resume work in the bay.34 The action was spurred by a 1920 recommendation 
from Commissioner Hulbert that “for only by so doing will the City ever regain the 
confidence of the Federal authorities that we mean to progress the Jamaica bay 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!33!For reflections upon boosterism, see William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago 
and the Great West (New York: Norton, 1991), 23-54. 34 Philip P. Farley, “Progress of the Jamaica Bay Improvement,” Brooklyn Chamber of 
Commerce Bulletin, November 19, 1921. 
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Development as was originally intended.”35 The tactic worked, for a year later, Congress 
agreed to fund dredging of the channels to the originally agreed-upon depth of thirty feet 
and appropriate widths, placing stipulations to this effect in the 1922 River and Harbor 
Bill.36 
 With progress finally being made, in December 1922, the New Commissioner of 
Docks, John Delaney, who replaced Hulbert upon the reelection of Mayor John Hylan in 
1921, argued that the City needed to finally adopt a comprehensive plan for developing 
Jamaica Bay. In a memo to the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, Delaney argued 
that the recent developments necessitated a greater degree of coordination than had 
been previously required. To this end, he proposed that the City adopt a plan akin to 
that in the minority report—long favored by Meyer. The scheme called for consolidating 
all of the smaller islands into two large ones: West Island, a 5,369-acre island with three 
two-mile long basins; and East Island, a smaller islet 1,115 acres in area. The measure 
was quickly approved the next year.37 With the City officially adopting a form of Meyer’s 
two-island scheme, City maps were changed to reflect the plan. Instead of depicting 
Jamaica Bay as it was, they reflected the hopes of the Docks Department by showing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!35 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Forth-Ninth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries of the City of New York (New York: New York City 
Department of Docks and Ferries, 1920), 40. 36 “Jamaica Bay Deepened to 30 Feet,” The Port of New York Harbor and Marine 
Review, October 1922. 37 “Murray Hulbert, Jurist, 65, Dead”; “New Plan for Jamaica Bay Development,” The 
Port of New York Harbor and Marine Review, December 1922. 
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the consolidated islands, not yet constructed. This was the magic wand in action, using 
the power of representations of space to realize the Department’s plans.38 
 From 1923 to 27, progress on the harbor scheme accelerated at a number of 
places. The federal government dredged the entrance channel to a depth of thirty feet.39 
With the bay’s entrance secured, the City undertook extensive work on the interior 
channels: the main channel was first extended to Fresh Creek Basin at the existing 
depth of eighteen feet, and then deepened to thirty feet from Mill Basin to Paerdegat 
Basin.40 To stimulate commercial development, the Docks Department constructed a 
600-foot long, 400-foot wide pier at Canarsie.41 The Department also completed a 
causeway road, Cross Bay Boulevard, finishing what Flynn had started decades earlier. 
The road’s construction enabled significant filling in the vicinity of Broad Channel, 
starting construction on what the City hoped would become West Island.42 Finally, the 
Docks Department undertook extensive surveys of the hinterlands, planning facilities 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!38 “Proposed Improvements in Jamaica Bay,” November 1923, Folder: Jamaica Bay 
Proposed Harbor, Vertical Files, Archive at Queens Library, Queens Public Library, 
Central Branch. 39 Ibid. 40 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Fifty-Fifth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1926), 81; New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Fifty-Sixth Annual 
Report of the Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department 
of Docks and Ferries, 1927), 87, 90. 41  Department of Docks and Ferries, Fifty-Sixth Annual Report, 87–88. 42 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Fifty-Fourth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1925), 72. 
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and infrastructure like roads and railroad connections—one of the most crucial elements 
of the whole scheme.43 
  An adjunct to the port scheme began in 1928 when work commenced on Floyd 
Bennett Field, the City’s first municipal airport.44 Constructed on Barren Island, the site 
was selected by the Mayor of New York after a commission reported on a variety of 
sites. Construction took three years, entailing significant amounts of filling: 387 acres 
total, though with the dredging already underway, this amount was easily fulfilled. 45  
 The 1920s was a promising time for the advocates of Jamaica Bay harbor. After 
a decade of caution, the City had committed itself to a bold scheme, going to great 
lengths to publicize its intentions, making “enthusiastic claims” about the bay’s 
greatness. Disseminating images of a transformed bay was akin to waving a magic 
wand in the hope of effecting change, drawing upon the power of representations of 
space backed by the authority of the City. As powerful as it was, the spell failed to hold 
up in the face of economic catastrophe. 
 
A Window Closes: 1931-38 
 With the dawning of the Great Depression, concrete progress on the Jamaica 
Bay projects significantly slowed. With commerce diminishing, particularly foreign trade, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!43  Department of Docks and Ferries, Fifty-Sixth Annual Report, 103. 44 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Fifty-Seventh Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1928), 97–99. 45 “Floyd Bennett Field Grows from Sand Waste,” New York Times, July 20, 1930; New 
York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixtieth Annual Report of the Department of 
Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, 1931), 
18–19. 
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the need for a port in the bay became harder to justify. Advocates turned to creative 
methods to create inducements for business and industry, yet by the end of the 1930s it 
seemed to most observers, in particular Robert Moses, that contemporary events had 
passed over Jamaica Bay and that a new plan for its future was needed. 
 From 1931 to 32, the City resolved keep working towards the port. In spite of the 
Board of Estimate approving yet another plan for developing a comprehensive plan for 
Jamaica Bay in early 1931, which the New York Times described as the framework for 
“a vast extension of the City’s harbor,” the actual work done in the bay amounted to very 
little.46 Later that year, dredging mandated by the new plans commenced at Paerdegat 
Basin, being completed in 1932, and bulkheading at Mill Basin continued for the 
remainder of the year. The Department continued to survey its facilities and plan for a 
great expansion of commerce, but this must have contained some element of wishful 
thinking, for the City’s attempts to secure critical railroad connections continued to fail 
due to its dire financial situation.47 
 With significant funds expended and little to show for it, the Department of Docks 
started to become defensive. Beginning in 1931, the Docks Commissioner included in 
his annual reports a section with such titles as “Propaganda Against the Port,” decrying 
phenomena like a “strenuous advertising campaign” by other Atlantic ports to siphon off 
ship traffic. That year’s report noted that imports and exports at New York were only 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!46 “Jamaica Bay Seaport as City Envisions It,” New York Times, May 3, 1931. 47 Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixtieth Annual Report, 10–12; New York City 
Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixty-First Annual Report of the Department of Docks 
and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, 1932), 8, 22–
23. 
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valued at $1.9 billion, a significant decline from $5.5 billion in 1919, and blamed this 
decrease on cities such as Baltimore and Philadelphia which were seeing significant 
increases in recent years. It noted that the “publicity given to the endless discussion of 
alleged congested conditions in our harbor” had created the impression that “New York 
has reached the ultimate in construction.”48 
The 1932 report shows a similar defensiveness. In its discussion of the project, in 
spite of noting how “the almost limitless possibilities of Jamaica Bay continue to 
challenge the imagination of port planners and to inspire the schemes of waterfront 
dreamers,” it concedes that “little of practical accomplishment may be had” as long as 
the all-important railroad connections remained elusive. The rest of the section attempts 
to justify the vast sums spent thus far: $11 million, with only $1.8 million in 
reimbursements granted by the federal government. Arguing that if one included the 
reimbursements and left out the $1.4 million spent on the causeway road and the 
$269,000 spent dredging Paerdegat Basin because they were only indirectly related to 
the port scheme, the City had only spent $7.5 million. Reclamation had created lands at 
Floyd Bennett Field, Bushes Meadows, Canarsie, and along Cross Bay Boulevard 
totaling 1,100 acres: spaces worth $15 million—double the amount spent by City. 
Although these figures might have looked good on paper, the Department did little with 
these lands save for renting them out to vacationers for paltry sums.49 
 The severity of the economic decline was illustrated by conditions at other sites 
within the Port of New York. While the Jamaica Bay project was underway, the Docks !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!48  Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixtieth Annual Report, 16–17. 49  Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixty-First Annual Report, 8–9, 71. 
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Department had also constructed a port facility at Stapleton, Staten Island, which 
opened in 1927. The Department’s Annual Report from 1931 notes that although the 
project seemed like a good idea when it was approved, the Staten Island Piers had 
become the “perennial problem of the department…. If in time of comparative prosperity 
the piers were not attractive to shippers, it is correspondingly difficult to rouse 
commercial interest in them in these days of utter depression.” To alleviate this problem, 
the report suggested Stapleton for an experimental “free port” in which commerce duties 
and red tape would be greatly diminished.50 
With a completed facility in such dire straits, officials began to reconsider the 
wisdom of continuing the Jamaica Bay improvement, forcing boosters to adapt their 
strategies. In a 1931 letter to Cyrus Potts, a businessman, lawyer, and president of the 
Jamaica Bay Improvement Association during the 1930s, A.C. Welsh of the Brooklyn 
Chamber of Commerce noted that a motion was made during a recent Board of 
Estimate meeting to postpone the Jamaica Bay project indefinitely; although he noted 
that it was defeated, Welsh conceded that the motion made him think:  
Port developments are made [in] a gradual process of evolutionary 
development based upon the demands of commerce…. There seems little 
doubt that industry would be unable to absorb all of Jamaica Bay at once. 
The government could hardly be expected to spend more money on 
channel improvements until the present development has been put to 
use.51 
 
Potts seems to have taken Welsh’s words to heart, for until 1938, when Robert 
Moses secured the bay for the Parks Department, Potts tirelessly lobbied for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!50  Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixtieth Annual Report, 19–21. 51 A.C. Welsh to Cyrus Potts, June 17, 1931, Folder: Misc. Documents, 1931, Papers of 
Cyrus Potts, Archive at Queens Library, Queens Public Library, Central Branch. 
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creation of a free port in Jamaica Bay, writing numerous newspaper editorials 
and letters to public officials extolling the virtues that made it an ideal site for 
such a development.52 
The remainder of the 1930s saw little additional progress in spite of repeated 
attempts by boosters to revive the moribund project. The final actions taken by the 
Docks Department in support of the improvement was another survey of lands in 1933 
with an eye toward future facilities.53 In addition to pushing for a free port, boosters 
attempted to use the occasion of the 1939 World’s Fair to revive development, arguing 
that the bay’s north shore would be an ideal site for the event, but these efforts were 
unsuccessful.54 In 1936, Staten Island’s Stapleton site was chosen as an experimental 
free port over other sites in the City, putting the final nail in the coffin for the project, 
though boosters and officials refused to give up hope.55 
After largely disappearing for over two decades, conceptions of Jamaica Bay that 
envisioned multiple uses began to reappear in the press and public speeches of 
boosters and officials. In a 1936 interview, president of the Atlantic Avenue !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!52 Congressman Emanuel Celler to Cyrus Potts, March 14, 1934, Folder: Misc. 
Documents, 1934, Papers of Cyrus Potts, Archive at Queens Library, Queens Public 
Library, Central Branch; Cyrus Potts to Congressman Robert L. Bacon, March 14, 1934, 
Folder: Misc. Documents, 1934, Papers of Cyrus Potts, Archive at Queens Library, 
Queens Public Library, Central Branch; Cyrus A. Potts, “Free Ports in the United States" 
Clipping from Unknown Newspaper, n.d., Folder: Newspaper Clippings, Papers of Cyrus 
Potts, Archive at Queens Library, Queens Public Library, Central Branch. 53 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixty-Second Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1933), Division of Surveys and Dredging. 54 “Jamaica Bay Harbor Urged by Hockert,” Long Island Daily Press, October 9, 1935. 55 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixty-Fifth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1936), 7–8. 
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Improvement Committee and Highland Park Civic Association, James McCue, 
continued to argue for expanded harbor facilities in the bay, though he also noted its 
potential for becoming a “seaside resort whose popularity might outstrip Jones Beach 
and Coney Island.”56 A year later, in 1937, in a speech before the Canarsie Board of 
Trade, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia offered a similar assessment, hailing the bay’s 
potential for commercial and recreational use.57 
Robert Moses would ultimately bring the era of Jamaica Bay port development to 
an end in 1938. That year, in a publication titled The Future of Jamaica Bay, Moses put 
forth a convincing case for creating a park in the bay. Within a year, control of the bay 
would be transferred to the Parks Department, but not without significant internecine 
wrangling. Signaling the end of the era, Henry Meyer, long considered the “father of 
Jamaica Bay harbor,” gave Moses his blessing in a July 22, 1938 letter to the editors of 
the Brooklyn Eagle.58 
 
Conclusion 
A number of factors conspired to doom the port scheme. The agreement 
between the City and federal government led to mistrust between the two sides, 
producing multi-year delays at critical points. Much progress had been made after 1923 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!56 “Jamaica Bay Hailed as Port of the Future,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, November 22, 
1936. 57 “Mayor’s Picture of Jamaica Bay as Ocean Port Cheers Realtors,” Queens Press 
News, May 1, 1937. 58 New York City Department of Parks, The Future of Jamaica Bay (New York: New 
York City Department of Parks, 1938); Henry A. Meyer, “Indorses Moses’ Jamaica Bay 
Plan,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, July 22, 1938. 
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when the stumbling block of channel specifications was overcome, but the onset of the 
Great Depression put the City in a position of financial peril. With the City unable to 
make full use of existing port facilities at Mill Basin and Stapleton, Staten Island, 
continuing the project made less and less sense. The Department of Docks also failed 
to articulate a consistent vision of Jamaica Bay harbor out of a desire to avoid getting 
ahead of the project’s actual progress. Boosters like Meyer and newspapers eagerly 
embraced radically transformed representations of space in the bay, yet the dissonance 
between these depictions and the official plans hindered their transformative power. 
 The port scheme ultimately failed, yet it resulted in significant topographical 
changes to the bay. Filling took place along the completed Cross Bay Boulevard—itself 
a major new feature of the bay—expanding Broad Channel. Floyd Bennett field, a 
geometrically precise peninsula, took up nearly 500 acres that was once water and 
marshland. Basins and bulkheading now extended from Floyd Bennett Field to Howard 
Beach. Finally, as will be discussed in chapter three, pollution was becoming a major 
problem, leading to a decrease in recreational use and different types of residence 
patterns. With these dramatic changes, it would be difficult to imagine the bay as virgin 
territory. New conceptions started to emerge of the bay as a “remote, abandoned, far-
away” part of the City. It is these images that officials hoping to effect change would be 
forced to deal with going forward.59
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!59 “Jamaica Bay Hailed as Port of the Future.” 
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Chapter Three 
 An “Expanse of Forbidden Water Dotted with Dreary 
Marshes and Lonely Islands”: Jamaica Bay Becomes 
Polluted, 1880-1938 
  
 From 1880-1920, the conception of Jamaica Bay as New York’s Venice 
dominated public consciousness. Recreational use by thousands of New Yorkers and 
depictions in media all contributed to this conception. Individuals such as F.W. Dunton, 
Henry Meyer, and Edward Grout, all of whom wished to use the space for commerce 
and industry, created competing representations of an urbanized bay. In addition to 
offering visions of the bay’s future, they imagined it as a wasteland of virgin territory ripe 
for exploitation by the City. 
 From 1920 to 1938, the use and regulation of Jamaica Bay began to dramatically 
change, leading to new conceptions of its space. Pollution, which had been a growing 
problem in the first two decades of the twentieth century, reached levels deemed 
dangerous by authorities, forcing the City to take drastic steps to protect its citizens. 
Although depicting a space as polluted based upon scientific measurements is 
technically an objective assessment of physical conditions, the idea of Jamaica Bay 
being polluted became loaded with social meaning. With warnings from officials leading 
to a decline in fishing, Prohibition allowed the bay’s entrepreneurs to increasingly focus 
upon peddling illicit alcohol, taking advantage of the bay’s relative isolation. The bay 
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also became more residential as the Broad Channel Corporation continued to develop 
its island community and the City rented out its bay lands to those seeking cheap rents 
in the wake of the Great Depression. All of these factors contributed to the idea of the 
bay being a polluted space, abandoned by all save for the desperate, unsavory people 
who clung to its shores and islands. 
 
The Growing Scourge of Pollution: 1880-1920 
 Public officials became concerned with pollution in the Jamaica Bay area as early 
as the late nineteenth century. Although it was not yet a problem, sanitarians recognized 
that the area’s growing population and popularity as a summer resort would eventually 
overtax the ability of its waters to absorb and carry away sewage. These fears prompted 
a series of studies that found conditions to be deteriorating rapidly, yet it took the City 
decades to develop comprehensive solutions to its sanitation problems, necessitating a 
number of stopgap measures to avoid contagion. Worsening conditions started to take 
their toll on public perceptions of the bay, with depictions drawing attention to pollution 
beginning to appear in media as early as the 1910s. 
 Water pollution was a growing concern in late-nineteenth century American cities, 
leading to increased interventions by authorities. The first part of the Jamaica Bay area 
to be scrutinized by officials was Coney Island, which was becoming a popular seaside 
resort. In an 1879 interview with the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, sanitary engineer John 
Culyer noted his concerns with the current state of Coney Island’s infrastructure: “even 
the best arrangements now existing are comparatively but temporary expedients, 
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devised in haste and not too wisely developed.” Most buildings like hotels directly 
ejected their waste into the nearby water, an arrangement that would threaten the health 
of bathers when the population grew. Culyer argued for the installation of sewers, which 
could collect all of the area’s effluent and reroute it somewhere less harmful. One 
possible outlet was Coney Island point, where the water was deep and tide strong. He 
also suggested Jamaica Bay, which would be made possible by constructing a canal 
through southern Brooklyn, though he noted that this was sure to produce opposition 
from interested parties. The suggestion indicates the extent to which the bay was 
considered a backwater before the railroad trestle enabled greater access as well as a 
resource that could be exploited; however, this would not be the last time that officials 
contemplated using the bay as an oversized cesspool.1 
Long Island’s municipalities and the newly consolidated City of New York 
responded to the growing need for sewage treatment by constructing a number of 
wastewater treatment plants around the turn of the 20th century. In 1892, a plant was 
opened at Coney Island.2 By 1905, three plants treated waste flowing into Jamaica Bay, 
at Flatlands (constructed in 1896, it would be referred to as the Twenty-Sixth Ward 
plant), Far Rockaway (1896), and Jamaica (1903). Another plant would be added at 
Neponsit on the Rockaway Peninsula in 1911, and an outlet was built at Paerdegat 
Creek (which would eventually become Paerdegat Basin), though it lacked a treatment !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 “A Great Need: The Necessity of a Sewerage System for Coney Island,” Brooklyn 
Daily Eagle, August 5, 1879. See Joel A. Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink: Urban 
Pollution in Historical Perspective (Akron, Ohio: The University of Akron Press, 1996) 
for the development of municipal sewer systems. 2 Wellington Donaldson, “Preliminary Operations of the Coney Island Sewage Treatment 
Plant,” Sewage Works Journal 9, no. 2 (March 1937): 243–55. 
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plant and ejected raw sewage into the bay.3 The main mechanisms used by these 
plants were screening and chemical precipitation—a process that used lime and ferric 
chloride to effect the separation of dissolved solids.4 In spite of these efforts, the greatly 
expanding population of Brooklyn and Queens quickly overtaxed the plants, leading to 
concentrated flows of minimally treated sewage into Jamaica Bay and Lower New York 
Bay. 
In 1903, the New York State Legislature created the New York Bay Pollution 
Commission, the first comprehensive study of water pollution in the City. The 
commission was charged with assessing the current condition of the City’s waters, and 
to make recommendations based on their findings. Reporting in 1906, the Commission 
found that although New York Bay was “unmistakably” polluted, it was nevertheless “not 
as yet badly, polluted,” reaching this conclusion via bacteriological and observational 
analysis at hundreds of points throughout the City. The Commission did not specifically 
investigate conditions in Jamaica Bay, but estimated that the local population, which 
numbered 53,000 in 1904, produced on average five million gallons per day (GPD) of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 New York City Department of Sanitation, Annual Report of the New York City 
Department of Sanitation (New York: New York City Department of Sanitation, 1936), 3–
4, 18–19; New York City Department of Public Works, Annual Report of the New York 
City Department of Public Works (New York: New York City Department of Public 
Works, 1939), 123. 4 Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of New York, Report of the Metropolitan 
Sewerage Commission of New York (New York: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 
1914), 54; Donaldson, “Preliminary Operations." 
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sewage. No major recommendations were made, but they argued that further study was 
needed.5 
The muted response of the report stems from the results of its investigations. The 
Commission found that measurable instances of pollution tended to be highly localized, 
that there was not yet a “general nuisance.” They believed that most of the sewage 
ejected in to the waters was “disposed of… by animals and plants, chiefly the bacteria.” 
In spite of this, population growth greatly concerned the commissioners: they expected 
total sewage output to increase at least 65% by 1930. Not knowing how much more 
waste the water could safely absorb, they recommended further investigation. The 
Legislature obliged by creating yet another study group, the New York Metropolitan 
Sewerage Commission; this group worked nearly a decade, issuing its final report in 
1914. Unlike the Bay Pollution Commission, the Sewerage Commission studied 
Jamaica Bay in depth, issuing a supplementary report on it in 1917.6 
As opposed to the muted tone of the Bay Pollution Commission, the Sewerage 
Commission issued dire warnings, finding alarmingly bad conditions at numerous points 
throughout the city—Jamaica Bay among them. They reasoned that the deteriorating 
conditions of New York’s waters were largely a matter of numbers: more than six million 
people in the general area were discharging sewage through “several hundred outlets… 
without purification, regulation or control of any kind.” They expected the population to 
double in the next thirty years, leading to an enormous 1.33 billion GPD of sewage 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5 New York Bay Pollution Commission, Report of the New York Bay Pollution 
Commission (Albany: Brandow Printing Company, 1906), 3–5, 11–12, 45, map plate. 6 Ibid., 9–11, 46. 
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produced by 1940, enough to fill a ten-foot deep reservoir one square mile in area. 
Conditions had deteriorated to the point that the Commissioners believed bathing and 
shellfish gathering were ill-advised north of the Verrazano Narrows, implicating the vast 
majority of New York City’s waters.7 
In the Jamaica Bay area, the population and the waste they produced had 
expanded significantly since 1904, when the Bay Commission reported. The 1917 report 
found 436,000 residents discharging approximately fifty million GPD into the Bay, up 
significantly from the five million GPD discharged from 53,000 persons in 1904.8 The 
area’s population was expected to rise to 909,000 persons in 1940 and 1,415,700 
persons in 1960, ejecting 163 million and 204 million GDP, respectively.9 
The commissioners considered the inadequacy of the treatment plants to be the 
primary cause of Jamaica Bay’s pollution, but they also implicated the negligence of the 
bay’s residents. The main problem with the existing sewage works was that the 
precipitation process was inefficient: the continually expanding volume of waste was 
overwhelming the plants.10 Surveyors also discovered hundreds of “overhanging privies” 
at Broad Channel, The Raunt, Goose Channel and Ramblersville, in addition to cottages 
at Sand Bay, Bergen Creek, Cornell Creek, Old Mill Creek, and other sites discharging 
waste directly into the bay’s waters and marshes. As Culyer’s recommendations for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7 Metropolitan Sewerage Commission, Report, 27, 33. 8 New York City Bureau of Public Improvements, Report on the Main Drainage and 
Sewage Disposal of the Area Tributary to Jamaica Bay (New York: SL Parsons and 
Company, 1917), 11. 9  Metropolitan Sewerage Commission, Report, 46. 10 Ibid., 54; Bureau of Public Improvements, Report on the Main Drainage and Sewage 
Disposal, 27. 
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Coney Island show, this method of disposal was once considered acceptable, but 
changing conditions were decreasing its effectiveness. This would not be the first time 
that Jamaica Bay’s residents would be implicated as a source of pollution, but for the 
time being the magnitude of the problem at other areas diminished the attention given to 
them.11 
Investigations in the bay produced a number of disturbing findings. Checking for 
bacterial contamination, the officials took 20 samples at sites near Arverne, Second 
Creek, Fresh Creek, and Canarsie, finding nine “polluted” and five “doubtful,” indicating 
a great degree of pollution. In addition to checking for bacteria, the investigators 
recorded visual conditions throughout Jamaica Bay, particularly at sites near sewage 
outlets. In 1909, the officials found yachts moored in raw sewage at Paerdegat Creek. 
At Second Creek, the outlet of the Twenty-Sixth Ward plant, they found sewage 
“extending in a narrowing belt a mile away… the southern edge… bounded by a line of 
reddish scum… odor was noticed as soon as one rowed inside.” At Bergen Creek, site 
of the Jamaica plant’s outlet, they found eelgrass “covered with whitish deposit”, and at 
Far Rockaway water that was “turbid and whitish in color.”12 
The commissioners also investigated the effects of the growing pollution upon 
Jamaica Bay’s shellfish, finding that they were increasingly becoming a vector for 
infection. Jamaica Bay oysters were linked to outbreaks of illness as early as 1904, 
when twenty-one cases of typhoid were traced back to Jamaica Bay oysters sold at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11  Bureau of Public Improvements, Report on the Main Drainage and Sewage Disposal, 
18. 12 Ibid., 17–19. 
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Inwood. Seven years later, “Rockaway” oysters sold at Canarsie caused twenty-seven 
cases of typhoid and ninety-nine cases of diarrhea. Finally, in 1915, federal inspectors 
sampling Jamaica Bay oysters found them to have had ten times more bacteria than 
allowed under existing standards.13 
A 1912 poem found in a local magazine indicates that awareness of the problem 
went beyond the health department. Written from the perspective of an oyster, it 
laments: 
Then down to old Jamaica Bay I hied {sic}, my weary soul to lay, so 
smooth and peaceful was my bed my bitterness of spirit fled… But now, 
again I’m forced to speak! …who, in muck, a pearl could make Or wait the 
groping oyster-rake? From sewage, filth and city slime I go to seek a 
healthier clime. 
 
Accompanying the poem was a cartoon, depicting an anthropomorphic oyster fleeing 
raw sewage pouring from a pipe, garbage such as bottles and cans, and a dead cat 
(figure 10). The poem indicates that perceptions of Jamaica Bay, once overwhelmingly 
positive, were beginning to change in light of growing pollution.14 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13 Ibid., 18–19. 14 Lyon, “The Oyster Speaks,” The Queen’s Magazine, November 1912, Folder: 
Jamaica Bay Pollution, Vertical Files, Archive at Queens Library, Queens Public Library, 
Central Branch, Jamaica, NY. 
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Figure 10. Lyon, “The Oyster Speaks.” 
 The commissioners found that a number of steps had already been taken to 
address the problem of contaminated shellfish, but were skeptical as to their efficacy. In 
response to investigations, beginning in 1915, the federal government forbade the 
shipment of oysters from the bay from April 16th to November 30th save for those 
transported to pure waters for at least a week and found to be safe upon inspection. The 
same year, the New York City Department of Health began requiring shellfish from 
problem spots like Bergen Beach and Fresh Channel to be inspected before sale. 
These intermediary steps lasted less than a decade before more drastic steps were 
taken.15 
 From 1880 to 1920, the rapid growth of Brooklyn and Queens was taking its toll 
upon Jamaica Bay, along with its increasing popularity as a resort destination. Pollution 
was reaching dangerous levels, threatening the health of those who worked and played !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15  Bureau of Public Improvements, Report on the Main Drainage and Sewage Disposal, 
21. 
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in its waters. Conceptions of the bay as a quaint Venice were also threatened, as 
pollution began to impinge upon the activities that made the area unique and its 
residents were implicated as a source of contagion. 
 
The City Responds: 1920-1938 
 Along with the Commission’s unequivocal warnings about the deteriorating state 
of New York City’s waters, they offered a number of solutions for mitigating the 
problems. These guidelines provided the framework for the City’s actions moving 
forward. In addition to updating its treatment system—the ultimate solution to the 
problem, albeit one that would take many years and millions of dollars to enact—the 
City imposed new regulations upon the use of Jamaica Bay to protect the health of its 
citizens. 
The recommendations of the commissioners were strongly influenced by the 
desire to save money—an understandable perspective considering any treatment 
project’s massive cost. The general principle of the plan was that all of an area’s 
sewage should be routed to a central point, allowing treatment plants to take advantage 
of economies of scale. To cut costs, they recommended that the City take advantage of 
natural features like “the absorptive capacity of the harbor waters” which would allow 
treatment “no more completely than was necessary to satisfy a reasonable standard of 
cleanness.” Outlets could also be placed deep underwater in areas possessing strong 
currents, allowing the dispersal of effluent before it surfaced and became a nuisance. 
The “utmost degree of purification” would only be employed in “exceptional cases” and 
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treatment capacity could be built up in stages. Using these guidelines, the City produced 
outlines for plans for different areas, grouped according to the region’s hydrology.16 
The suggestions for Jamaica Bay were strongly influenced by the overall guiding 
principles. The report recommended that the level of treatment for effluent be 
determined by how the bay was going to be used in the future. Since commercial use 
would “necessarily… exclude its use for pleasure,” with the harbor plan seeming like the 
most likely future for the bay, the overall level of treatment could be less than in 
recreationally oriented areas, saving considerable money. The commissioners also 
possessed great faith in the ability of the bay to absorb sewage, highlighting features 
that enhanced water quality like a strong tidal flow that enabled significant amounts of 
water to cycle in and out of the bay at its mouth and the bay’s shallowness and large 
surface area which aided in the layers of water mixing and absorbing oxygen.17 
Even though the group felt that Jamaica Bay’s future only necessitated minimal 
treatment of effluent, they nonetheless provided a number of options. The 
commissioners briefly entertained the possibility of routing all sewage from Brooklyn and 
Queens to Jamaica Bay, where it could be released with minimal treatment, but 
ultimately rejected the scheme due to the possibility of “unpleasant odors and the 
presence of flies” menacing residents should future development draw near the bay’s 
shore. In an effort to adapt to different possibilities for future uses, the schemes divided 
the bay into different zones, allowing different levels of treatment.18 The 1917 report 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!16  Metropolitan Sewerage Commission, Report, 19, 48–49. 17 Ibid., 53, 90. 18 Ibid., 32–44, 92–93. 
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provided four options, with plans A and B envisioning two treatment plants, C three, and 
D six. Plan C was the suggested course of action for its thoroughness in important 
areas of the bay and reasonable cost.19 
The Commission’s recommendations for Jamaica Bay reflect the changing 
conceptions of its space due to the growing problem of pollution. The fact that the 
commissioners entertained the possibility of turning Jamaica Bay into a septic tank for 
Brooklyn and Queens demonstrates the potency of the idea that the bay was becoming 
spoiled by pollution. As with other plans from this era, it views the bay as a resource to 
be exploited, albeit in a very different way than through building hotels and houses in its 
spaces. 
In spite of the dire warnings from the Commissioners, the City would take more 
than a decade to develop a comprehensive plan for dealing with the sanitation problems 
highlighted in the reports. In the interim, it took incremental, stopgap measures towards 
improving capacity. During the 1920s, the City opened a new plant at Hammels on the 
Rockaway peninsula, a facility that used fine screens.20 The existing Twenty-Sixth Ward 
and Jamaica plants were upgraded with similar features in 1925 and 1926, 
respectively.21 
The City finally launched a coordinated effort to deal with the sanitation problems 
in the 1930s. An important step taken by the City was the formation of a citywide 
Department of Sanitation in 1930. This new department brought together what were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!19  Bureau of Public Improvements, Report on the Main Drainage and Sewage Disposal, 
49. 20 Department of Public Works, 1939 Annual Report, 123. 21 Department of Sanitation, 1936 Annual Report, 3–4. 
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once separate operations in the five boroughs, with a commissioner heading the 
department as well as serving as the chairman of a special Sanitary Commission that 
sought to address problems and make policy. The department would quickly act to deal 
with the existing problems, producing a comprehensive plan for the City only one year 
later.22 
The plan introduced in 1931 by the Sanitation Department sought to define the 
different levels of water treatment desired by the city, and to provide a blueprint for 
achieving these standards. The treatment system constructed would, with modifications, 
constitute today’s sanitation system. The basic goals of the system were to ensure that 
“no solid matter should be recognizable as sewage” with no “discoloration or turbidity” 
except in locations close to sewer outlets, that sewage should never “impede 
navigation,” that oxygen should not fall below three cubic centimeters (ccs) per liter of 
water, and finally, that bacterial levels should be at levels appropriate for drinking water 
at bathing and aquaculture sites. The standards chosen by the department were the 
most specific yet, providing a clear set of guidelines for the construction of treatment 
plants.23 
The proposed system would make use of the latest treatment technology. 
Overall, the plan called for thirty-three plants, with four in the Jamaica Bay area 
(including one on Coney Island). Three different treatment options were provided, some 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!22 New York City Department of Sanitation, Annual Report of the New York City 
Department of Sanitation (New York: New York City Department of Sanitation, 1930), 
14–15. 23 William Schroeder, Jr., Preliminary Report on the General Plans for Sewage Disposal 
for the City of New York (New York: New York City Department of Sanitation, 1931), 5. 
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being more expensive than others. The middle plan, favored by the commissioners for 
its thoroughness and cost efficiency, called for eighty percent removal of bacteria and 
other contaminants versus ninety to ninety-five percent for the costliest and fifty-six 
percent for the least expensive. The Coney Island, Jamaica, and Twenty-Sixth Ward 
plants were to be rebuilt, and the Rockaway plants consolidated to a single unit. All of 
the plants save for the one at the Rockaways were to utilize a fully activated sludge 
process, the most expensive but best treatment option.24 
Progress on the plan proceeded very slowly. It took until 1934 for the City to 
provide funding for the first of the Jamaica Bay area plants, at Coney Island—
presumably selected due to its importance as a recreational site.25 Construction started 
in 1935 and finished in 1936, providing thirty-five million GPD treatment—although the 
City would quickly seek to double its capacity. In 1935 and 1936, the City began studies 
for improving the Jamaica and Twenty-Sixth Ward plants, respectively.26 The outbreak 
of World War Two severely limited progress: upgrades were not completed until 1943 at 
Jamaica and 1951 at the Twenty-Sixth Ward plant.27 The final facility, on the Rockaway 
Peninsula, was completed in 1952.28 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!24 Ibid., 8–10, 14, 16–21. 25 New York City Department of Sanitation, Annual Report of the New York City 
Department of Sanitation (New York: New York City Department of Sanitation, 1934), 6–
7. 26 New York City Department of Sanitation, Annual Report of the New York City 
Department of Sanitation (New York: New York City Department of Sanitation, 1935), 
91; Department of Sanitation, 1936 Annual Report, 1, 14. 27 New York City Department of Sanitation, Annual Report of the New York City 
Department of Public Works (New York: New York City Department of Sanitation, 1943), 
4; New York City Department of Sanitation, Annual Report of the New York City 
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With the slow progress designing and building extra treatment capacity, the City 
imposed a number of restrictions upon the permissible uses of the bay based upon the 
commissioners’ recommendations. The commissioners offered pointed warnings about 
the dangers of continuing to use the bay for aquaculture: the 1917 report noted that “no 
point of a bay of moderate area into which sewage is discharged is free from intermittent 
contamination… as a corollary any oysters located at any point in the bay will receive 
the accumulated sewage deposits from the sewage thus intermittently carried to them.” 
Consequently, they recommended that aquaculture be discontinued in the bay.29 In 
1921, the City and federal government launched a coordinated effort to end the sale of 
Jamaica Bay oysters. The effects were dramatic: with the bay providing 300,000 
bushels of oysters per year—estimated to be between twenty-five and thirty-three 
percent of the City’s supply—vendors scrambled to deal with the disruptions.30 
Authorities took additional steps to restrict the use of Jamaica Bay’s waters. In 
1926, Commissioner of Health Louis Harris issued a general warning against bathing in 
the bay, noting that it “creates the danger of sinus and mastoid troubles, of skin 
diseases, typhoid and other sickness. There is no doubt that it is highly unsafe to bathe 
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Department of Public Works (New York: New York City Department of Sanitation, 1951), 
15. 28 New York City Department of Sanitation, Annual Report of the New York City 
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in these waters.”31 A year later, the Commissioner created a “black list” of trouble spots, 
with Jamaica Bay again on the list; it would remain there for decades.32 
Despite of the warnings, bathers continued to use Jamaica Bay, prompting 
additional action by authorities. In 1931, the Sanitation Department dumped $50,000 
worth of chlorinated lime and sodium nitrate into Jamaica experimentally in order to 
“destroy poison gases and noxious odors.”33 Finding the efforts a success, the 
department appropriated funds for the construction of five chlorination plants at various 
locations around Jamaica Bay in 1936. Opening a year later, the plants operated during 
the recreational season, dumping five tons of chemicals a day into the bay to provide 
relief to bathers. The department hailed the effort as the largest ever attempted yet such 
quantities of chemicals presumably contributed to rather than diminished the noxious 
state of Jamaica Bay in the long run. The new sewage treatment plants eventually made 
the chlorination plants obsolete, but in the interim it was yet another stopgap measure.34 
With pollution becoming an increasing problem, some began to conflate the 
character of the bay’s inhabitants with the unhealthy environment. The New York Times 
article detailing the ending of the bay’s oyster industry included a number of sensational 
claims: Dr. Royal Copeland, Commissioner of the Department of Health, alleged that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31 “Bathers Warned Against Three Bays,” New York Times, July 21, 1926. 32 Waldo Walker, “Polluted City Beaches a Danger to Bathers,” New York Times, July 
17, 1927. 33 New York City Department of Sanitation, Annual Report of the New York City 
Department of Sanitation (New York: New York City Department of Sanitation, 1931), 
34; “Start Purification of City’s Waters,” New York Times, August 7, 1931. 34  Department of Sanitation, 1936 Annual Report, 18–19; New York City Department of 
Sanitation, Annual Report of the New York City Department of Sanitation (New York: 
New York City Department of Sanitation, 1937), 7; “Germs Doomed at Jamaica Bay,” 
Brooklyn Daily Eagle, July 13, 1937. 
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“several known typhoid carriers” lived “near the confines of the bay.” He pointed to the 
case of Typhoid Mary and the sixty infections and twenty deaths she caused as an 
example of the danger. Copeland’s juxtaposition reveals a changing conception of the 
bay as a space of disease and moral degradation as opposed to a space of healthful 
recreation. As the recreational and residential use of the bay continued to change in the 
1920s, these conflations became more solidified. Although Copeland’s allegation 
against the bay’s residents was a minor detail, they would receive increasing blame for 
the pollution, particularly as the classes of people within the bay’s spaces began to 
change.35 
Due to an expanding population and inadequate measures to address the 
growing amount of sewage entering Jamaica Bay, by 1920, pollution had become a 
noticeable part of its space. It took the City decades to respond in a systematic fashion, 
with treatment schemes still largely in the planning stages by the end of the 1930s. As 
the bay’s environment changed and new regulations restricted the types of activities 
permissible, conceptions of its space took a turn for the worse, with the bay’s people 
and environment being increasingly regarded as dangerous and unsavory. 
 
Changing Recreational and Residential Use: 1920-1938 
 With the dawn of the 1920s, officials began cracking down on what they viewed 
as another type of liquid pollution flowing into Jamaica Bay: alcohol. Recreational 
activities changed as the bay become a popular site for rum running and speakeasies, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!35 “Jamaica Bay, Foul With Sewage, Closed to Oyster Beds.” 
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its marshes and hummocks serving as a natural shield from the prying eyes of law 
enforcement. The dawn of the Great Depression also transformed existing uses of the 
spaces, driving desperate individuals to the low rents of the lands administered by the 
Department of Docks and Ferries. All of these changes conspired to solidify the 
developing conception of the bay as polluted, its citizens conflated with the area’s fallen 
state. 
Since 1880, although the bay was used by people from all walks of life—from the 
humble fisherman renting a catboat to elites visiting their yacht clubs— it had teetered 
on the edge of respectability. As discussed earlier, Barren Island, home to noxious 
industries and many non-white workers, was regarded as a dangerous and immoral 
place. The bay’s “Venice” could also be regarded as more ramshackle than rustic. 
Numerous incidents of rum running took place in Jamaica Bay during Prohibition, 
boosting its unsavory reputation. One 1924 incident began with Prohibition agents 
chasing a speedboat early in the morning; they failed to catch the craft, but stumbled 
upon another vessel, discovering seventy-two cases of scotch whisky in its hold that the 
crew admitted had been transferred from the speedboat.36 A similar incident in 1933 at 
the end of prohibition involved 420 cases of liquor being seized in the bay.37 Rum 
running would produce associated crimes as well, such as the theft of watercraft. A 
1922 incident saw a twenty-six foot speedboat named the Sea Wolf stolen from its 
owner, a Captain Irwin. Police were alerted after the craft was spotted on Jamaica Bay, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!36 “Police Get Liquor, But Boat Escapes,” New York Times, January 17, 1924. 37 “Coast Guard Upheld in Liquor Seizures,” New York Times, December 19, 1933. 
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presumably transporting liquor between rumrunners further out at sea and points in the 
bay.38 
One of the destinations of the alcohol smuggled via the bay’s waters was Broad 
Channel. With the construction of Cross Bay Boulevard in 1923, the community had 
become significantly more accessible, with train, water, and roadways all enabling New 
Yorkers to travel to Broad Channel, though it presumably remained distant enough to 
avoid major attention by the police. Consequently, entrepreneurs opened a number of 
cabarets and nightclubs. Broad Channel gained the nickname “Little Cuba” during this 
time, reflecting its new status as a destination for swilling rum.39 A local history notes 
that train conductors announced the Broad Channel station using this moniker, 
prompting complaints from local residents unhappy with being associated with illicit 
activity.40 Another nickname mentioned in a local history was “The Island of Free 
Love.”41 
Broad Channel’s hotels were able to take advantage of their location during the 
Prohibition Era by continuing to dispense alcohol. The Enterprise Hotel, one of the 
famous structures on stilts, had a bar that “dispensed the prevailing alcoholic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!38 “Agents Out to Nab Hip-Flask Drinkers,” New York Times, August 19, 1922. 39 Federal Writers’ Project, The WPA Guide to New York City: The Federal Writers’ 
Project Guide to 1930s New York (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 590. 40 Joe Carey, “Broad Channel, The 1920s Era,” n.d., Folder: Histories of Broad Channel, 
Papers of the Broad Channel Historical Society, Queens Public Library, Broad Channel 
Branch. 41 Virginia Balogh, “A History of Broad Channel as Told to Virginia Balogh by Residents 
of West 10th Road,” n.d., Folder: Histories of Broad Channel, Papers of the Broad 
Channel Historical Society, Queens Public Library, Broad Channel Branch. No other 
sources contain this nickname, but considering 1920s nightlife, it seems plausible: see 
Lynn Dumenil, The Modern Temper: American Culture and Society in the 1920s (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1995). 
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beverages” and served as a boarding house for fishers. Another hotel was the Atlantic, 
which also served family dinners on the weekend. Sporck’s Hotel, located west along an 
elevated boardwalk that ran from the station, featured dances. The community also had 
a successive series of cabarets and dance halls called Hermit’s Cafe that allegedly 
featured entertainers such as Jimmy Durante and Mae West.42 
Broad Channel was also becoming significantly more residential and suburban 
during the 1920s, with its permanent population increasing thanks to improvements put 
in place by the Broad Channel Corporation. In addition to filling and leveling, these 
included buried water pipes that enabled water to be pumped during the winters and 
electric service, though in the early years the electricity would be turned off at 
midnight.43 Population greatly expanded: in 1920, there were only 189 full-time residents 
in Broad Channel, but the total climbed to 583 in 1930. By 1940, the population had 
nearly doubled to 1069.44 
The growing residential population of the area supported less clandestine 
recreational businesses than the hotels that catered to outsiders. The largest was an 
extensive bathing park with treated swimming pools that opened in 1925, presumably !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!42 Carey, “The 1920s Era”; Balogh, “A History of Broad Channel.” Only Carey’s source 
mentions Mae West, but Durante is mentioned in this source as well as Balogh’s history, 
though there he was recalled to have been drawn to a fine restaurant called Colmel’s 
not mentioned in the other source. 43 Gertrude McAleese, “Broad Channel: A Condensed Version of the Past Sixty Years,” 
n.d., Folder: Histories of Broad Channel, Papers of the Broad Channel Historical 
Society, Queens Public Library, Broad Channel Branch. 44 US Census Bureau, 1920 US Census, Queens County, New York, population 
schedule, digital image, http://www.heritagequest.com; US Census Bureau, 1930 US 
Census, Queens County, New York, population schedule, digital image, 
http://www.heritagequest.com; US Census Bureau, 1940 US Census, Queens County, 
New York, population schedule, digital image, http://www.heritagequest.com. 
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taking advantage of the fact that swimming in the bay was no longer recommended by 
city authorities. The park had numerous recreational facilities including a ball field, 
tennis courts, handball courts, and bathhouses. To encourage visits, the operators ran a 
free jitney service to the mainland throughout the 1920s.45 Other recreational facilities 
that opened during the decade included a movie house and an ice cream parlor.46 
In spite of the growth, Broad Channel was perceived as a low-class community. 
The WPA Guide to New York, a product of the New Deal Federal Writers Project, noted 
that although the community had a section of “whitewashed and trim” cottages, the 
remainder consisted of “ramshackle buildings” that “lean over the water on their 
uncertain stilts”; “poverty and decay” marked “the dirt streets and battered houses.” As 
opposed to invoking curiosity, the features that once made Broad Channel part of New 
York’s Venice now inspired disdain.47 
The Raunt continued to hang on during Prohibition, with at least one of its 
establishments taking advantage of its remoteness. Abe Stransky wrote a recollection of 
his fishing trips with his father to the Raunt in the late 1920s when he was still a child, 
highlighting many details. While seeking a boat to go fishing in, the pair stumbled upon 
a hotel operated by John Peschke. The hotel’s saloon was fully decked out, equipped 
with a “long mahogany bar” behind which were “mirrors and shelves, stocked with all !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45 “The Broad Channel Parker: Newsletter of the Broad Channel Bathing Park, Volume 
One, No. 1,” July 13, 1935, Folder: Histories of Broad Channel, Papers of the Broad 
Channel Historical Society, Queens Public Library, Broad Channel Branch; “The Broad 
Channel Parker: Newsletter of the Broad Channel Bathing Park, Volume One, No. 2,” 
July 27, 1935, Folder: Histories of Broad Channel, Papers of the Broad Channel 
Historical Society, Queens Public Library, Broad Channel Branch. 46 Balogh, “A History of Broad Channel" 47 Federal Writers’ Project, The WPA Guide to New York City, 590–91. 
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kinds of liquor,” and a honky-tonk piano. Peschke’s mother cooked food for the guests, 
and a second, unnamed man operated a boat primarily used for transporting 
contraband. After he got to know the two better, Peschke was given samples of “special 
liquors” as a boon. The isolation of the Raunt didn’t manage to shelter Peschke from the 
law, however, for Stransky recalls that the man spent time in prison for violating the 
Volstead Act.48 
Competition with Broad Channel must have taken a toll on proprietors like 
Peschke, for by the end of the 1930s the Raunt was little more than a residential 
community perceived as low class. The WPA Guide described The Raunt as a “desolate 
island,” with “a few dozen jerry-built shacks” connected by “crazy catwalks,” mentioning 
no hotels. It notes the lack of gas and water, with only rain barrels serving the 
“colonists.” The residents tried “feeble attempts at gardening” as evidence by raised 
platforms filled with “pale gray soil.”49 A WPA project to connect the Raunt to Broad 
Channel with a bridge was completed in 1936, but failed to spur significant growth.50 
Even though the Raunt’s population had gradually expanded to seventy-five full-time 
residents in 1940 from fourteen in 1920, the allure of the space was fading.51 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!48 Abe Stransky, “The Raunt on Jamaica Bay: A Recollection,” January 18, 1984, 
Folder: The Raunt, Vertical Files, Archive at Queens Library, Queens Public Library, 
Central Branch. Paschke is found in the 1920 Census.  49 Federal Writers’ Project, The WPA Guide to New York City: The Federal Writers’ 
Project Guide to 1930s New York, 591. 50 Sarah Wilford, “Lack of Bridge Prolonged Exile of ‘Raunt,’” Long Island Daily Press, 
March 24, 1936. 51 US Census Bureau, 1920 US Census; US Census Bureau, 1930 US Census; US 
Census Bureau, 1940 US Census. 
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Goose Creek, the other remaining island settlement in the bay, experienced 
decline. A Long Island Daily Press article from the beginning of the 1930s notes that all 
of Goose Creek’s hotels and cabarets had closed; the lack of traffic prompted the Long 
Island Railroad to cease regular stops at the site. The article attributes the decline to 
Prohibition, although competition with Broad Channel must have played a role as well.52 
With the nightlife gone, Goose Creek’s proprietors began selling their buildings to Broad 
Channel: in one example, a dance hall was moved and repurposed as a school.53 By 
1940, the City demolished the remaining structures.54 
The Department of Docks continued to rent space for bungalows and tents in 
order to earn a return on its investments in the Bay. In 1921, 244 individuals and 
organizations rented bungalows at various unspecified sites described as “Flatlands 
Bay” and “Jamaica Bay.”55 By 1925, though these particular enumerations disappear 
from the rent rolls, recreational areas with a number of lots for rent appeared at Sand 
Bay, Canarsie—a site created by the port project—and Hamilton Beach, near Howard 
Estates. The Sand Bay leases were for one and two years, most costing $100 annually. 
The majority of renters were individuals but a few groups like the Canarsie Yacht Club 
leased space as well. In 1925, the site earned the City $8,874 from eighty lots. The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!52 “Once a Noted Playground, Goose Creek, in Jamaica Bay, Is Now Almost 
Demolished,” Long Island Daily Press, circa 1930, Folder: Jamaica Bay Settlements, 
Vertical Files, Archive at Queens Library, Queens Public Library, Central Branch. 53 McAleese, “Broad Channel.” 54  Frederick Black, Jamaica Bay: A History (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Interior, 1981), 58. 55  New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Fiftieth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1921), 81–82. 
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Hamilton Beach lots were only rented by individuals, with seventy-three lots rented in 
1925, netting the City $7,752.50. Most rents were between $150 and $200 annually.56 In 
1927, the City began renting out lots at Bergen Beach, yet another site created by 
dredging.57 By 1929, Sand Bay earned the City $11,803 from forty-one lots, and 
Hamilton Beach brought in $38,492 from 117.5 lots.58 
The 1930s saw a different trend. Income from most lucrative sites of the 1920s 
declined. In 1931, Sand Bay disappeared from the rent rolls (although it would reappear 
the next year bringing in only $1,150) and revenue from Hamilton Beach greatly 
declined, with only $12,662 being earned from sixty-five lots. That year, the City started 
renting out lots at a number of new sites in Jamaica Bay in the vicinity of Flatlands Bay 
and Bergen Beach in Brooklyn, leasing 101 lots. Though the number varied, the most 
common rent paid was twenty-five dollars annually, significantly less than that at 
Hamilton Beach.59 This number expanded to 139 in 1933, a year when revenue from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!56  New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Fifty-Fourth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1925), 60–64. 57  New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Fifty-Sixth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1927), 69–70. 58 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Fifty-Eighty Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1929), 32, 73–79. 59 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixtieth Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1931), 92–101; New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixty-First 
Annual Report of the Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City 
Department of Docks and Ferries, 1932), 71, 104–117. 
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Hamilton Beach had dropped to $3,581, but would shrink to only twelve sites in 1938, a 
year in which Hamilton Beach only brought in $382.60 
In sum, the statistics from the Docks Department show a gradual decline from the 
beginning of the 1920s, when 250 sites were rented. The total number of recreational 
sites would remain around 150 through the end of the decade and even slightly rise 
through the early 1930s, but by the end of that decade the total had precipitously 
dropped. The amount paid for rental sites had significantly declined as well. The onset 
of the Great Depression may account for the shift to less expensive lots, but the 
continuing popularity as measured by lots rented out is nonetheless surprising 
considering the dire warnings of City officials in regards to sanitation in 1925. A likely 
explanation is that individuals looking for cheap housing relied upon what were formerly 
vacation sites, in spite of inferior facilities—a trend which was occurring on the 
Rockaway Peninsula as well. The failure of the City’s efforts with higher-rent spaces like 
Hamilton Beach and the popularity of cheaper spots around Flatlands Bay possibly 
shows a shifting of their clientele towards those with less financial means, which could 
also explain increasingly negative portrayals of Jamaica Bay at the end of the 1930s.61 
From 1920 to 1940, Canarsie’s recreational industry experienced a trajectory 
similar to many of the other sites highlighted, enjoying sustained popularity then decline. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!60 New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixty-Second Annual Report of the 
Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City Department of Docks and 
Ferries, 1933), rent roll; New York City Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixty-Seventh 
Annual Report of the Department of Docks and Ferries (New York: New York City 
Department of Docks and Ferries, 1938), 86, 119. 61 For changes in recreation and residence on the Rockaway Peninsula, see Lawrence 
Kaplan and Carol P. Kaplan, Between Ocean and City: The Transformation of 
Rockaway, New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 
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In the 1930s, a few concession stands appear on the Department of Docks’ rent rolls at 
Canarsie Pier, indicating that some were using the space for recreation, but little growth 
is evident.62 Golden City continued to be the community’s main draw, yet in spite of its 
popularity over the 1920s Canarsie acquired an unsavory reputation as a rough and 
rowdy place.63 
Canarsie’s residents launched a series of stunts to rehabilitate the image of their 
community. In the late 1920s, local business leaders attempted to rename the 
community Lindport in honor of Charles Lindbergh in order to evoke positive 
associations, but were ultimately unsuccessful.64 Another stunt occurred in 1934 when a 
delegation of eleven people, including the executive secretary of the Canarsie Chamber 
of Commerce, crashed a swim in the waters off Coney Island held by New York City 
health officials attempting to demonstrate the positive changes wrought by the newly 
opened sewage treatment plant. Dressed in swimming suits and gas masks, they 
declared that “if the water of Jamaica Bay is polluted, the water of Coney Island must be 
polluted too” in a vain protest of the state of Jamaica Bay’s waters, or at the very least 
the unequal treatment paid Coney Island. The stunt probably did more harm than good 
for New Yorkers’ impressions of the bay, but it nonetheless demonstrates that pollution 
was having an effect on Canarsie’s businesses.65 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!62  Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixty-Second Annual Report, 95; New York City 
Department of Docks and Ferries, Sixty-Seventh Annual Report of the Department of 
Docks and Ferries, 116–17. 63 Craig Radow, “The Coney Island of Canarsie,” New York Times, July 1, 2007. 64 Ibid. 65 “10 Officials Swim, Find Coney Clean,” New York Times, August 6, 1934. 
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 By the end of the 1930s, Canarsie’s reputation had not improved, and its status 
as a recreational site was in severe decline. A severe fire nearly destroyed Golden City 
in 1934, leading to the Park’s demolition later in the decade.66 With this centerpiece 
gone and its oysters and beaches implicated in the spread of disease, the WPA Guide 
offered a stark description of the community, describing it as: 
A sparsely settled community laid out on dispiriting flat lands, smoked over 
by the perpetual reek of fires in the vast refuse dump at its western end. 
Its residential section of one- and two-family houses and shacks (most of 
which resemble those in Charles Burchfield's paintings) is broken by 
weedy lots and small truck farms cultivated by Italians. Along the 
uninviting waters of the bay is a forlorn beach resort--an amusement park 
called Golden City, a fishing boat center, a beach backed by a dump and 
beery dance halls--with an outlandish quality that made Canarsie the butt 
of many vaudeville jokes.67 
 
Conclusion 
From 1920 to 1938, the recreational and residential use of Jamaica Bay shifted 
dramatically. Dire warnings from officials about pollution significantly impacted aquatic 
recreation, leading many of the Bay’s entrepreneurs to reorient their business towards 
the illicit. The bay’s former recreational spaces became significantly more residential, in 
particular Broad Channel, which became a permanent community. With this change, the 
residents and users of the bay became increasingly working class, as opposed to the 
mix of classes in prior eras. With Broad Channel becoming more integrated into the 
fabric of the City, the Raunt and Goose Creek declining, recreational use of the bay’s 
waters diminishing, and its topography dramatically transformed by the port project, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!66 “2 Brooklyn Fires Sweep Wide Areas,” New York Times, January 30, 1934; Radow, 
“The Coney Island of Canarsie.” 67 Federal Writers’ Project, The WPA Guide to New York City, 501. 
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bay’s space was losing its territoriality, its sense of place and uniqueness. As fewer 
New Yorkers actually went out into the bay for recreation, the knowledge from these 
experiences that reinforced the conception of it being “Venice” was increasingly not 
being created, although it nonetheless continued to exist among certain of the bay’s 
residents. 
The conception of the bay as a recreational Venice was mostly gone, replaced 
with the image of a fallen, polluted space. Beyond The Raunt and Broad Channel, the 
WPA Guide described the bay as home to “lonely and forbidding islands, some spotted 
with frail shacks” where lived characters like Old Doc, a peg-legged veteran of the Boer 
War who kept a pack of “wolfish dogs” to protect his isolation.68 A 1941 New York Times 
article contemplating the next steps for the bay uses similar language, describing the 
bay as an “expanse of forbidden water dotted with dreary marshes and lonely islands,” 
as well as “just something the Rockaways’ visitors see on their way to the beach.”69 A 
1936 Brooklyn Daily Eagle article similarly depicts it a “remote, abandoned, far-away 
section of the city.”70 The future of Jamaica Bay was no longer bright, leading to very 
different possibilities for its spaces in the minds of New Yorkers.  
Not all observers gave up on the bay. A 1938 editorial in the New York Herald 
Tribune described it as: 
The one great remaining body of water within the city limits still capable of 
being reclaimed for bathing, fishing and boating. The very wildness and 
sense of waste and isolation which led to its being zoned for industrial 
uses are, now… among its greatest assets as a recreational ground… its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!68 Ibid., 590–91. 69 Charles G. Bennett, “Jamaica Bay to Be Play Area,” New York Times, June 29, 1941. 70 “Jamaica Bay Hailed as Port of the Future.” 
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wide skies, its long water reaches and low, grassy and mysterious-
seeming islands make Cross Bay Boulevard (despite the shacks and hot-
dog stands which already too much disfigure it) an avenue into a strange 
corner of primitive romance of a kind one would hardly expect to come 
upon between Ozone Park and the Rockaways.71 
 
Although this depiction was over the top, it nonetheless shows a reclaiming of the earlier 
sense of the bay as a wasteland of unexploited resources, yet environmental change 
demanded a new relationship between city and nature in order for those resources to be 
properly utilized.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!71 “Sanitation and Yellow Bar Hassock,” New York Herald Tribune, June 6, 1938. 
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Chapter Four 
“A Strange Corner of Primitive Romance”: Robert Moses and 
Jamaica Bay, 1930-1960 
 
 After nearly four decades of attempts by the Department of Docks and Ferries to 
transform Jamaica Bay into a commercial and industrial seaport, Robert Moses, 
commissioner of the New York City Parks Department, moved in 1938 to scrap the 
existing plans and transform the majority of the bay into a park. Like developers and 
officials in the past, Moses conceived of the current Jamaica Bay as a vacant wasteland 
in order to accentuate its suitability for his scheme. His plans told a story of devastation 
and renewal: though polluted, the bay could be reclaimed as a natural space for 
recreational use. Cleaning up the bay meant removing its residents, who as before were 
conflated with the space’s fallen state. 
 The chief competition to Moses’ plans came from New York City Sanitation 
Commissioner William Carey and the bay’s remaining residents, who each had their 
own views of what Jamaica Bay should be. Carey wished to dump garbage into the 
bay—a use that Moses argued would spoil the bay for other activities. The residents of 
the bay, who desired to keep living in their island and shoreline homes, resisted the 
City’s efforts with varying degrees of success: Broad Channel’s residents banded 
together and earned a reprieve from condemnation, yet every other settlement that was 
once part of the “Venice of New York” would be demolished. In spite of these early 
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victories, the difficulty of ameliorating the bay’s condition held up key portions of Moses’ 
plans. By 1960, his main achievement in the bay was the construction of a bird 
sanctuary: the Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge. Moses may have been able to successfully 
manipulate people, but the natural world would prove far more difficult to change. 
 
The Master Builder 
 Robert Moses is remembered, even by his detractors, as a man of big ideas, able 
to conceive of dramatic transformations of space. He was a master of manipulating the 
mechanisms of public power, ruthlessly harnessing funding and other resources, 
unafraid—and often disdainful—of those who stood in his way. As a public official 
holding various offices throughout his career, he was able to realize his vision for New 
York City on a massive scale, making him an extremely controversial figure. 
Moses rose to prominence in the administration of New York Governor Alfred E. 
Smith in the early 1920s as head of the Long Island State Park Commission, impressing 
many with the success of his Jones Beach State Park project. In 1933, he was put in 
charge of the newly created Triborough Bridge Authority, a position he exploited to 
tremendous effect to fund a variety of projects. When Fiorello LaGuardia became mayor 
of New York in 1934, he appointed Moses as commissioner of a newly consolidated City 
Parks Department, giving him authority over all of the City’s parks and parkway roads. 
Moses’ shrewdness earned New York a greater share of federal funding during the New 
Deal era than any other city, helping to finance the multitude of projects he initiated. In 
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1946, his power grew when Mayor William O’Dwyer appointed him City Construction 
Coordinator, granting authority over all public projects in the City.1 
As the creator of New York’s contemporary park system, Moses was extremely 
influential. The year he became Park Commissioner, he laid out his ideas in a talk 
entitled “What New York Can Expect of its Park Department.” Stating that the City’s park 
system “should be a coordinated one, combining beauty, utility and recreational 
facilities,“ he argued: 
Those who believe that city parks are intended to be fenced off spaces 
where green trees, vari-colored flowers and soft sward are grown for their 
exclusive visual enjoyment, must change their ideas. By the same token 
those who believe that these precious spaces are set aside for bare play 
spaces also must change their ideas. A compromise must be reached by 
each of these two elements. A third element, representing a small minority 
of rowdies, vandals and litter throwers, can expect no quarter. The parks 
are for the greatest good of the greatest number and must be respected 
as such.2 
 
Moses’ philosophy reflects a complex mélange of ideas, some rooted in the past, some 
reflecting contemporary trends, some ahead of their time. Nineteenth-century park 
designers had approached parks as picturesque pleasure-gardens—spaces of nature 
that allowed for recreation in a healthy and beautiful environment. Moses did not 
completely abandon traditional aesthetic forms like those pioneered by Frederick Law 
Olmsted, but unlike Olmsted he approached parks primarily from a functional point of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Robert Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: 
Vintage, 1975) remains the definitive take on Moses’ life and work, though Caro’s 
sharply critical judgments have since been reevaluated. Hilary Ballon and Kenneth 
Jackson, eds., Robert Moses and the Modern City (New York: Norton, 2007) is a recent 
work attempting to place Moses’ work in a broader context. 2 “What New York Can Expect of Its Park Department,” Better Times, March 12, 1934, 
5–6, Folder: Department of Parks, 1936, Box 97, Papers of Robert Moses, New York 
Public Library Milstein Division, New York, NY. 
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view, regarding them as necessary for a population that possessed increasing amounts 
of leisure time.3 Historian Michelle Kleehammer argues that Moses’ conception of parks 
are best understood within the framework of conservationism as defined by Samuel 
Hays, that “public recreational space was a commodity to be used and conserved much 
like timber, water, and other resources recognized by the Progressives.” In order for the 
public to utilize park spaces in the most efficient way possible, they needed to be altered 
to include recreational facilities and carefully managed: to leave park land in its purest 
natural state would be wasting its potential; like Olmsted, Moses did not see a tension 
between these modifications and the end result of a space of nature.4 Moses’ projects in 
Jamaica Bay mostly affirm Kleehammer’s assertion that Moses was a “wise use” 
conservationist, but the Master Builder’s work with the Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge 
complicates the picture somewhat. 
  
Changing Course, 1930-1938 
 With the only development of the port scheme confined to Mill Basin, the Jamaica 
Bay region still possessed significant amounts of undeveloped land ripe for exploitation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 Galen Cranz, The Politics of Park Design, A History of Urban Parks in America 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), 3–7, 61–63, 101–106.  4!Michelle Kleehammer, “Robert Moses, Jones Beach, and the Legacy of Progressive-
Era Conservationism,” Long Island Historical Journal 14, nos. 1-2 (2001-2002): 29. For 
the constructed nature of Central Park, see Anne Whiston Spirn, “Constructing Nature: 
The Legacy of Frederick Law Olmsted,” in Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human 
Place in Nature (New York: Norton, 1995), 91–113. Christopher Sellers points out that 
perceptions of the “naturalness” of Moses’ parks varied depending on the observer’s 
own experiences: see Christopher Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature and 
the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth Century America (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2012), 95-96. 
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when Robert Moses ascended to his positions of authority in the City. Within a decade, 
he had created schemes purposing most of these lands for highways and parks, 
methodically proceeding area by area. His plans did not go unopposed, for the existing 
project’s course of action—filling in marshes to consolidate the islands—offered a 
convenient outlet for dealing with the growing problem of the City’s garbage. Moses 
created a narrative of renewal, portraying his efforts as saving the City’s last remaining 
wild treasures from pollution and exploitation. 
The Master Builder articulated his plans for the Jamaica Bay region as early as 
1930. Speaking before the New York City Park Association on February 25, he laid out 
a grand scheme for the City’s transportation system. The centerpiece was a series of 
parkways encircling the City to provide express motor transport between boroughs. One 
of these highways, which would eventually become the Belt Parkway, was to encircle 
Jamaica Bay on the southwestern shore in Brooklyn, then break north in Queens. 
Moses’ parkways were also literally “park” ways, possessing areas of natural space. 
Along Jamaica Bay’s north shore, Moses envisioned the road’s “ribbon park” as a way 
of preserving lands from development, securing their future as recreational spaces.5 
The project was approved in 1938, and the first section of road opened two years later.6 
With the new roads enabling greatly increased accessibility to outlying areas of 
the City like the Jamaica Bay region, the rehabilitation of this once widely used summer 
resort was a logical adjunct. Moses first turned his eye to the Rockaway Peninsula. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5 Caro, The Power Broker, 343–45. 6 “City Votes $16,000,000 to Build Brooklyn-Queens Belt Parkway,” New York Times, 
October 14, 1938; “Belt Road to Open to Traffic Today,” New York Times, June 29, 
1940. 
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Similar to Jamaica Bay itself, the Rockaways—once a thriving summer resort—had 
fallen upon hard times during the depression.7 Under a new agency created by the New 
York State legislature in 1934, the Marine Parkway Authority, he created the Marine 
Parkway Bridge to connect Brooklyn with Breezy Point on the Rockaway peninsula—an 
improvement long desired by the City. The project was completed in 1937.8 
One of the benefits of the new bridge was the easy access it provided to an old 
ocean-fronting park: Jacob Riis Park. Similar to the way he exploited the Triborough 
Bridge Authority, Moses used the ability of the Marine Parkway Authority to raise bonds 
without significant public oversight to finance the improvement of the park. The new Riis 
Park conformed to Moses’ ideals of park design, featuring modern recreational facilities 
like concessions, bathhouses, a pitch-and-putt golf course, playgrounds, and a 
boardwalk in a beautiful natural setting. Contemporary observers contrasted the park 
with nearby Coney Island, noting its lack of plebian attractions and amusements. The 
park opened with the bridge in 1937, but Moses was not yet done exploiting the Marine 
Parkway Authority.9 
The same year that Riis Park and the Marine Parkway Bridge opened, Moses 
devised a scheme to utilize existing balances from both the Marine Parkway Authority 
and Henry Hudson Authority (which had built the eponymous bridge) to finance a 
massive $12 million improvement of public beaches on the eastern Rockaway 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7 Lawrence Kaplan and Carol P. Kaplan, Between Ocean and City: The Transformation 
of Rockaway, New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 8–21. 8 “Governor Signs Bill for Marine Parkway,” New York Times, April 9, 1934; “Beach at 
Riis Park to Open on June 19,” New York Times, June 7, 1937. 9 “Beach at Riis Park to Open on June 19.” 
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Peninsula. The project took two years to complete, opening in 1939. The sculpted 
beaches featured bathhouses, concessions, and recreational facilities such as tennis 
courts. Moses argued: 
The Rockaway Improvement may not be a model to be followed in the 
development of unspoiled natural beaches. I believe however, that it will 
be a guide to those who seek to reclaim beaches which man has spoiled, 
and to restore them at least measurably for the purposes to which they 
were intended by nature. 
 
The quote demonstrates Moses’ conservationist ethos, demonstrating the importance 
he accorded the proper management of natural spaces: it is the facilities and alterations 
of the space that enabled its proper use by the public as “intended by nature.”!10 
 With virtually the entirety of Jamaica Bay save for its eastern shore either 
developed or incorporated into schemes, Moses introduced his plans for the bay itself in 
1938, in a carefully prepared publication entitled The Future of Jamaica Bay. In typical 
Moses fashion, it was an impressive piece of marketing, including extensive 
photographs and illustrations along with its prescriptions for the space. Moses called for 
the bay to become a massive park. He pointed out that the alternative was the port 
scheme, described as a plan that would “never be successful, but will ruin Jamaica Bay 
for housing and play.” He insisted that the choice not be left to “land speculators and 
crackpot industrial theorists,” pointing out that the City had more than enough port 
facilities in Staten Island to expand into as it was.11 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10 New York City Parkway Authority, Rockaway Improvement (New York: New York City 
Parkway Authority, 1939). 11  New York City Department of Parks, The Future of Jamaica Bay (New York: New 
York City Department of Parks, 1938). 
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Moses drew upon the older conception of Jamaica Bay as a wasteland in order to 
sell his scheme. He argued that “Jamaica Bay is the last remaining area in New York 
City whose character is undetermined,” going on to quote the recent New York Herald 
Tribune editorial (discussed in chapter three) describing the bay as a “strange corner of 
primitive romance” possessing “low, grassy and mysterious-seeming islands”.12 Moses 
would use similar language in a 1948 letter to the Board of Estimate asking it to further 
the project, describing the bay as possessing the “sole remaining primitive areas within 
the city which have not changed since the first European landed on our shores” and as 
“the most unique and unusual park area within the boundaries of any city in the 
country.”13 
The scheme presented a number of actionable steps and general guidelines for 
the final shape of the park. First, Moses asked the City to scrap the 1922 port plans. He 
then requested that all lands in and around the bay be rezoned and transferred to the 
Parks Department for development into park spaces save for small industrial zones at 
Mill Basin and Idlewild. The islands were to be cleared for public use, including Broad 
Channel, described as the product of an “outrageous lease to a real estate speculator.” 
After pollution was abated, the bay would be used for swimming, fishing, boating, and 
the preservation of wildlife. Additionally, Moses noted the bay’s possibilities for housing, 
presumably the shoreline spaces not dedicated to parks or industry.14 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12 Ibid. 13 Robert Moses to The New York City Board of Estimate, June 10, 1948, Folder: 
Department of Parks, 1948, Box 99, Papers of Robert Moses, New York Public Library 
Milstein Division. 14 New York City Department of Parks, The Future of Jamaica Bay. 
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Although Moses acknowledged the existing conception of the bay as polluted, he 
implied that it was something that could be removed. As before, the residents of the bay 
were conflated with the pollution. In The Future of Jamaica Bay, Moses described Broad 
Channel as a type of “mushroom development,” chastising the carelessness of the 
planners who allowed its development but also associating the community with decay 
like fungus upon a log. He included a number of pictures showing muddy flats strewn 
with trash behind rickety looking houses, images consistent with contemporary 
descriptions of Broad Channel as a low class, decrepit community. The images implied 
that the residents of Broad Channel were unable to properly manage their space, and 
that Moses’ expertise would be the only way to bring about the proper utilization of the 
bay.15 
The chief opposition to Moses’ plan within New York City government came from 
Sanitation Commissioner William Carey. When one of the City’s main garbage dumps, 
Riker’s Island, was slated to be closed because of the rapidly approaching 1939 World’s 
Fair (the mounds of garbage were visible from the Fair site), Carey needed a new place 
to put the trash.16 The Sanitation Commissioner eyed Jamaica Bay as the solution for 
his garbage disposal problem: with the harbor scheme still on the books, the move was 
justified as a way to help create the port’s central islands, with the trash serving as 
landfill.17 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15 Ibid. 16 Stuart Miller and Sharon Seitz, The Other Islands of New York, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Norton, 2011), 199–203. 17 “100 Groups United to Fight Bay Dump,” New York Times, June 5, 1938. The City 
failed to deal with Riker’s Island in time for the Fair. To mask the unsightly piles of trash, 
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Moses deployed a variety of tactics to stymie Carey. The Future of Jamaica Bay 
contained an illustration labeled “Civic Nightmare” (figure 11) depicting what Jamaica 
Bay would look like if Carey got his way, showing flaming towers of refuse that echoed 
contemporary depictions of Riker’s Island. After firing this initial volley, Moses wrote 
Carey, insisting that public opinion was on his side. He suggested that the Sanitation 
Commissioner eliminate his plan in order to save face, which would make the issue “a 
scrap between the residential and recreational interests and the industrial boys and the 
speculators.” Carey shot right back, noting that “there is, I am sure, precedent to support 
the statement that many times a worthy procedure must be abandoned because well 
directed though somewhat exaggerated opposition is brought to bear on the question.”18 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Carey and Moses worked together to plant hundreds of trees around the island, giving it 
the appearance of a forest: see Miller and Seitz, The Other Islands, 199-203. 18 Robert Moses to The Honorable William F. Carey, Commissioner of Sanitation, July 
20, 1938, Folder: Department of Parks, 1936-37, Box 97, Papers of Robert Moses, New 
York Public Library Milstein Division; William F. Carey to Robert Moses, July 22, 1938, 
Folder: Department of Parks, 1938, Box 97, Papers of Robert Moses, New York Public 
Library Milstein Division. 
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Figure 11. New York City Department of Parks, The Future of Jamaica Bay. 
 Moses also enlisted the help of friends at the New York Times. Two months 
before the Future of Jamaica Bay was released, he wrote Iphigene Sulzberger, wife of 
the owner and publisher of the Times, requesting that the paper investigate the 
Sanitation Department’s stoppage of burning trash in incinerators; Moses believed that 
resuming this practice would obviate the need for dumping.19 An article doing that very 
thing with a title unflattering to Carey’s position, “100 Groups United to Fight Bay 
Dump,” soon appeared, lending credence to Moses’ case that the public supported his 
position.20 The intensity of the onslaught led Carey to drop his bid for the bay in 
September 1938.21 
 From 1930 to 1938, Robert Moses dramatically altered the course of Jamaica 
Bay’s development. Over the past half-century a variety of actors within government had 
exercised agency over the space—often acting at odds to one another—but now a 
single individual was responsible for its future path. As powerful as he was, Moses still 
had to contend with existing conceptions of the bay’s space, yet he was able to harness 
them to his cause with great effectiveness, creating the promise of a veritable Garden of 
Eden out of a spoiled wasteland. With Moses calling all of the shots, it must have 
seemed to contemporary observers that a single, coherent vision was going to finally 
emerge for the bay, yet the Master Builder would quickly discover that there were forces !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!19 Robert Moses to Mrs. Arthur Kays Sulzberger, May 25, 1938, Folder: Department of 
Parks, 1938, Box 97, Papers of Robert Moses, New York Public Library Milstein 
Division. 20 “100 Groups United to Fight Bay Dump.” 21 “Carey Bows to Protest On Jamaica Bay Dump,” New York Times, September 25, 
1938. 
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at work beyond even his control, and as before, the bay’s residents would not hesitate 
to shape the space as they saw fit. 
 
Securing the Bay, 1938-1950 
 With most opposition to his plans quashed, Moses proceeded to acquire the bay 
for the Parks Department. Although The Future of Jamaica Bay implied that only 
pollution hindered the creation of a paradise within the bay, a variety of factors emerging 
out of the space’s complex history complicated its development. The Master Builder was 
forced to make a number of compromises with the legal regimes regulating the use of 
the bay and the Broad Channel community.  
The process of acquiring the bay for the Parks Department took more than a 
decade thanks to the number of parties having jurisdiction over the space; these 
complexities would portend future difficulties faced by Moses. The first step was to 
acquire clean title to the bay from New York State: this was necessary because the 
1909 law transferring ownership of the bay’s underwater lands to the City mandated that 
the space be used for a harbor. With his usual effectiveness, Moses was able to secure 
passage of a bill by the New York State Legislature transferring the lands to the City in 
1939.22 
The issue of Broad Channel, which Moses targeted for demolition, proved to be 
significantly more complicated. Moses suggested in the Future of Jamaica Bay that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!22 Robert Moses to The New York City Board of Estimate, June 13, 1944, Folder: 
Department of Parks, 1944, Box 98, Papers of Robert Moses, New York Public Library 
Milstein Division. 
!! 118!
City discontinue its lease to the Broad Channel Corporation when it was up for renewal 
in 1945, and then evict the residents. In 1939, the Corporation went bankrupt, reverting 
control of its lands back to the City. Instead of ending the matter, an unexpected 
difficulty emerged: the residents of Broad Channel rented land from the Corporation, not 
their houses, which they owned. Condemning Broad Channel would entail a significant 
expense for the City due to the cost of reimbursements.23 
The residents of Broad Channel, which had developed into a tight-knit residential 
community, united in protest, launching an effective public relations campaign against 
Moses’ plans. In their past dealings with the Broad Channel Corporation, which were 
often tense, the residents had banded together to form the Broad Channel Home 
Owners’ Association in order to coordinate their activities; this organization 
spearheaded the current campaign. Thanks to their efforts to contact local officials and 
spread the word about the imminent destruction of their community, sympathetic articles 
appeared in local newspapers. One article depicted the residents as a group of 
conscientious homeowners, quoting a local resident discussing how his life savings was 
invested in the improvements he had made; he also pointed out that though Moses 
depicted his community as a “slum,” the pictures in his pamphlet were taken 
immediately after a “typhoon” had struck the community, creating a false impression.24 
Another article quoted a Broad Channel resident asking why the City was contemplating 
destroying the community when they were spending millions to build new homes for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!23 “Home Owners Fight Moses Plan to Make Park of Broad Channel,” Long Island Star-
Journal, December 15, 1938; “Jamaica Bay Home Owners Are Jittery,” Long Island 
Daily Press, August 24, 1938. 24 “Jamaica Bay Home Owners Are Jittery.” 
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“destitute families,” implying that the residents were responsible and upstanding 
citizens. 25 In sum, the residents sought to create the impression of a well-ordered 
community and that they were proper stewards of Jamaica Bay, pushing back against 
the dominant conceptions in media and those advanced by Moses. 
Moses soon changed course when an opportunity to solve a related problem 
presented itself. Although it may seem out of character, Moses came to believe that the 
Broad Channel issue threatened to become a political liability. In response to a 1944 
memo from City Planning Commissioner Cleveland Rodgers suggesting that the City go 
ahead and demolish Broad Channel, Moses declared that Rogers showed no “common 
sense” and that “only an irresponsible perfectionist who ignores the political aspects of 
the situation will support your recommendation.”26 Moses must have quickly come to 
this conclusion, because in 1939, he devised a scheme to sell Broad Channel’s lands to 
its residents in order to finance the reconstruction of Cross Bay Boulevard—slated to be 
done as part of his Rockaway Improvement project. The matter was referred to the City 
Planning Commission in 1940 for study.27 
Solving the Broad Channel issue would prove to be more complicated than 
Moses had hoped. In 1944, the Planning Commission determined that in order to sell 
the lands, they needed to possess certain features to meet code, of greatest import 
roads that met a certain width and grade and sanitary sewers. Moreover, it found that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!25 “Home Owners Fight Moses Plan.” 26 Robert Moses to Cleveland Rodgers, Commissioner, City Planning Commission, April 
14, 1944, Folder: Department of Parks, 1944, Box 98, Papers of Robert Moses, New 
York Public Library Milstein Division. 27 “Sale of Broad Channel Land Results in Unique Problem,” Rockaway Review, 
February 1944. 
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the needed improvements would be very expensive, costing at least two million dollars, 
yet they were nonetheless feasible.28 In light of the report, the City Board of Estimate 
voted in 1945 to approve the basic guidelines of the plan. In the meantime, Broad 
Channel’s residents were granted a three-year extension of their leases while the City 
worked out the plan’s implementation out to a desire to avoid “injury and hardship” to 
the community. By 1948, when the leases were once again up for renewal, the City had 
still not carried out the scheme, claiming a shortage of funding. An uneasy status quo 
developed: the Board of Estimate voted once more to extend Broad Channel’s leases 
temporarily; the process would be repeated numerous times over the upcoming 
decades, prompting anxiety among Broad Channelites whenever the issue came up for 
a vote.29 
With the Broad Channel issue somewhat resolved, acquisition of the remaining 
lands could proceed. The process took five years, beginning in 1945. That year, the 
Board of Estimate transferred a large number of City-owned lands to the Parks 
Department, officially ending the City’s commitment to the port scheme.30 Four years 
later, the Department gained authority over the northern shore, and finally, in 1950, the 
City provided funding to condemn the remaining lands still occupied by individuals.31 
While Moses was orchestrating his schemes for Jamaica Bay, in 1941, Mayor 
LaGuardia put into motion a plan to build a new airport on the bay’s northeastern shore. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!28 “The Rebuilding of Broad Channel,” Rockaway Review, June 1944. 29 Gene Ruffini, “The Forgotten Island,” Long Island Daily Press, May 27, 1957. 30 “Jamaica Bay Super-Park Plan Gets Green Light from City,” New York Daily News, 
March 2, 1945. 31 “Jamaica Bay Land Set Aside for Park,” New York Times, June 17, 1949; Charles G. 
Bennett, “City Acts to Seize Jamaica Bay Land,” New York Times, July 5, 1950. 
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Anticipating a boom in air travel after World War Two that was projected to overwhelm 
the recently opened LaGuardia Field, City officials selected the Jamaica Bay site 
because of its proximity to the modern parkways developed by Moses and the clear 
approach it offered planes—among other reasons.32 Most of the 1,200-acre site, at 
Idlewild, was occupied by a golf course, and had less than 200 homes—most of them 
summer houses. That year, with the assistance of federal money, the City began the 
process of acquiring the property, gaining title on December 30.33 The project took 
seven years, with the airport opening for service on July 1, 1948. By the time it had 
opened, the project had been expanded to a total of 3,150 acres, making it the largest 
airport in the world.34 
At the time of the airport’s construction, the community of Idlewild seemed 
particularly behind the times to contemporary observers. Although it had been home to 
a small resort, the site experienced the same decline as the rest of the bay’s 
recreational sites. A 1935 article described Idlewild’s main feature as a boarded-up 
hotel, a remnant from the bay’s resort era.35 Another, from 1941, described the hotel 
and other remaining relics as part of a former “dilapidated Venice-on-Jamaica Bay,” 
revealing the conflation of this conception of space with pollution and decline.36 A 1942 
article reported on a man named Charles Sylvester, an 80-year old fisherman who was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!32 “Mayor Asks Fund for New Airport,” New York Times, August 15, 1941; “Idlewild 
Airport Wins Council Test,” New York Times, December 6, 1941. 33 “New Airport Site Acquired by City,” New York Times, December 31, 1941. 34 “Idlewild Airport Officially Opened,” New York Times, July 1, 1948. 35 Sarah Wilford, “Idlewild Park Hotel Waiting for Renaissance,” Long Island Daily Press, 
September 17, 1935. 36 “Roar of Planes May Revive Idlewood, Society’s Orphan,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 
September 9, 1941. 
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the sole resident of a small parcel of land called Thurston Island. Described as a 
“character out of ‘Tobacco Road,” Sylvester was attempting to negotiate with the City for 
a larger sum of money to be paid for his condemned property. The reporter observed 
that he brought an “old potato sack” with “three tin boxes” to court with him, one 
containing the deed to his island and other legal documents, the other two food which 
“he feared to leave in his shack because the island had voracious rodents.” The 
bemused tone of the article reflects the understanding of the bay as a fallen space, yet 
also hints at its “primitive romance”—excluding the rats. The juxtaposition is even more 
striking considering the plans to build an airport: a symbol of modernity and 
technological progress.37 
Even after the condemnations, thousands of residents remained in the vicinity of 
Idlewild as “squatters,” but observers saw nothing romantic about them. Many of the 
homes had somehow escaped demolition due to technicalities involving their removal. 
Papers reported on the residents with a mixture of revulsion and pity suffused with class 
bias. One article described them as “swamp-dwellers” living perilously close to Jamaica 
Bay, whose “polluted waters… washed over cesspools, garbage cans and dumps, and 
left germ-laden deposits in their wake.” The collection of “shacks” was contrasted with 
nearby Howard Beach and Broad Channel, which had developed into “vigorous 
communities… predominantly made up of properly maintained one-family homes, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!37 “Hermit Balks City on Idlewild Deal,” New York Times, January 9, 1942. See David 
Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1994) for cultural 
attitudes towards technology. 
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gardens vieing {sic} with each other for color and neatness.” 38  Ironically, Jamaica Bay’s 
waters were probably the cleanest they had been in decades considering the new 
sewage treatment plants, yet the conception of the bay and its residents as being 
tainted by pollution continued. By 1972, only a handful of people remained in Idlewild, 
but the hamlet’s time would soon be over because the City was slated to build a 
highway onramp through the remaining houses; the residents were reported to be 
“eager” to lose their homes thanks to the decrepit condition of their community and the 
reimbursements they were slated to receive for their property.39 
By 1955, most of the remaining aspects of the bay’s Venice era were destroyed. 
In 1954, the remaining residents of the Raunt were evicted. Although only a handful still 
lived in the community, residents like Paul Kuhn, a commercial artist, mourned its 
passing: “The water is what drew most of us to the Raunt in the first place… where else 
can be find {sic} another place like this? There is no other Raunt.”40 The quote from 
Kuhn reveals the continuation of the ideal of Jamaica Bay’s settlements as hybrid 
spaces of city and water, even as they were becoming more conventionally suburban. A 
year later, the residents of Ruffle Bar—one of the few islands privately owned until 
Moses’ condemnation proceedings—occupying 15 houses, were forced to leave. With 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!38 Seymour Marks, “Disease and Death Stalk Swamps Where 3,000 Make Their 
Homes,” Long Island Daily Press, April 26, 1950. The positive spin on Broad Channel 
reveals how the community was able to rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the public 
against Moses’ onslaught. 39 Glenn Singer, “They WANT to Lose Their Homes,” New York Times, January 23, 
1972. 40 Richard Petrow, “The Raunt Goes Back to the Birds,” Long Island Daily Press, 
October 10, 1954. 
!! 124!
the bay secured, Moses was finally able to start the transformation of its spaces into the 
park he envisioned.41 
From the introduction of his plans in 1938 through 1950, Robert Moses deftly 
manipulated the mechanisms of public power to secure Jamaica Bay for the Parks 
Department. The old plans and regulations surrounding the port scheme were gone, 
erased from public laws and City maps. With this changing of representations of the bay 
came changes to its topography—the last vestiges of the past knocked down to make 
way for renewal. Moses’ narrative largely reigned, tarring the bay’s remaining residents 
as depraved and diseased, yet the Master Builder had underestimated the strength of 
the Broad Channel Community, who were among the few that successfully challenged 
his will. 
 
Implementing his Vision, 1950-60 
 With the necessary steps taken to secure the bay, Moses created and put in 
motion a number of schemes to develop it for recreation. Despite his best efforts, as 
with the process of acquiring the bay a number of problems emerged, most importantly 
the frustratingly tenacious water pollution. A new round of alterations to the bay 
nonetheless commenced, beginning the task of reclaiming the bay for nature through 
human action. 
Moses’ plans called for recreational facilities at a variety of sites, many of them 
hugging the Ribbon Parkway. On the northern shore, Canarsie and Spring Creek were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!41 “Playground for the Birds,” New York Daily News, September 4, 1955. 
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to have bathing, boating, and picnic facilities. In the southwest, Marine Park and Plumb 
Beach were to have beaches and golf courses. In the east, at sites south of Idlewild 
Airport, Jamaica Bay Park was to feature bathing, and Idlewild Park was to feature a 
golf course. Additionally, a beach was planned for Broad Channel Island, as well as 
boating facilities.42 
The City made little substantive progress on the project during the 1950s. Many 
of the sites, particularly Marine Park and Spring Creek, consisted of marshes unsuitable 
for park use in their current form, necessitating extensive filling.43 Ironically, Moses 
supported the use of garbage for landfill, a move that would come back to haunt the City 
decades later when they discovered that PCBs had been included among the trash 
dumped at landfills along the bay’s northern shore.44 Although numerous acres of solid 
land were created, the City was unable to use it: in spite of the opening of the bay’s final 
sewage treatment plant in 1952, completing the program put forth in the 1930s, a City-
financed study from the late 1950s discovered that raw sewage was still being ejected 
into the bay. The problem lay with the combined sewer system, where sanitary sewage 
and stormwater flowed together to treatment plants: the City estimated that during 
periods of heavy rain, up to ninety percent of the sanitary flow could escape treatment 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!42 New York City Department of Parks, Twenty-Six Years of Park Progress (New York: 
New York City Department of Parks, 1960), 11–12. The document is the bi-annual 
report of the Parks Department. The creative naming reflects the intensity of Moses’ 
self-marketing. 43 William A. Raidy, “Long Island’s Wonderland of Tomorrow,” Long Island Sunday 
Press, October 13, 1957. 44 “Moses Would Keep Garbage Fill Plan,” New York Times, May 21, 1951; Onishi 
Norimitsu, “Neighborhood Report: Jamaica Bay; Plans in Works for Restoring Jamaica 
Bay,” New York Times, October 16, 1994. 
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due to plants becoming overwhelmed, making the bay unsafe for swimming. As long as 
the bay remained dangerously polluted, the City did not proceed with building facilities 
that would be unsafe to use.45 
The main accomplishment of the Parks Department and Robert Moses in the 
Jamaica Bay area resulted from an unexpected disaster. In 1950, a fire on the Long 
Island Railroad’s cross-bay trestle put the Rockaway line out of commission, placing the 
company in a difficult position.46 The high cost of rebuilding the trestle led the trustees of 
the railroad—which was experiencing financial problems—to decide to abandon the line. 
City officials condemned the move because of the hardship it inflicted on Rockaway 
residents dependent upon public transportation for commuting to jobs across the bay. 
For this reason, officials decided to purchase the line from the Long Island Railroad in 
1951 and incorporate it into the existing mass transit system. The trestle reopened in 
1956 after extensive improvements.47 
The reconstruction of the Rockaway line entailed significant dredging, much of it 
in the vicinity of Broad Channel. Never missing an opportunity, Moses had the 
construction teams create two artificial ponds—one nearly 200 acres, the other fifty—on 
northern Broad Channel island. They were to serve as avian habitat, becoming the 
Jamaica Bay Bird Sanctuary (part of the larger Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge, which 
encompassed the islands). Moses had envisioned wildlife preservation in The Future of 
Jamaica Bay, yet with the continuing existence of Broad Channel and other settlements, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45  Department of Parks, Twenty-Six Years of Park Progress, 33–34, 64–65. 46 “LIRR May Abandon Burned Beach Line,” New York Times, May 9, 1950. 47 “Rockaway Line to Open on Time,” New York Times, February 10, 1956. 
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these plans had largely been unrealized. He arranged for grasses and trees to be 
planted around the ponds to support the birds, and hired a superintendent to supervise 
the site.48 
The Refuge quickly became a popular site for both people and birds when it 
opened in 1953. Numerous avian species utilized the space because it was located on 
major migration routes.49 In 1960, the first year attendance figures show up in Parks 
Department reports, 15,000 people visited, but the number grew to 40,000 by 1962; 
officials attributed the increase to the continued development of the site’s nesting 
grounds. They also reached out to public schools, delivering lectures on the 
preservation efforts to students. The Parks Department coordinated with agencies like 
the Audubon Society, the United States Department of the Interior, and the New York 
State Conservation Department to ensure the project’s success.50 
The Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge reflects Moses’ conservationist ethos because 
it was a carefully managed space of nature, in his own words a “game refuge,” but 
certain features of the space complicate the traditional “wise use” understanding of 
conservation.!51 Because hunting was not allowed in Jamaica Bay, it was not a game 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!48 John O’Reilly, “Wildlife on the Subway,” New York Herald Tribune, ca 1950, Folder: 
Jamaica Bay Park Development, Vertical Files, Archive at Queens Library, Queens 
Public Library, Central Branch, Jamaica, NY. 49 “Bird Life Revives on Jamaica Bay,” New York Times, May 7, 1955. 50 Department of Parks, Twenty-Six Years of Park Progress, 11–12; New York City 
Department of Parks, Twenty-Eight Years of Park Progress (New York: New York City 
Department of Parks, 1962), 11–12. 51 Robert Moses to Harry Levy, December 28, 1956, Folder: Department of Parks, 1956, 
Box 100, Papers of Robert Moses, New York Public Library Milstein Division. 
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refuge in the traditional sense.52 Although the refuge was designed to accommodate 
human use, as seen by its programs for visitors, it greatly benefitted migrating birds in a 
preservationist sense. If one is willing to go beyond the older historiographical debate 
between conservation and preservation, the space reflects many of aspects of 
conservationism as defined by Christopher Sellers: it was a space focused on 
preserving what was understood as a remaining wilderness, it was done on the behalf of 
a more elite constituency of society (middle class birdwatchers), and it was a space that 
was to be managed by experts.53 
Newspapers generally reported on the Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge and similar 
developments in the bay with glee, but not all observers were impressed.!54 A 1951 
article featuring former fishermen revealed that there were still individuals within the 
Jamaica Bay area capable of looking beyond simple concepts like city and nature: Bill 
Hitschler, described as a “Canarsie old-timer” described how “filling-in drives off the wild 
life… that’s where the fish feed hibernates—on the meadowland. When they started 
dredging many years ago, they shut off our mainland creeks.” Hitschler, informed by his 
work in the bay, was one of the few to notice the irony that the filling, done to make the 
area more “natural” in the eyes of officials like Robert Moses, was destroying local 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!52!“Ban on Queens Hunting,” New York Times, November 5, 1958.!53!Sellers, “Crabgrass Crucible,” 1-9. Kleehammer considers the Refuge to be an 
aberration and not representative of Moses’ overall conservationist ethos: Kleehammer, 
“Robert Moses,” 34. 54 William A. Raidy, “From Garbage Dump to Paradise Park,” Long Island Daily Press, 
March 21, 1954, is representative of the hopeful tone taken by the media during this 
period. 
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ecosystems.!55 With fewer New Yorkers possessing Hitschler’s knowledge due to the 
many changes taking place, it would be decades until wetland destruction in Jamaica 
Bay received significant attention from officials and experts.56 
 
Conclusion 
In 1960, Robert Moses retired from the Parks Department. From 1938 until his 
retirement, he had pursued the development of Jamaica Bay into a recreational park 
with laser focus, ending the City’s commitment to building a commercial and industrial 
port. Virtually all of the remaining undeveloped spaces of Jamaica Bay were 
incorporated into plans, creating the rough outlines for what Jamaica Bay is today. 
Moses told a story of devastation and renewal, imagining the bay as both a spoiled 
wasteland and an urban Eden. 
As compelling as Moses’ narrative was, it also entailed risk: with Jamaica Bay 
still largely undeveloped as a recreation area, Broad Channel still in limbo, and pollution 
still flowing into its waters, the fate of New York’s final frontier was still indeterminate. 
Sewage plants and the wildlife refuge reinforced the narrative of restoration, but slow 
progress would soon endanger the scheme: the conception of Jamaica Bay as a 
polluted and abandoned section of the City would continue to invite uses akin to Carey’s 
plan to turn the bay into a dump. Although environmentalist sentiment would be on the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!55 David Gordon, “Old Jamaica Baymen Rue Lost Marshes,” New York Daily News, 
March 1, 1951.  56!Although Gateway National Recreation Area sought to preserve wetlands, serious 
concern over these spaces did not emerge until 2000: “Panel to Study Weland Loss,” 
Rockaway Wave, February 24, 2001. 
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rise, adding fire to Moses’ dreams for the bay, continuing pressures for land in the 
nation’s largest city would make Jamaica Bay an attractive target for developers well 
into the 1960s. The battle for the bay was far from over.
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Chapter Five 
“An Ecological Fort Knox”: The Struggle For Gateway 
National Recreation Area, 1960-1972 
 
Through 1960, the best efforts of land developers and government officials had 
failed to transform the space of Jamaica Bay into a coherent form. The bay was still 
depicted on New York City maps as parkland, yet halting progress on Robert Moses’ 
plans meant that these representations of space did not conform to reality, weakening 
their power to effect change. Depending on what one chose to emphasize, the bay 
could either be horribly polluted, or one of the last remaining wild spaces in the City. 
From 1960 to 1972, various parties used these conceptions of space to argue for 
different schemes. New York City officials continued to push for Moses’ park project, yet 
much of the 1960s would see a lack of progress similar to prior decades. Business 
interests would be emboldened by this state of affairs and attempt to change course 
back towards a commercial and industrial bay, yet a new actor with the power and 
resources to effect profound change would soon emerge on the scene: the federal 
government, specifically the Department of the Interior.  
Spurred by a resurgent environmental movement, a nationwide clamor by 
experts for new recreational spaces, the demand for new solutions to urban problems, 
and Richard Nixon’s desire for political gain, in 1968, Secretary of the Interior Walter 
Hickel put forth a bold new vision for Jamaica Bay. Hickel proposed to incorporate the 
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bay and a variety of other spaces in the area into an urban national park: Gateway 
National Recreation Area, which along with Golden Gate National Recreation Area in 
San Francisco would be the first such parks of their kind in the United States. The fight 
for Gateway National Recreation Area pitted officials, conservationists, and 
representatives from New York’s minority communities against the Port of New York 
Authority, who wanted to expand Kennedy Airport into the bay to alleviate perceived 
overcrowding. Local residents were caught in the middle: both projects called for Broad 
Channel’s removal, and Gateway’s planners wanted the beachfront spaces of the 
Breezy Point Cooperative—a white working class community located on the western 
end of the Rockaway Peninsula. To resist, Breezy Point invoked Richard Nixon’s politics 
of backlash, injecting race and class into the conflict, ultimately winning themselves and 
Broad Channel a reprieve. Although the supporters of Gateway presented a united front, 
tensions over the proper balance between preservation and recreation in the park 
simmered beneath the surface. 
 
The Need for Recreation 
In order to understand why the federal government became involved with 
Jamaica Bay and the dynamics of the battle that ensued, one must consider an earlier 
episode in the vicinity of the bay, at Breezy Point, on the western end of the Rockaway 
Peninsula. Responding to planners who argued that the nation faced a serious shortage 
of recreational spaces, officials eyed Breezy Point as an ideal spot for mitigating the 
perceived crisis. The site’s near-pristine beaches were viewed as some of the best 
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remaining recreational spaces in the area, yet the peninsula’s residents would be loath 
to give up their homes.1 
Providing for the country’s recreational needs acquired a new urgency in the 
postwar period. Aided by expanded leisure time, widespread automobile ownership, and 
massive public investment in roads, Americans were engaging in outdoor recreation at a 
higher rate than ever before. Officials at all levels of government and a variety of 
independent advocacy groups argued that existing parks facilities were being overused, 
threatening their long-term potential to provide for Americans’ recreational needs.!2 The 
Regional Plan Association was an important voice in this rising clamor.3 In a series of 
reports released in 1960, the Association painted a stark picture of the need for more 
recreational lands. Based on current trends, they calculated that over the next twenty-
five years total park acreage nationwide needed to double to keep up with demand. 
They argued that older cities like New York would have trouble meeting this need due to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Michael Kelleher, “The Changing Standard of National Significance: How the New 
Environmentalism of the 1960s Redefined National Significance and Led to the Creation 
of Gateway National Recreation Area, the First Urban National Park,” 1995, Gateway 
National Recreation Area Cultural Resources Library, Staten Island, NY deals with this 
issue in depth, and provided a start for my investigations. 2 Samuel Hays, Beauty, Health and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United 
States, 1955-1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 115–17, 288. 3!The Regional Plan Association, an independent policy research and advocacy group, 
dates from 1922. The Association embodies the Progressive Era ethos of applying 
technical solutions like regional planning to urban problems, gaining notoriety with the 
release of their 1929 “Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs.” For more on the 
development of regional planning in New York City, see Keith D. Revell, Building 
Gotham: Civic Culture and Public Policy in New York City, 1898-1938 (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
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land pressures.4 In recognition of this fact, they identified 140,000 acres of available 
land at 200 sites in the region and urged officials to acquire it as quickly as possible 
before it was put to other use.5 
 On the state level, in 1960 New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller made a large 
push to finance the acquisition of lands for recreational use. Responding to 
recommendations made by the State Conservation Department in concert with Robert 
Moses acting in his capacity as chairman of the State Council of Parks, Rockefeller 
asked the legislature to approve a ballot measure authorizing a $75 million bond issue 
to finance the immediate acquisition of lands statewide. Rockefeller cited concerns 
similar to those raised by the Regional Plan Association, namely that the demand for 
recreational areas was exploding and that development pressures necessitated an 
immediate response by public officials.6 The issue was approved, and was eventually 
increased to $100 million.7 
In August 1962, the Regional Plan Association released detailed plans for the 
development of the western end of the Rockaway Peninsula—Breezy Point—following 
in the footsteps of their earlier recommendations. The area was considered to have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4 Mario Clawson, Park, Recreation and Open Space Project of the Tri-State New York 
Metropolitan Region by the Metropolitan Regional Council of the Regional Plan 
Association. Vol 2: The Dynamics of Park Demand (New York: Regional Plan 
Association, 1960), 30. 5 William Niering, Park, Recreation and Open Space Project of the Tri-State New York 
Metropolitan Region by the Metropolitan Regional Council of the Regional Plan 
Association. Vol 3: Nature in the Metropolis: Conservation in the Tri-State New York 
Metropolitan Region (New York: Regional Plan Association, 1960), 61. 6 “Text of Governor’s Message on Park Bond Issue,” New York Times, March 13, 1960. 7 Layhmond Robinson, “Governor Vetoes Breezy Point Bill,” New York Times, April 20, 
1963. 
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some of the finest oceanfront beaches in New York City. Apart from Riis Park, which 
separated Breezy Point from more developed areas on the peninsula to the east, and 
Fort Tilden, a small military installation abutting Riis Park, the only existing development 
was a white working class community of 2500 homes, the Breezy Point Cooperative. 
The Cooperative started out as a collection of vacation homes built on sites leased from 
a developer—the Atlantic Improvement Corporation; despite consisting of small 
bungalows, the community’s homes were increasingly becoming occupied year-round. 
By the 60s Breezy Point had 900 permanent residents. After Atlantic Improvement 
attempted to evict the residents in order to build high-rise apartment buildings, they 
banded together into the Breezy Point Cooperative, pooling their resources in order to 
buy the land beneath their houses. The Cooperative was successful in carrying out their 
scheme, winning a reprieve from their landlord.8 
Using the plans developed by the Regional Plan Association, in October 1962, 
Mayor Robert Wagner declared his intention to purpose Breezy Point for recreation.9 An 
important factor driving Wagner to action was assurances he had received from 
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall that the federal government would be providing 
financial support to the project, with the Secretary going so far as to note that it would 
receive the “first priority of anything in the country I’ve looked at”; this reflects the 
growing involvement of the federal government with recreation. The two appeared 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8 Joe Janoff, “Park Plan Angers Breezy Point,” New York World-Telegram, October 8, 
1962. 9 Charles G. Bennett, “Site in Rockaway Is Urged as Park,” New York Times, August 15, 
1962. 
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together a number of times, taking a helicopter tour of the area and giving press 
conferences to make the effort publicly visible.10 
Though Wagner won an early victory, his efforts were quickly stymied. The New 
York City Planning Commission condemned the entirety of Breezy Point’s lands for $12 
million, but Atlantic Improvement was able to quickly obtain a ruling that deemed that 
number to be too low, ordering the City to pay nearly $40 million dollars for the lands. 
While the City contemplated its next move, residents of the Breezy Point Cooperative 
protested en masse at City Hall, winning a reprieve from the condemnation. The high 
price required for obtaining Atlantic Improvement’s lands would necessitate the 
cooperation with the federal government promised by Udall, but it would take a new 
Secretary of the Interior to ultimately come through. In the meantime, the City continued 
to attempt to develop spaces it already possessed, like Jamaica Bay.11 
  
 
The Persistence of Water Pollution, 1960-1969 
During Robert Moses’ tenure at the Parks Department, the City poured millions of 
dollars into new sewage treatment plants as part of its efforts to create Jamaica Bay 
parkland, yet by 1960 important gaps still remained in the City’s treatment regimen. With 
plans for park development still underway, officials resolved to keep working towards a 
fix. In spite of the greatly increased level of treatment from the new sewage works, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10 Martin Arnold, “Mayor Gives Hope For Breezy Point,” New York Times, October 5, 
1962. 11 Michael Stern, “Public Use of Breezy Point Rises Despite Local Opposition,” New 
York Times, July 4, 1968. 
!! 137!
prevailing conception of the space continued to be dominated by the fact that it was 
polluted.  
Despite calls for action by the Parks Department to solve the problem of the 
combined sewer, progress proved very slow. A special commission appointed by Mayor 
Wagner presented a plan in 1959 to upgrade existing facilities and construct additional 
capacity to treat stormwater, yet little would be done in the early 1960s save for drawing 
up plans.12 Presumably, costs played a factor, with the plan’s $1.3 billion price tag 
forcing the City to seek state and federal help. Thanks to grant money, construction of 
the first auxiliary treatment plan started at Spring Creek in 1968 yet was not completed 
until 1971.13 
With the bay still not clean and amelioration moving at a glacial pace, colorfully 
revolting descriptions of its space started to appear in newspapers. One article featured 
a scientist describing the bottom of the bay around Kennedy Airport as being coated 
with “black mayonnaise” due to a filthy combination of poor drainage, sewage, and 
pollution from the airport.14 Another article opened with a disgusting scene: “the pea 
soup-green water, broken by pools of oil and debris, gave off little reflection. Low-flying 
jetliners roared overhead, emitting long streams of black exhaust. And all around was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12 Seymour Marks, “Wasteland or Wonderland?: Jamaica Bay: The Filth Just Keeps 
Pouring In,” Long Island Daily Press, December 16, 1968; New York City Department of 
Parks, Twenty-Six Years of Park Progress (New York: New York City Department of 
Parks, 1960), 63–65. 13 “A Clean Jamaica Bay Envisioned in Decade,” Long Island Sunday Press, March 21, 
1971. 14 Michael Harwood, “The ‘Black Mayonnaise’ at the Bottom of Jamaica Bay,” New York 
Times, February 7, 1971. 
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the smell of rotting eggs.”15 These descriptions are decidedly more graphic than those 
that appeared during the Moses years, which acknowledged the fact that the bay was 
polluted but did not go into gory detail about greasy films and rancid smells, instead 
focusing on the progress that was supposedly being made.16 
The extra attention paid to bay pollution seems to have led officials to once more 
scrutinize Broad Channel. The community still lacked a permanent arrangement with 
New York City over its legal status: Broad Channelites wanted to buy the land beneath 
their homes, which was currently leased from the City, but to do this the community 
needed to meet City code by having a sewer system installed; who would pay for this 
was the root of the problem. By the 1960s, the estimated cost of the system had nearly 
doubled from the figure originally quoted by the City in 1945, exacerbating the already 
difficult situation.17 
When the Broad Channel community yet again faced the expiration of their short-
term leases in 1967, City officials moved to end the status quo and expel the residents 
on the grounds that their community posed a health hazard. Health Department officials 
relied upon statistics to legitimate their depiction of Broad Channel as a polluted space 
and the residents as irresponsible stewards of the bay: they described finding numerous 
violations in a recent sanitary inspection, from ninety-five cesspools leaking sewage into 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15 Michael Dyer, “Jamaica Bay Lays a Rotten Egg,” unknown periodical, May 22, 1970, 
Folder: Jamaica Bay Pollution, Vertical Files, Archive at Queens Library, Queens Public 
Library, Central Branch, Jamaica, NY. 16  William A. Raidy, “From Garbage Dump to Paradise Park,” Long Island Daily Press, 
March 21, 1954; "Bird Life Revives on Jamaica Bay,” New York Times, May 7, 1955. 17 Hal Shapiro, “Broad Channel Seeks Solution to Its Dilemma,” Long Island Daily 
Press, April 1, 1962. 
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the streets, to 400 homes discharging sewage directly into the water.18 Noting that the 
hepatitis infection rate was sixty times higher in Broad Channel than the city average, 
officials contended that the potential for a wider contagion was dire: Deputy Mayor 
Timothy Costello declared that “we can ignore [the problem] now only at our peril—
yours in the community and ours in the city.”19 Costello declared that “infants have 
already died because of the conditions here,” even though he acknowledged his 
statement was framed in the “most dramatic way possible.20” All of these efforts had an 
effect: Broad Channel would once more temporarily lose its respectability. Even 
sympathetic articles focused on negatives that implied a low-class space, one noting the 
community as having an “old, rundown, shabby look,” another calling attention to 
“crumbling summer cottages on stilts” that “jettison their wastes directly into the bay.”21 
Broad Channelites responded with skepticism, disagreeing with the City’s 
characterization of their space. Residents acknowledged problems with sewage 
disposal, but considered them to be isolated cases rather than a systemic problem. With 
little progress made on the City’s plans for Jamaica Bay, other schemes were starting to 
fill the void created by inaction, such as a 1967 recreational study conducted for the City 
that recommended tearing down Broad Channel and building golf courses in its place; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!18 New York City Department of Health, Evaluative Report Relative to Sewage Disposal 
Practices and Needs, Broad Channel Community, Borough of Queens, New York, NY 
(New York: New York City Department of Health, 1967), 2. 19 “Fear of Epidemic May Seal the Doom of Broad Channel,” Long Island Daily Press, 
May 2, 1967. 20 Ibid. 21 Shapiro, “Broad Channel Seeks Solution.” 
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residents pointed to these proposals as evidence of the City’s true intentions. The tense 
status quo between the two sides must have added to the mistrust as well.22 
As they had done many times before, the residents of Broad Channel banded 
together against the City and the negative characterizations of their community in the 
press. They continued to use the bay for activities such as swimming, with one resident 
describing the inlets surrounding the island as “extensions of their backyards”: this type 
of use can be seen as an everyday form of resistance to Costello’s efforts to define the 
space of Broad Channel as polluted; it also reflects the hybrid conception of space 
possessed by its residents.23 Broad Channelites organized a widely publicized cleanup 
of their community in the summer of 1967 assisted by the Borough President of 
Queens, Mario Cariello—an activity that sought to demonstrate how the community was 
a responsible caretaker of the bay.24 Additionally, residents wrote countless letters to 
newspapers, coordinated by the Civic and United Organizations of Broad Channel; form 
letters encouraged the writer to emphasize the salubriousness of his/her community, 
one declaring that “Broad Channel is a good clean average American Community in 
which we wish to raise our children to become good American Citizens” [emphasis 
mine]. These efforts can be seen as the Broad Channel community attempting to attach 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!22 Frank McLoughlin, “For Birds or People? War Aboil on Use of Jamaica Bay,” New 
York Daily News, April 30, 1967; Steven V. Roberts, “Eviction Fears Lash an Island in 
the Bay,” New York Times, May 5, 1967. 23 Roberts, “Eviction Fears.” 24 Richard Seelmeyer, “Shopkeepers, Housewives, Nuns Begin Broad Channel 
Cleanup,” Long Island Daily Press, May 7, 1967. 
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positive meanings to their space, depicting it as a place of tight-knit community and 
moral integrity as opposed to pollution and depravity.25 
The campaign succeeded in stopping immediate action by the City. The publicity 
surrounding the cleanup must have helped, as evidenced by sympathetic media 
coverage: instead of focusing on the unsightly portions of the community, a New York 
Times article appearing after the announcement of the cleanup noted how “the tidy 
houses frequently show signs of weekend puttering—a closed-in porch, a bit of bright 
shrubbery and new shingles.”26 Other articles offered contrary takes on the statistics 
cited by the Health Department, concluding that the threat of disease was being vastly 
blown out of proportion.27 These efforts gained Broad Channel additional time; the City 
agreed to conduct yet another study of upgrading the Community.28 
Broad Channel residents would be given hope by the results, though the fight 
was far from over. The study, released in December 1967 found the costs to have 
increased yet again to almost $6 million for storm and sanitary sewers and associated 
street upgrades; most importantly, it found that the project was still feasible, giving 
ammunition to those pushing for the preservation of the community.29 In 1968, Queens 
Borough President Mario Cariello successfully shepherded a measure to extend Broad 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!25 Broad Channel Civic Association, “Sample Letters,” March 8, 1968, Folder: The 
Struggle to Buy Our Land, Papers of the Broad Channel Historical Society, Queens 
Public Library, Broad Channel Branch. 26 Roberts, “Eviction Fears.” 27 Taylor Frances, “Statistics on Hepatitus, TB Disputed,” Long Island Daily Press, May 
3, 1967. 28 “Sewers May Save Broad Channel,” Long Island Daily Press, May 9, 1967. 29 City of New York, Office of the Mayor, An Analysis of the Broad Channel Issue (New 
York: City of New York, Office of the Mayor, 1967), ii–iii. 
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Channel’s lease for five years through the Board of Estimate. The effort encountered 
shoals when the Corporation Counsel of the City declared the measure illegal on the 
basis that the City could only enter into one-year leases, but finally, in 1969 Mayor John 
Lindsay signed legislation authorizing the longer lease term, putting the matter to rest. 
Residents expressed elation, yet the future of Broad Channel still remained in jeopardy 
as new threats had materialized in the interim.30 
 
The Perils of Slow Progress: Others Eye Jamaica Bay 
Although significant amounts of the remaining Jamaica Bay lands had been 
transferred to the city’s Parks Department during the Moses years, the fate of Jamaica 
Bay as an area set aside for recreation was by no means assured. The only significant 
progress on the park scheme originally proposed in 1938 had been the creation of the 
Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge and the implementation of pollution controls that were 
proving to be inadequate. Moses succeeded in clearing all human settlements in the 
bay save for Broad Channel, advancing the conception of the bay as being one of the 
last remaining natural spaces in the City, yet with Jamaica Bay still conceived of as 
polluted conditions were right to foil the Parks Department’s plans. 
Early calls for change came in the mid-1960s. In addition to those proposing new 
plans for recreational space such as golf courses, others called for the commercial 
development of spaces in the bay. Richard L. Geist, Vice President of the Rockaways 
Chamber of Commerce, made a determined push for industrial development in 1965, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!30 “Broad Channel Is Elated; 5-Year Leases Approved,” Rockaway Wave, May 2, 1968; 
“New Lease on Broad Channel Life,” New York Daily News, May 28, 1969. 
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generating significant publicity. Declaring the cost of developing parkland to be 
“astronomical,” most likely a reference to the extremely high cost of continuing the 
pollution abatement program, Geist argued that the undeveloped north shore of 
Jamaica Bay was an ideal spot for businesses because it offered easy access to 
numerous modes of transportation. A Parks Department spokesperson pushed back 
against the plans by pointing out that recreational facilities were almost ready near 
Spring Creek Basin and that giving up lands which could potentially be used for open 
space would be foolish in an era when such lands were growing scarce. The plans 
would go nowhere, yet the episode reveals the vulnerability created by decades of slow 
progress.31 
The most serious threat to Moses’ plans came from the Port of New York 
Authority, one of the few agencies that had defeated him in the past. Unlike New York 
City government agencies, the Authority was an interstate quasi-public entity that 
operated with significantly fewer restraints on its power; Robert Moses himself had 
utilized similar entities to great effect in implementing his plans. The Authority had dealt 
Moses one his most significant setbacks in 1947, when the City agreed to turn operation 
and development of its airports, notably the soon-to-opened Idlewild Airport, to the 
interstate agency instead of a New York City body.32 
On September 8, 1966, the Port of New York Authority announced its intention to 
expand Kennedy Airport into Jamaica Bay by twenty-five percent, citing a variety of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31 “Geist Urges Industrial Sites on Jamaica Bay Parklands,” Long Island Daily Press, 
August 11, 1965. 32  Robert Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: 
Vintage, 1975), 766–67. 
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reasons. Above all, Authority officials believed that Kennedy Airport, one of the busiest 
in the nation, was hopelessly too small. Aviation experts asserted that things would only 
get worse as larger jets such as the Boeing 747 came into service. Additionally, they 
anticipated that the use of air transportation would double over the coming decade, 
putting even more stress on the already-swamped airport. As the most serious threat 
yet to the recreational development of Jamaica Bay, the actions of the Authority 
precipitated a showdown between the numerous interested parties over the Bay’s 
future.33 
Conservationists immediately condemned the project, demanding new action by 
the City. The Sierra Club harshly denounced the plan, noting that it would hurt not only 
natural resources but also people like fishermen, duck hunters and charter boat 
captains.34 In 1968, the Park Association of New York City and the Citizens’ Housing 
and Planning Council released a report urging Mayor Lindsay to address the delays in 
Jamaica Bay by appointing an official to coordinate development. The report also 
blasted the Port Authority’s plans. Contemporaneously, Queens Assemblyman Herbert 
Posner called for a special commission to be appointed at the state level to oversee the 
bay’s development because “the city has done nothing but let the bay go downhill.” 
These efforts reveal a cognizance among officials of the threat posed by the constant 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!33 Joseph Ingraham, “Kennedy Airport Will Expand 25%,” New York Times, September 
9, 1966. 34 “Nature Groups Rap More Runways,” Long Island Daily Press, February 1968. 
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delays. The recommendations would ultimately be taken up, albeit in a different way 
than the Park Association or Posner intended.35 
Mayor Lindsay met with the new Secretary of the Interior, Walter Hickel, on 
March 20,1969 to discuss City-federal coordination in developing Jamaica Bay and 
Breezy Point. The Regional Plan Association was involved yet again: prior to the 
meeting, the group had submitted a plan to a number of lawmakers in Congress to 
develop Jamaica Bay, Floyd Bennett Field, Breezy Point, Sandy Hook (in New Jersey), 
and sites in and near Staten Island into a massive recreation area to be administered by 
the federal government. Lindsay would bring a similar plan to his meetings with the 
Interior Department. 36 
The project, described as “Gateway National Recreation Area” because its sites 
surrounded the entrance to New York Harbor, was very attractive to the new 
administration. President Nixon, presumably unaware of the prior meetings between 
Hickel and Lindsay, had asked Hickel in a May 5, 1969 memo to study the creation of a 
“national park on Long Island” for mass recreation; Hickel responded by informing Nixon 
about Gateway.37 A few weeks later, a memo from Hickel to the President noted how he 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!35 Joseph Fried, “City Urged to Aid Jamaica Bay Area,” New York Times, December 8, 
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was “encouraged by your enthusiasm for… the Gateway National Recreation 
Association.”38 
Historians characterize Nixon’s environmental policies as being born from 
political expediency. Samuel Hays describes Nixon’s environmentalism as an attempt to 
distract Americans from his Vietnam War policies.39 J. Brooks Flippen argues that while 
Nixon himself was “consumed” by the desire for partisan advantage, members of his 
staff like Hickel—who barely survived his confirmation hearings due to skepticism from 
conservation groups—saw the political reality of a resurgent environmentalism as a 
great opportunity to get things done.40 Communications from within the administration 
confirm these perspectives, such as a memo from Hickel to the Secretary of the Army 
that notes how the Gateway project would be a way of delivering on campaign 
promises, namely a plank in the 1968 Republican Party platform to establish recreation 
areas in urban areas. 41 Whether done for immediate political gain or not, the focus also 
reflects the continuing importance of recreation on the federal level. 
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Gateway can also be seen as emerging from a renewed attention to urban 
problems at all levels of government, in particular an awareness of what was referred to 
as the “urban crisis.” Federal intervention in cities had greatly increased under President 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs, yet urban riots and other chaos continued. 
New York City was seen as the epicenter of the crisis by figures such as Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, who warned Nixon about the potential for social disintegration in its 
communities.42 
On the local level, the project must have also been important to Lindsay, who 
was running for re-election after a difficult first term. With a Republican party primary for 
mayor looming in June, an achievement like Gateway would have helped him. 
Additionally, the mayor was attempting to enlist the help of a reluctant Nixon 
Administration for his primary run, and the visible cooperation with Hickel fit in with 
these efforts.43 
After a helicopter tour of the site, Hickel and Lindsay jointly announced the 
Gateway project on May 13, 1969. The press release from the Department of the 
Interior, which would manage the project, argued that the 15,600 acre site would be of 
“significance to millions of visitors from not only the crowded New York City area, but to 
much of the mid-Atlantic and Northeastern Seaboard.” It would be the first time the 
federal government had ever set out to develop a major recreation area within a city. 
Although specifics needed to be worked out, with Hickel promising a report in ninety 
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days, Lindsay offered assurances that “nobody would be thrown out,” referring to the 
communities of Breezy Point and Broad Channel.44 
With the City and federal government moving rapidly, the Port of New York 
Authority responded in kind. On the same day Gateway was announced, the Authority 
announced new plans for the expansion of Kennedy Airport. The plan called for the 
immediate addition of two runways, with the possibility of three more being built in the 
future.45 To assuage concerns over the destruction of the environment, the Authority 
commissioned the National Academy of Sciences to study the project’s impact. An 
airline executive asked about the study noted how “it was clear that we didn’t have a 
chance in hell of getting this approved unless we worked in advance with the ecology 
groups and conservationists,” providing “bird refuges and other things that would satisfy 
them.”46 
From the perspective of 1969, the stage must have seemed set for the final battle 
over Jamaica Bay’s future. The Port of New York Authority and the federal government, 
unlike the agencies that had attempted to transform Jamaica Bay in the past, 
possessed the power and resources to effect massive change of the space. Would it be 
an extension of Kennedy Airport, or the nation’s first urban national recreation area? !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!44 Edward Burks, “Hickel Announces Start Now on US Park in the Harbor Area Here,” 
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Numerous groups would attempt to provide their own answers to this question as the 
planning and legislative process unfolded. 
 
Gateway: Preservation vs. Recreation  
Gateway was being created out of an environmentalist desire to provide nature to 
urban residents, yet well-established conservation groups would also see value in its 
spaces for preservation, presenting a dilemma for planners. The Interior Department’s 
plans for the site, which came out in December 1969, attempted to balance these 
concerns. The primary focus was to provide diverse recreational opportunities for “fun 
and relaxation,” while the secondary focus was on preservation and environmental 
education, with the planners hoping that visitors would be inspired to “cleanse the air 
and waters and to plan healthy and attractive communities.”47 
Gateway as it was framed contained an important conceptual dilemma: 
recreation—particularly active recreation—could be observed to be in conflict with 
preservation, a tension that lay at the heart of national parks (see chapter six). Planners 
dealt with this problem by dedicating the different sites within the park exclusively to 
recreation or preservation, yet this would fail to satisfy groups wanting more of one or 
the other; this conflict would be particularly intense in Jamaica Bay, which was greatly 
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valued for its wildlife but also the site closest to minority communities in Brooklyn and 
Queens that the park was intended for. 
Reflecting the planners’ strategy, the Jamaica Bay Unit was to be focused on 
environmental education and preservation. The authors noted that in spite of being 
“polluted, invaded, ravaged, neglected, bisected, despoiled and littered,” Jamaica Bay 
was “an ecological Fort Knox” due to the richness of its fish and wildlife. They called for 
“most existing structures” to be demolished and the residents of Broad Channel to be 
relocated at the end of their current lease. An “urban environmental research center” 
would be the only major structure, providing a center for study and public education. It 
recommended that the northern shore of the bay be devoted to “community and 
neighborhood recreation needs,” though no specifics were offered.48 
The planners’ descriptions of Jamaica Bay reflect and attempt to reconcile the 
conflicting conceptions of its space existing at the time. The conception of the bay as 
“Fort Knox” plays upon the dueling conceptions of it being an unexploited wasteland and 
polluted: the plans argued that even though virgin nature had been “ravished,” an 
essential wildness remained, locked away like gold in “Fort Knox.” Similar to Robert 
Moses’ plans three decades earlier, it assumed that if the pollution—which includes the 
bay’s residents—were to be cleared, the bay could again be a space of pristine 
nature.49 
To balance out Jamaica Bay’s preservationist focus, Breezy Point was 
designated as a recreational space. The plan envisioned people engaging in a “wide !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 
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variety of overnight and year-round educational and cultural uses” like going to “bike, 
fish, listen to music, see exhibits, view performing arts, gaze at the stars, picnic, and 
learn about their environment.” Numerous facilities like “game courts, playing fields” as 
well as “pavilions, cafes, rest areas, and places for the performing arts” would be built. 
Because of the value of the beaches it abutted, the report called for the Breezy Point 
Cooperative to be “purchased outright.” Cognizant of the location’s remoteness, the 
authors called for establishment of ferry service from major rail and subway hubs to 
better meet the needs of inner-city residents who did not own cars.50 
In recognition of the social utility of Gateway, the definition of recreation within 
the park was deliberately left vague. Planners noted that it would be “preposterous” to 
let a specific meaning of this concept guide development, arguing for “community 
needs… to dictate [its] nature and character.” This aim reflects contemporary ideals of 
parks as spaces that served to heal the social fabric of cities frayed by the urban crisis. 
By mixing in park space, different groups would be able to come together and reach 
common understandings of urban problems.51 
Although the project was widely supported by prominent politicians, it would also 
have its detractors, most notably Robert Moses. He made the argument that the park 
would take up valuable lands that could be better utilized to address housing problems, 
especially for minorities. Moses mocked the idea of a “National Gateway park guarded 
by Smoky Bears imported from Yellowstone, the Grand Canyon and Glacier Park,” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!50 Ibid. The proposal also included Sandy Hook, New Jersey, as well as sites on Staten 
Island. 51 Ibid.; Galen Cranz, The Politics of Park Design, A History of Urban Parks in America 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982),135–42. 
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declaring “the notion that some federal park and other officials happened on it and 
rescued it” to be “one of the most ridiculous pieces of fiction in recent times.” When 
viewed through the lens of Moses as a conservationist in the Progressive-Era sense, 
the disdain he expresses toward the National Park Service would seem to affirm his 
ideal that parks need to be carefully managed in order to be properly utilized by urban 
residents. His language also reveals the intense pride he felt over his accomplishments 
in Jamaica Bay, viewing Gateway as a usurpation of his achievements.52 In spite of 
Moses’ efforts, his line of opposition failed to gain traction. 
The proposal was only the start of a long and tortuous process, providing a 
starting point for the crafting of legislation and efforts to coordinate the many involved 
parties. A number of unresolved issues would delay progress for nearly two years. A 
variety of governmental entities had jurisdiction and ownership of the sites targeted for 
inclusion, requiring unprecedented cooperation between the City, New York State, and 
different branches of the federal government. The latter proved especially problematic: 
the plan called for the Army to turn over the underutilized facilities of Fort Tilden on the 
Rockaways and Fort Hancock on Sandy Hook to the Interior Department, but officials in 
the Department of Agriculture wanted to use Fort Tilden as an animal quarantine 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!52 Robert Moses, “New York: City of Contrasts, Crisis,” New York Amsterdam News, 
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station; Army officials would also be extremely hesitant to relinquish their property, 
leading to dragged-out lobbying efforts by Interior officials.53 
The unresolved issue of the expansion of Kennedy Airport also played a 
significant role in delaying the project. The National Academy of Sciences study group, 
originally commissioned by the Port Authority to study the impact of expanding Kennedy 
Airport, would also analyze the Gateway plans, giving it significant influence. Wise to the 
weight of the forthcoming report, representatives from interest groups like the National 
Audubon Society sought to influence the proceedings: the Society’s President asked to 
“compare notes” with the study group before their report was released in order to avoid 
“future conflicts of opinion.”54 
In the interim, varying groups worked to influence the process of shaping 
Gateway. Like the federal government, City officials had to strike a balance between the 
many interests who had designs on Jamaica Bay. Apart from Mayor Lindsay, the most 
important figure involved in shaping the process was the head of the City Parks 
Department, August Heckscher. Testifying before the National Academy of Sciences 
study group in 1970 in favor of Gateway and against the Port of New York Authority’s 
airport expansion plan, Heckscher laid out the City’s priorities for the park. He largely 
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endorsed the project, but argued that Jamaica Bay in particular would be underutilized 
under the current plans: 
We see our primary goal as serving the needs of City residents, many of 
whom have neither the means nor the opportunity to leave the City…. 
Jamaica Bay is within easy reach of millions of people who have limited 
access to the natural world or to recreational opportunities… while the 
magnitude and grandeur of Jamaica Bay might suggest to some a special 
and limited experience, we believe the Bay can receive multiple use by 
those who live within a half hour’s distance. Its suitability for boating, 
swimming, sailing, fishing, picnicing [sic], camping, skating, observing, and 
simply being alone make the Bay attractive most of the year…. Active 
recreation… [is] not inconsistent with the preservation of the interior.55 
 
Heckscher’s position reflects his adherence to the ideals of the emerging environmental 
movement: at one point he notes that the bay offered “active discovery and direct 
participation…. consistent with the ‘new conservation’ which disparages strictly 
vicarious participation outside a fenced area in favor of full, managed utilization.” Yet 
Heckscher was careful to emphasize the bay as a space of nature to appeal to 
conservationists: he argued that “the Bay represents life and the potential for living…  it 
is New York City’s last frontier… [offering] unparalleled lessons to teach, especially for a 
people whose urban heritage has almost eliminated their ties with the natural 
environment.”56 
 Heckscher worked closely with conservationists to ensure the success of 
Gateway, in particular the National Audubon Society. The Society’s members were 
some of the key players in the fight for Gateway, acting behind the scenes in various !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!55 New York City Parks, Recreation and Cultural Affairs Administration, August 
Heckscher, Administrator, “Jamaica Bay: Present and Future, Presentation to the 
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important ways. They worked hard to gain the support of different groups in order to 
show a united front behind the project, organizing a Gateway Citizens Committee as a 
pressure group. Society members also worked closely with experts testifying at hearings 
to craft the most politically advantageous testimony as part of an organized effort to 
coordinate messaging.57 
Although they recognized the need for Gateway to be a multiple use area, the 
primary concern of Audubon Society members was wildlife and the bird refuge in the 
center of Jamaica Bay, reflecting their conservationist ethos. In 1969, reacting to a 
confidential briefing on the Gateway proposal held for Audubon and other supporters by 
Heckscher, Audubon Society President Elvis Stahr revealed the group’s priorities by 
noting the project’s “’surprising’ sensitivity towards protection of the environment,” its 
“emphasis on keeping [the] area in its ‘natural state’” and “considerable attention to 
preserving the unique ecology of the Jamaica Bay section.” Audubon would remain 
laser-focused throughout the legislative process and beyond, weighing decisions based 
upon how they would impact wildlife preservation. The fact that Heckscher would hold a 
confidential briefing for conservationists indicates his closeness with this particular 
constituency and the fact that he must have regarded them as a key for ensuring 
Gateway’s success.58 
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The Audubon Society and their allies fought hard to eliminate Broad Channel and 
Breezy Point by testifying against them at hearings, viewing the communities as major 
impediments to the project. Audubon Society members decided that it would be 
politically expedient to support the recreational development of the northern shore of 
Jamaica Bay in addition to Breezy Point: these sites would provide facilities to 
underserved New Yorkers. Memos reveal that a key reason for Audubon’s support of 
active recreation at these sites was that it would keep recreational development out of 
the center of the bay, which Audubon wanted to keep as a natural space: one notes that 
they were going to attempt to have a provision inserted into the legislation mandating 
that the bay’s interior’s be preserved from future development. With pollution from Broad 
Channel impeding the recreational development of Jamaica Bay’s north shore and 
harming the ecology of the bay, the neighborhood’s removal would be a double win.59 
The strategy of the Audubon Society reveals the extent to which conceptions of 
natural space influenced their thinking. Similar to the Gateway planners, Audubon 
members segregated areas of Gateway based upon use, separating recreational 
sections from those focused on preservation. The push to remove Broad Channel can 
be seen as emerging from a conception of natural space that only allows for a minimal 
human presence. Broad Channel community members expressed a very different view: 
thirty-year resident Henry Waichaitis argued that “we’ve lived with the bird sanctuary for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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years, and the Bay is part of us… why, now, does the city come along and say we 
would be detrimental to the park?” Through his language Waichaitis demonstrates that 
he thought of his space in a manner similar to his ancestors: as a hybrid space of city 
and nature, a position informed by his years of living and working in Jamaica Bay.60 
The inclusion of Broad Channel and Breezy Point became the most contentious 
issues facing the Gateway project. As in the past, these communities banded together 
and mounted an organized opposition, attempting to influence officials and sway public 
opinion. The intensity of the opposition led Hickel to describe Broad Channel as posing 
the “most difficult problem confronting us” in a 1970 letter to Mayor Lindsay, hinting that 
its destruction might be politically unfeasible.!61  
Mayor Lindsay was put in a difficult spot by these controversies. Lindsay’s 
response to the racial conflicts of the 1960s had created the perception that he favored 
minorities at the expense of working-class whites, with one of the most controversial 
examples being his support of citizen involvement on a police oversight board.62 His 
Administration’s actions in 1967 regarding Broad Channel’s sanitation problems must 
have reinforced these views. In spite of desiring to reach out to this particular 
constituency after his reelection in 1969 and his initial assurances, Lindsay decided to 
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fully back the Gateway plans, arguing that Broad Channel needed to be eliminated in 
order to maintain the “integrity” of the park.63 
With groups like the Audubon Society pushing for the removal of Broad Channel 
based on the fact that it polluted the bay, the fight would play out similarly to that in the 
late 1960s over sewers. Broad Channel had acquired powerful allies in their earlier 
struggles, and these relationships would continue to help them.64 They would also 
continue to use the power of the pen, for example writing the Sierra Club to demand that 
they correct facts appearing in a pamphlet they published about Jamaica Bay: the 
pamphlet depicted Broad Channel as a summer community whose residents leaked 
sewage into the bay’s waters, depicting them as irresponsible. Broad Channel’s letter 
emphasized the fact that it was a permanent community that wanted sewers and was 
taking responsible steps like utilizing cesspools and septic tanks in the interim.65 
With questions of public versus interests dominating the debate over their lands 
instead of environmental issues, Breezy Point and its supporters employed the politics 
of backlash, injecting race into the Gateway proceedings and reversing the dynamics of 
class at play. They portrayed Gateway as an unfair imposition on the middle class, 
exploiting Richard Nixon’s strategy of appealing to white voters supposedly ignored by 
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the federal government in an era of Civil Rights.66 One letter to the president himself 
from the daughter of a Breezy Point resident declared “why must you spend all that 
money on a Park when there is so much more you could do with it. People on welfare in 
New York are spoiled, the more they get the more they want at our expense… why must 
the Middle Class always suffer the loss!” 67 In essence, this insinuates that Gateway was 
a project primarily intended to benefit minorities, in spite of the fact that the Gateway 
plans and proposals were careful to speak in broadly inclusive language. These efforts 
seem to have been successful. After initially voicing his support for the project, 
President Nixon withdrew into the background for nearly two years, removing some of 
the wind from Gateway’s sails; perhaps he did not want to risk alienating his “silent 
majority.” It was only when the project appeared moribund that Nixon would become 
directly involved again. 
Conservationists were wise to the racial politics of the day as well. In a March 
1971 strategy session conducted before hearings held by the Senatorial and House 
subcommittees on Parks and Recreation, Gateway Citizens Committee members 
emphasized the importance of getting “community organizations—primarily ethnic—of 
low income areas, who have most to gain from the establishment of Gateway” to testify, 
as well as groups like the NAACP and Urban League.68 The efforts must have been 
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successful, because the Committee held a reception in June 1971 to brief 
representatives from these groups who would be testifying at the hearings. Audubon 
Society staff ecologist Richard Plunkett noted that the proceedings “nearly got out of 
hand” when some of the representatives from “Puerto Rican and Black groups made 
fiery statements about how often similar projects had been turned against them.” 
Plunkett indicated that the experience reiterated the importance of including these 
groups in the process.69 
Audubon also contemplated directly invoking race in the fight over Gateway. In 
the same June 1971 memo that mentioned the incident with Puerto Rican and Black 
groups, Audubon Society members noted that because Breezy Point was “almost 
completely white, largely Irish and Italian; [the] cooperative could be challenged (not by 
us) on grounds of systematic exclusion of Blacks [and] Puerto Ricans.” Although this did 
not happen, the fact that Audubon Society members were willing to consider it reveals 
the extent to which they were willing to play hardball politics to achieve their goals of 
preserving the environment.70 
Theoretically, those in favor of preserving Jamaica Bay had common goals with 
Broad Channel and Breezy Point. Both communities lived in sensitive environments; as 
indicated by the Broad Channel resident who described himself as being of the Bay, 
they had a stake in maintaining their integrity. The stature of the Gateway project, the 
first effort by the federal government to create an area dedicated to preservation and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!69 "Re: Current Status of Gateway Proposal.” Although I have been characterizing the 
Audubon Society as conservationist, this episode demonstrates that the organization 
was undergoing a transition towards more environmentalist thinking 70 Ibid. 
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recreation in the biggest city in the country, meant that perhaps a precedent for 
cooperation between the many interested parties could have been reached, yet the 
politics of race and class were exposing the divides among them in nearly 
insurmountable ways. While historians of environmentalism have typically attributed the 
absence of the white working class within the movement to their lack of education in 
subjects like ecology, the case of Jamaica Bay demonstrates that environmentalism’s 
willingness to embrace a broader variety of causes such as urban issues sometimes 
intersected with the politics of backlash, driving the white working class away from the 
cause.71 
 
From Proposal to Park 
 Against the backdrop of the various groups articulating their own visions of 
Gateway, the legislative process moved along at a snail’s pace. Little progress would be 
achieved in 1969 and 1970 due to the many outstanding issues. No legislation for the 
project was submitted by the administration during this time, a fact that was strongly 
criticized by the congressional delegations of New York and New Jersey.72 Complicating 
matters further, Walter Hickel was fired by Richard Nixon in November 1970 after 
criticizing the administration’s Vietnam policies in the wake of the Kent State 
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shootings.73 His successor, Rogers Morton, voiced support for the project in early 
February 1971 during a meeting with Mayor Lindsay, assuring him of the 
administration’s continuing support in spite of the difficulties, but this change surely did 
not help matters.74 
Almost a week after Morton gave his reassurances to Lindsay, on February 17 
the National Academy of Sciences environmental study group issued their report on the 
Kennedy Airport expansion project and Gateway, shaking up the proceedings in an 
unexpected way. The group offered a strong condemnation of the runway project, 
systematically dismantling the arguments made in favor of airport expansion. They 
determined that capacity could be greatly increased with better management and the 
adoption of new technologies, noting that if their recommendations were followed 
Kennedy would be able to meet increased demand well into the future. In response, the 
Port of New York Authority quickly dropped their plans for expansion.75 
To the consternation of Gateway supporters, the report argued that the federal 
government was ill equipped to provide for the recreational needs of inner city New 
Yorkers. In particular, the group noted that Gateway was too oriented towards 
preservation and passive recreational activities that only “upper class” New Yorkers 
would enjoy: this reflects a cognizance of the elite status of conservationists and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!73 Dennis Hevesi, “Walter J. Hickel, Former Alaska Governor and Nixon Official, Is Dead 
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narrow goals they had for Jamaica Bay. They also maintained that the federal 
government would not be flexible enough towards altering the orientation of the park in 
the future as needs changed and evolved, that the lands would become “locked up.” To 
remedy this, they called for the City to develop more traditional parks with financial 
support from the federal government.76 
Sensing the danger from this line of attack, the New York Times published an 
editorial on February 27 praising the NAS saving Jamaica Bay from the Port of New 
York Authority but also condemning them for reading “into the Gateway project a conflict 
between mass recreation and wildlife preservation that does not necessarily exist.” It 
noted that the idea that “upper-class people” would be the only ones served at sites like 
the bird refuge was a “gratuitous slur” because of the fact that numerous “school 
excursions from the inner city” utilized the facility. They also claimed that the group 
misunderstood what national parks do, that the lands would not be “locked up.” The 
defensiveness of the editorial reveals that the study group had struck a nerve: 
conservationists were indeed trying to lock up a significant part of Jamaica Bay’s lands 
for the sake of preservation.77 
Likely recognizing the threat posed by the NAS report, President Nixon broke his 
multi-year quiescence on Gateway in May 1971 by offering a bill that addressed many 
of the existing controversies. Nixon then traveled to New York with Secretary Morton to 
take a helicopter tour of the Gateway sites with Mayor Lindsay as well as the governors 
of New York and New Jersey in a visible show of support for the project. To the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!76 National Research Council, Jamaica Bay and Kennedy Airport, 89–90. 77 “Jamaica Bay Half Saved,” New York Times, February 27, 1971. 
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consternation of the Audubon Society, the bill removed Broad Channel and the Breezy 
Point Cooperative from the project, as well as the Staten Island sites to reduce costs—
and presumably to avoid the controversy involved with destroying these white working 
class communities. To make up for some of the reduced recreational capacity, Nixon 
included the then-unutilized Floyd Bennett Field in the bill. In addition to responding to 
the National Academy of Sciences report, Nixon timed his maneuver to occur just before 
the first hearings on Gateway scheduled before the Senate, which were to be held on 
May 12. Although these had been scheduled before the administration’s announcement, 
Nixon’s influence would weigh heavily on the proceedings, sweeping aside the efforts of 
groups like Audubon to influence the process.78 
At the hearings in the Senate and House of Representatives (held in July), the 
creation of Gateway almost seemed like a foregone conclusion, with no serious 
objections being raised to the project. Instead, the hearings focused primarily upon how 
it would best serve the needs of urban residents. The lawmakers considered the issue 
of including the northern shore of Jamaica Bay in the project, generally agreeing that it 
would provide useful recreational spaces. Transportation would be another important 
consideration. Most lawmakers agreed that mass transportation was needed for the 
project to reach its potential, yet many disagreed on whether or not it was not the 
federal government’s responsibility to provide this. Representative James McClure of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!78 Richard L. Madden, “Nixon Backs Gateway Recreation Area,” New York Times, May 
9, 1971; Richard L. Plunkett to Dr. Stahr; Mssrs. Callison, Clement, Barnes, Boardman, 
“Re: Gateway National Recreation Area Proposal,” Memorandum, May 19, 1971, 
Folder: Gateway National Recreation Area, Box 258, Papers of the National Audubon 
Society, New York Public Library Milstein Division. 
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Idaho declared: “Every city in the country has the same right to demand equal 
treatment… I think New York must solve its own transportation problem.”79 
The issue of Breezy Point received considerable attention. As expected, 
Audubon Society member Richard Plunkett focused on the necessity of these areas in 
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, pursuing the 
strategy discussed in the meetings, but because the administration had excluded 
Breezy Point from their bill, much of the hearing focused instead on what lands would 
be needed to ensure access to park visitors. In general, most lawmakers agreed that 
beachfront was necessary for the park to properly function, reaching the conclusion that 
acquiring an eighty-nine-acre stretch of beach as proposed in one of the bills would be a 
feasible alternative to completely removing the Breezy Point Cooperative. As to Broad 
Channel, Nixon’s maneuvering resulted in the issue being only briefly addressed during 
the House hearings, with most mentions simply recalling the fact that acquiring the 
community would be too expensive.80 
Seeing that the process had been completely hijacked by Nixon, Audubon 
Society members reacted in a manner that strikingly reflected the concerns of the 
National Academy of Sciences study group. A memo reacting to the developments in 
July, after the hearings notes: 
We can certainly live with the Gateway project that seems likely to be 
reported by the House Subcommittee… what we will get… are open, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!79 Gateway National Recreation Area: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Parks and 
Recreation on S. 1193 and S. 1852, 97th Cong. (1971); Gateway Area Proposals: 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation on H.R. 1370, 
H.R. 1121 and Related Bills, 97th Cong. (1971). 80 Ibid. 
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relatively natural areas, which can remain that way under the present 
National Park Service planning for the development of the various units. 
 
Although the Breezy Point Cooperative would be still there, the “limitation of capacity at 
Breezy Point may be helpful in the long run if we can convert this failing into effective 
pressure for the development of… the northern and western shores of Jamaica Bay,” 
which would ultimately “aid in the preservation of the marshland and natural areas in the 
center of Jamaica Bay by providing a reason for continued efforts to improve water 
quality within Jamaica Bay.” In sum, the project was going to be of limited use to people, 
but the birds would do well.81 
 The process would continue for another year, but in the end the project 
succeeded, with Richard Nixon signing the bill authorizing Gateway National Recreation 
area into law on October 28, 1972. The final bill was very similar to the administration’s 
proposal: it included Breezy Point but provided provisions to protect the Cooperative; all 
of Jamaica Bay was included minus Broad Channel, but a last-minute loophole had 
been included allowing the City to turn over the property within a five-year window if it so 
chose; finally, Floyd Bennett Field also made it in, as well as the sites in Staten Island 
and New Jersey.82 
The bill, however, did not directly provide increased transportation to Gateway. 
Reacting to the project, Senator Jacob K. Javits noted that “the task now was to move !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!81 Richard L. Plunkett to Dr. Stahr; Mssrs. Callison, Clement, Boardman, Miller, “Re: 
Hearing on Gateway National Recreation Area before Subcommittee on Parks and 
Recreation, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,” 
July 20, 1971, Folder: Gateway National Recreation Area, Box 258, Papers of the 
National Audubon Society, New York Public Library Milstein Division. 82 An Act to Establish the Gateway National Recreation Area in the States of New York 
and New Jersey, and for Other Purposes. 
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the project along quickly and to make sure that there is adequate provision for 
transportation,” a prospect that would not be easy seeing the resistance at the hearings. 
Additionally, although the bill called for the transfer of military sites like Fort Tilden, 
Wadsworth and Hancock to the Park Service, the details of how this would happen still 
needed to be resolved. The federal government would have their hands full in 
developing the motley collection of lands in order to reach the desired outcome of 
providing recreational opportunities to the urban masses.83 
 
Conclusion 
 The establishment of Gateway National Recreation area marked the beginning of 
a new era for Jamaica Bay. The hand of the federal government offered new hope to 
those who wished to turn Jamaica Bay into the world’s finest open-space park within an 
urban area, but the project faced numerous difficulties. Despite being considered “non-
urban in character,” many of Gateway’s lands were heavily polluted, and had all been 
heavily altered by human action. Officials would quickly learn that representing spaces 
on a map as “natural” did not erase the past. Some wished to maintain the fictions of 
simple binaries, but others recognized a radical potential going forward: like Henry 
Waichaitis, they dared to conceptualize New York City as being “of the bay” instead of 
separate, existing in a complex web of human and natural processes. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!83 Richard L. Madden, “Four-Year Gateway Effort Ends As Nixon Signs the Bill Into 
Law,” New York Times, October 29, 1972. 
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Chapter Six 
“The Leavings of a Throw-Away Society”: Jamaica Bay and 
Gateway National Recreation Area, 1972-1994 
 
 The federal government’s creation of Gateway National Recreation Area in 1972 
was the most important step taken towards codifying a vision of Jamaica Bay and 
surrounding areas since the City Parks Department took control of the space after 1938, 
but the final form of the park was far from settled. Planning Gateway would require 
significant compromises between the National Park Service and all the other interested 
parties: Broad Channel, Breezy Point, other surrounding communities, and government 
at all levels. Furthermore, Jamaica Bay’s space, a messy amalgam of the human and 
the natural—a physical record of the schemes both completed and unfulfilled since 
1880—posed significant conceptual difficulties. 
 Instead of forcing Gateway to fit the mold of traditional national parks, planners in 
the Park Service put forth a radical redefinition of how its space was to be conceived of. 
Rather than taking pains to separate humanity and nature as in traditional national 
parks, planners argued that the conceptual divide between them was irrelevant. 
Drawing upon environmentalist thought, Gateway was to offer a new model for national 
parks where natural systems and masses of urbanites could exist as part of a 
harmonious whole, nurturing each other to greater standards of health. For the first time 
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in the bay’s history, officials were basing its development upon a conception of space 
that attempted to reconcile the bay’s unique history and relationship with New York City. 
 
Gateway and the Evolution of the National Park Idea, 1916-1974 
In order to understand the conceptual difficulties Gateway posed to National Park 
Service planners, one needs to consider the organization’s history. From its very 
beginning, the Service’s mission contained a fundamental tension. The 1916 Organic 
Act, which established the Park Service, defines the organization’s purpose as such: 
 The service thus established shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal 
areas known as national parks, monuments and reservations, which purpose is 
to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life 
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such 
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.1 
 
Use and preservation were generally seen to be at odds: the more people used national 
parks, the greater the chance that their naturalness would be degraded. Throughout its 
history, the Service has struggled to find the proper balance between these two 
functions.2 
Because it is a public organization, the Park Service has been subject to outside 
pressures concerning its mission. At numerous times, policy makers have intervened in 
response to demands to provide greater public access or stricter standards for 
preservation, mandating changes to the organization’s practices and holdings. One of 
the most important groups helping the Service adapt to its evolving mission was the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 An Act to Establish a Park Service and For Other Purposes, 16 U.S.C §1 (1916). 2 John C. Miles, Wilderness in National Parks: Playground or Preserve (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2009), 30–33. Miles’ work is an extensive study of this 
struggle. 
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Advisory Board on Parks, Monuments and Historic Sites, a body of eleven members 
appointed by and serving at the pleasure of Secretary of the Interior. The Board, created 
and given authority to advise on policy by the 1935 Preservation of Historic Sites Act, 
consisted of citizen experts in a variety of fields. Although its recommendations could be 
ignored, it nonetheless provides a useful window into the politics of the Park Service.3 
One of the key pressures facing the Park Service in the Post-World War Two 
period was the demand that it become more involved with meeting the nation’s 
recreational needs. As previously noted, this issue gained a sense of urgency as 
widespread prosperity provided Americans ever-greater amounts of leisure time. The 
Service had already been given the responsibility to assist state and local governments 
with planning recreation areas thanks to the 1936 Park, Parkway and Recreational Area 
Study Act, yet lawmakers increasingly sought for it take a more direct role. Although on 
the one hand this change made sense due to the organization’s expertise in 
administering parks—something no other federal agency had a hand in—on the other, 
the types of spaces managed by the Service—with their strong emphasis on 
preservation—made it an uncomfortable fit.4 
The proposals to involve the National Park Service with recreation prompted a 
strongly conservative reaction from Advisory Board members. From the beginning of the 
Service, the general standard among the organization had been that apart from historic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3 “Preservation of Historic Sites Act,” in Lary Dilsaver, ed., America’s National Park 
System: The Critical Documents (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994). 4 “An Act to Authorize a Study of the Park, Parkway, and Recreational Area Programs in 
the United States, and for Other Purposes,” in Lary Dilsaver, ed., America’s National 
Park System: The Critical Documents (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994). 
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sites, national parks needed to be nationally significant spaces of nature. A 1950 
Advisory Board meeting reveals what this terminology has most frequently meant: a 
member declared that national parks were “an exhibit of the great landscape of the 
country… nowhere duplicated and… not replaceable.” The word “landscape” reflects the 
fact that aesthetics have played a key role in helping to define what a national park is 
and what makes it significant, with spectacular areas like the Grand Canyon and 
Yosemite Valley forming the archetypes of nationally significant areas.5 Arguing that 
“undeviating adherence” to traditional standards was “the only way to protect the 
National Park System,” Advisory Board members were unwilling to dilute the existing 
standards of the national park system in order to accommodate its expansion into 
recreation, fearing that to do so would lead to an overall decline in the system’s 
prestige.6 Board members were similarly anxious about allowing quotidian forms of 
recreation to take place in national parks. They argued that national parks were “not the 
nation’s playgrounds,” instead being spaces of “spiritual refreshment and inspiration,” 
recognizing that the usage of spaces contributes to the way they are conceived of.7  
During the tenure of Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, who served from 1961-69 
under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, the Park Service would be 
given the responsibilities dreaded by the Board. Udall’s views reflected those of the 
emerging postwar environmental movement far more than those of the earlier !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5 “Minutes of the 22nd Meeting of the Advisory Board on Parks, Monuments and Historic 
Sites,” April 17, 1950, 11, Box 1: 1936-54, National Park System Advisory Board 
Minutes, 1936-83, Record Group 79, Records of the National Park Service, National 
Archives, College Park, MD. 6 Ibid., 3. 7 Ibid., 10–11. 
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conservation and preservation movements. He saw the need for a societal shift in 
regards to the United States’ relationship with nature, believing that environmental 
problems were affecting society on a scale never before seen and therefore demanded 
a commensurate response.8 Udall was willing to take dramatic steps to implement his 
agenda, such as in 1964, when he fired Conrad Wirth—Director of the Park Service—
over disagreements concerning the Park Service’s future. Wirth was replaced with 
George Hartzog, a man more amenable to the organization’s changing role.9 
Beginning in the early 1960s, at the urging of the Recreational Advisory 
Council—a body of six Cabinet-level officials created by the president in 1963—
Congress began creating National Recreation Areas to be administered by the National 
Park Service.10 They were designed to be “well above the ordinary in quality and 
recreation appeal, being of lesser significance than the unique scenic and historic 
elements of the National Park System, but affording a quality of recreation experience 
which transcends that normally associated with areas provided by State and local 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8  Ronald Foresta, America’s National Parks and Their Keepers (Washington, DC: 
Resources for the Future, 1984), 65–68. Udall is considered one of the first 
administrators on the national level to be acting from an environmentalist standpoint, 
versus conservationist. Christopher Sellers notes that Udall’s concern with cities and 
suburbs was a key distinction: Christopher Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban 
Nature and the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century America (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 248. For more, see Stewart L. Udall, The 
Quiet Crisis (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963). 9 Miles, Wilderness in National Parks, 160–65. For more on Hartzog’s tenure, see Kathy 
Mengak, Reshaping Our National Parks and Their Guardians: The Legacy of George B. 
Hartzog Jr. (Santa Fe NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2012). 10 Barry Mackintosh, The National Parks: Shaping the System (Washington, DC: 
National Park Service, 1991), 72–79, 88. 
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governments.” This language reflects a cognizance of the concerns raised by the 
Advisory Board about expanding the Park Service into recreation.11 
Under Udall and Hartzog, the Park Service adopted an innovative administrative 
scheme to accommodate its expansion and assuage concerns like those expressed by 
the Advisory Board. In 1964, Hartzog prepared a memo, blessed by Udall, that 
proposed creating three separate management categories for areas administered by the 
Service: natural areas, historical sites, and recreation areas. Each category would be 
managed differently, and even though all sites within the designations needed to 
possess nationally significant features, there was an underlying understanding that 
recreation areas were different than traditional parks, which fell under the “natural area” 
designation. The policy was officially adopted in 1968.12 
The tripartite designation would go a long way towards solving the conceptual 
dilemmas facing the Park Service, yet it would not be a complete solution. In addition to 
expanding its role with recreation, Congress forced the Service to adopt stricter 
standards of preservation with the 1964 Wilderness Act. The Act mandated the Park 
Service to label specific lands within all of its holdings—recreation areas as well as 
national areas—as wilderness after a comprehensive review.13 Wilderness areas were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11 “Federal Executive Branch Policy Governing the Selection, Establishment, and 
Administration of National Recreation Areas by the Recreation Advisory Council, 
Circular No. 1, March 26, 1963,” in Lary Dilsaver, ed., America’s National Park System: 
The Critical Documents (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994). 12 Mackintosh, The National Parks, 72–79, 88; Miles, Wilderness in National Parks, 
160–65. 13 Miles, Wilderness in National Parks, 161, 165. 
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to be managed with high standards that sought to preserve the ecological qualities that 
made them unique, drawing upon the work of scientists.14 
The demands being placed upon the National Park Service to both expand 
access and more strictly preserve nature was taking the organization in conflicting 
directions. How could the organization provide mass recreation without degrading 
wilderness areas it was supposed to strictly protect? Although Udall’s scheme provided 
flexibility, it failed to solve the essential tension within national park space that was 
being stretched to the breaking point. 
After briefly embracing the changes facing the organization, the Advisory Board 
quickly reverted to its former position. Board members were initially optimistic about 
Gateway, with one member noting in 1969 that “it was only through proposals of this 
kind that we could truly meet the needs of our growing population and yet retain other 
areas in a primitive condition,” but they would quickly change their tune.15 After the 
influential Conservation Foundation offered a sharply critical assessment of Gateway on 
the eve of its creation, the Board resumed its conservative stance.!16 Criticism of the 
park appeared among the Advisory Board as early as October 1974, six months after 
the Park Service took over administration of its sites. The scale of the remaining work to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14 Foresta, America’s National Parks and Their Keepers, 127. 15 “Minutes of the 61st Meeting of the Advisory Board on Parks, Monuments and 
Historic Sites,” October 6, 1969, 60, Box 5: 1969-72, National Park System Advisory 
Board Minutes, 1936-83, Record Group 79, Records of the National Park Service, 
National Archives. 16 Conservation Foundation, National Parks for the Future: An Appraisal of National 
Parks as They Begin Their Second Century in a Changing America (Washington, DC: 
The Conservation Foundation, September, 1972), 15, 48–49. The group was created to 
report and reflect upon the direction of the Service on the 100-year anniversary of the 
creation of Yellowstone, giving it significant clout. 
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be done cast a long shadow: one member noted that it would probably take fifteen to 
twenty years to fully develop Gateway because of pollution. Fearing that similar projects 
would overtax the Service, the Board returned to its position that the Park Service had 
no business providing mass recreation. They did not suggest that the Service give up 
Gateway, but instead argued that administering the park would give the Service the 
expertise to speak out against further efforts by lawmakers to expand their 
responsibilities or holdings.17 
The abandonment of Gateway by important policy makers appears to have 
resulted in an ironic twist: with the recreation area treated as an aberration, planners 
would ironically be better able to produce innovative ideas for solving the dilemmas 
faced by the National Park Service. Although the impulse expressed by the Advisory 
Board was understandable given the strains being placed on the organization, trying to 
return to traditional conceptions of national parks was increasingly untenable—
particularly at a site like Gateway National Recreation Area, which possessed little 
resemblance to archetypes such as Yosemite and Yellowstone. 
 
Planning Gateway: 1972-1979 
Conceptual difficulties aside, Park Service personnel faced significant political 
and logistical challenges with planning Gateway. The status of Broad Channel and 
Breezy Point remained unsettled. Planners needed to take a thorough accounting of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!17 “Minutes of the 71st Meeting of the Advisory Board on Parks, Monuments and 
Historic Sites,” October 7, 1974, 52–53, Box 6: 1973-77, National Park System Advisory 
Board Minutes, 1936-83, Record Group 79, Records of the National Park Service, 
National Archives. 
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park’s cultural resources—human-made artifacts such as historic buildings and sites—
and natural resources in order to decide what to preserve and how these resources 
would be managed. Determining the needs of visitors was another key consideration, 
requiring a clear understanding of demographics and input from surrounding 
communities. The ultimate goal was a General Management Plan (GMP): this was 
completed in 1979, and outlined the basic procedures as to the park’s operation. Prior to 
the GMP, a number of preliminary reports and plans were issued to allow for public 
comment: in these documents, planners took pains to summarize the nature of the 
feedback they received and the ways in which they were responding.18 
 The first outstanding issue to be successfully settled was the status of Broad 
Channel. Although it is not clear who opted for it, language allowing for the transfer of 
Broad Channel to the federal government for inclusion in Gateway had been inserted 
into the final bill during the conference committee resolving differences between the 
House and Senate versions of the law. At the behest of Congressmen Joseph Addabbo 
and Frank Brasco of New York, conference committee member Rep. Nicholas Bedich of 
Alaska wrote the law to place the entire responsibility of acquiring Broad Channel on the 
City, essentially maintaining the status quo. It only allowed transfer of the property if the 
City acquired clean title, cleared “all improvements,” and then donated the lands to the 
federal government. Additionally, a five-year deadline was set. The Congressmen, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!18  National Park Service, “Gateway National Recreation Area General Management 
Plan,” August 1979, 5–6, 40–44, Gateway National Recreation Area Cultural Resources 
Library, Staten Island, NY. 
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aware of the City’s track record with Broad Channel, felt confident that these provisions 
would protect the community.19 
 Resolution of the conflict between Broad Channel and the City occurred 
surprisingly fast, obviating the need for the protections incorporated into the Gateway 
bill. Thanks to the continual efforts to lobby officials, the incoming chairman of the City 
Planning Commission, John Zuccotti, used his position and influence to help end Mayor 
John Lindsay’s efforts to raze Broad Channel in 1973.20 Contemporary observers 
speculated that Lindsay was contemplating running for governor, so with primaries only 
a year away it was not surprising that he changed his policy.21 Simultaneously, 
Assemblyman Herbert Posner and Senator John Satucci—both from Queens—
introduced bills in both houses of the New York State Legislature authorizing the direct 
sale of the City-owned lands at Broad Channel to its homeowners. The bill made it 
through the Legislature in about three months, being signed by Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller on June 19.22 
The deal reached between Broad Channel and the City was the most important 
step seen towards ending their decades-long conflict, but final resolution would drag on 
for more than two decades, with the final lots bought by Broad Channel homeowners in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!19 An Act to Establish the Gateway National Recreation Area in the States of New York 
and New Jersey, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 92-592, 86 Stat. 1309 (October 
27, 1972); Jane Salodof, “Broad Channel’s Future Appears Uncertain,” Long Island 
Daily Press, November 26, 1972. 20 “Joy on Broad Channel Island,” New York Times, March 18, 1973. 21 Salodof, “Broad Channel’s Future Appears Uncertain.” 22 Gene Spagnoli, “Rocky Signs Bill to Clear Broad Channel Land Buys,” New York 
Daily News, June 20, 1973. 
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1995.23 Broad Channelites and their ancestors had successfully fought off the efforts of 
FW Dunton and Robert Moses to erase their community and remake the bay, yet their 
victory of went beyond mere survival: it was the codification of a vision of space; 
Jamaica Bay was to be a hybrid space of city and nature. Broad Channel was finally 
integrated into the City, but the bay would remain an integral part of the community. 
After the deal, Broad Channel offered little resistance to the plans being 
developed by the Service. Most of the community’s interactions with planners consisted 
of requests for more information on issues such as borders and environmental impacts. 
In another sign of the community’s intimate knowledge of the bay, they offered a 
corrective to tidal flow patterns found on one of the Park Service’s maps. When 
residents inquired about recreational facilities—something the City had not provided due 
to the uncertainty surrounding the community’s survival—the Service responded by 
nothing that they were “committed to developing facilities that will serve local as well as 
regional residents,” but could not “legally develop any facilities outside the park 
boundaries.” This is likely referring to the fact that the only part of Broad Channel Island 
included in Gateway was the bird refuge, which was already dedicated to preservation. 
The statement is indicative of the difficulties planners faced in balancing the wants of 
local communities with the larger aims of the Gateway project.24 
As with Broad Channel, the creation of Gateway in 1972 did not settle the 
outstanding controversies with the Breezy Point Cooperative. Although most of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!23!Pam Belluck, “A Marsh to Call Their Own, at Last,” New York Times, August 29, 
1995.!24 “Gateway National Recreation Area Final Environmental Statement,” August 1979, 
236, Gateway National Recreation Area Cultural Resources Library. 
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community had been spared, its oceanfront beach was to be included within the park’s 
borders. Planners viewed this property as essential to the success of the Breezy Point 
unit because it linked together Riis Park and the western tip of the Rockaways (the 
community essentially bisected the Rockaway peninsula). Breezy Point itself was 
considered to be the lynchpin of the park’s recreational spaces because of its proximity 
to minority neighborhoods in Brooklyn and Queens. Despite this, the Gateway bill 
represented a compromise between the Breezy Point Cooperative and the federal 
government. The bill only allowed the Secretary of the Interior to acquire an “adequate 
interest” for the purposes of establishing the park in the vicinity of Breezy Point as 
opposed to seizing lands: this weakness would be exploited by the Cooperative as part 
of a strategy of massive resistance. To protect Gateway, the bill granted the Secretary 
the authority to limit new commercial construction and alterations to residential 
properties within the Cooperative.25 
 Negotiations over the issue of buffer zones between the Breezy Point 
Cooperative and Gateway proved to be extremely contentious, ultimately ending in 
failure. In October of 1971, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Nathaniel Reed, sent 
a letter to the Cooperative proposing that the government acquire 200-foot buffers on all 
sides save for the east, which was to have a 100-foot buffer to allow for the 
development of a bathing area.26 The Cooperative replied by noting that they wished to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!25 An Act to Establish Gateway National Recreation Area. 26 Nathaniel P. Reed to James Heller, October 13, 1971, Folder: Parks and Sites, 
Gateway, Part 1, Mar. 28, 1969 to Jan. 17, 1972, Box 181, Parks and Sites: Fire Island - 
Gila Cliff Dwellings, Central Classified Files, 1969-1972, Record Group 48, Records of 
the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, National Archives, College Park, MD. 
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retain ownership of the lands, but would be willing to “covenant non arbitrary restrictions 
as to its use and control.” Furthermore, they took issue with the size of the eastern 
buffer zone.27 Interior wrote back suggesting that instead of selling or donating the lands 
the Cooperative could simply surrender development rights. They also reiterated the 
necessity of 100-foot boundaries in the east.28 The Cooperative’s reply declared the last 
letter to be a “disappointment,” noting they would still have to pay taxes on the buffer 
lands even if they gave up development rights. They reiterated their proposal for a 
“covenant… that any future development in the buffer zone will be with the approval of 
the Secretary of the Interior if not unreasonably withheld.”29 The final letter in the series, 
from Interior, revealed that an impasse had been reached: Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Curtis Bohlen stated that Interior would remain firm on the matter, and accused the 
Cooperative of acting in bad faith out of a desire to “continue development into the 
buffer zone” based upon the language of the Cooperative’s letter.30 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!27 John J. Carroll to Nathaniel P. Reed, Folder: Parks and Sites, Gateway, Part 1, Mar. 
28, 1969 to Jan. 17, 1972, Box 181, Parks and Sites: Fire Island - Gila Cliff Dwellings, 
Central Classified Files, 1969-1972, Record Group 48, Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of the Interior, National Archives. 28 Nathaniel P. Reed to John J. Carroll, February 2, 1972, Folder: Parks and Sites, 
Gateway, Part 2, Box 181, Parks and Sites: Fire Island - Gila Cliff Dwellings, Central 
Classified Files, 1969-1972, Record Group 48, Records of the Office of the Secretary of 
the Interior, National Archives. 29 Walter Pozen to Nathaniel P. Reed, February 28, Folder: Parks and Sites, Gateway, 
Part 2, Box 181, Parks and Sites: Fire Island - Gila Cliff Dwellings, Central Classified 
Files, 1969-1972, Record Group 48, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the 
Interior, National Archives. 30 Curtis Bohlen to Walter Pozen, May 23, 1972, Folder: Parks and Sites, Gateway, Part 
2, Box 181, Parks and Sites: Fire Island - Gila Cliff Dwellings, Central Classified Files, 
1969-1972, Record Group 48, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, 
National Archives. 
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No further progress was made through 1979, forcing federal authorities to try to 
settle the matter in court. Filing suit against the Cooperative in August of that year, the 
government claimed that a past agreement made with Breezy Point residents in 1948 
only gave the residents rights to beach lands extending to the low-water mark that 
existed that year. The dynamic environment of the Rockaway Peninsula had extended 
the beach significantly beyond this mark by 1979. In 1982, the Cooperative won the suit, 
giving them clear title to the land and putting an end to the efforts of the federal 
government to acquire the connecting strip. It was another instance of the courts 
adapting to ambiguities of space in the highly dynamic Jamaica Bay area, modifying 
legal frameworks to fit local realities.31 
The Cooperative, acting in tandem with representatives from Brooklyn 
communities near Floyd Bennett Field and the Marine Parkway Bridge, worked in other 
ways to hinder the park’s development. By vociferously lobbying the Park Service, they 
were able to force planners to significantly scale back their ambitions for Breezy Point. 
Conservation groups, including the Sierra Club, played a part in this as well.32 The only 
major conservationists working against these efforts was the National Audubon Society, 
but this is consistent with their earlier strategy to develop recreational spaces on the 
bay’s northern shore in order to achieve the greater good of preserving its center.33 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31 Joseph Fried, “US Is Suing to Take Land at Breezy Point for Part of Gateway,” New 
York Times, August 24, 1979; “Breezy Point Co-Op Wins in Court,” New York Times, 
November 17, 1982. 32 “Final Environmental Statement,” 228–33. 33 Richard Plunkett to Eleanor Ament, “Re: Improved Bus Service to Gateway,” May 13, 
1980, Folder Gateway National Recreation Area, Box B-572, Papers of the National 
Audubon Society, New York Public Library Milstein Division, New York, NY. 
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While a 1976 draft of the General Management Plan (GMP) sought to accommodate 
200,000 visitors on peak days, seeking a doubling of peak visitation from the current 
total of 90,000 people during the summer, the final version planned for no significant 
increase. Practically, this meant that fewer attractions would be created at Breezy Point 
to draw visitors. Park Service officials cited the concerns of the local communities and 
environmental groups regarding the overuse and crowding of Breezy Point’s beaches, 
but also cited the failure of government at all levels to provide for better mass transit 
options. The Cooperative and their allies had a hand in this as well.34 
 At various points during the planning process, Service personnel considered 
ways of improving transportation to Gateway, but most of these efforts would be 
defeated. A plan was briefly considered to hire private companies to provide 
transportation to the park, but protests by Breezy Point and their allies defeated the 
proposal; the message was clear to an unnamed Bedford Stuyvesant resident: “it is 
quite evident that they don’t want us out there.”35 A brief glimmer of hope for expanded 
access came in 1979 when New York City considered taking advantage of federal 
funding provided by the 1978 National Parks Access Act. In spite of public hearings 
filled with “racial acrimony” as Breezy Point residents dueled with representatives from 
minority groups, the City provided expanded bus access from neighborhoods deep in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!34 Michael Sterne, “US Gives Up Plans to Expand Use of Beaches at Breezy Point: 
Other Areas Involved,” New York Times, April 13, 1978. 35 “Rockaway Group Spurns Gateway Park Bus Plan,” New York Amsterdam News, 
November 13, 1976. 
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Queens and Brooklyn to Gateway from Independence Day to Labor Day in 1980, but the 
busses only ran for one summer season due to low ridership.36 
Minority groups perceived the actions of Breezy Point and their allies as part of a 
larger pattern of racial bias underlying the planning of Gateway. In 1976, the New York 
Amsterdam News reported how groups such as the Central Brooklyn Coordinating 
Council and the Coalition of Concerned Citizens for Human Services felt that park 
officials were failing to pay minority groups the same amount of attention as white 
groups at public meetings, for example failing to take notes on or tape record the 
comments of Black and Hispanic residents. Additionally, they claimed that minorities 
were not receiving proportional economic benefits of the jobs that were being created by 
Gateway, citing a recent example of the park firing four out of five members of an all-
minority “public involvement team” due to a lack of funding.37 This led to the perception 
that “present planning favors residents of communities around the park to the 
disadvantage of minorities and the poor.”38 
Wise personnel choices by the Park Service would go a long way towards 
addressing the concerns of minority groups. In 1978, Herbert S. Cables, Jr.—an African-
American employee of the Park Service since 1974—was promoted to superintendent, 
a post he would hold until 1982, when he was appointed director of the Park Service’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!36 Glenn Fowler, “Riis Park Bus Service Is Extended,” New York Times, May 27, 1979; 
Anthony DePalma, “Gateway: Half-Fulfilled Dream,” New York Times, November 21, 
1982. 37 Simon Anekwe, “Gateway Park Project Allegedly Submerged in Racial Bias,” New 
York Amsterdam News, November 6, 1976. 38 “Demand Gateway Planning Input,” New York Amsterdam News, August 14, 1976; 
Anekwe, “Gateway Park Project Allegedly Submerged in Racial Bias.” 
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North Atlantic Region.39 As much as the sheer visibility of an African-American man in 
the top job at Gateway must have created goodwill, Cables’ actions on the job were key. 
By the time the final plans for Gateway had been unveiled in 1979, New York 
Amsterdam News reporter George Todd reported that many of the concerns of minority 
groups—particularly those involving sharing in the economic benefits of Gateway—had 
been addressed. Todd in particular praised Cables, who “held several conferences with 
local minority groups to hear their concerns about full participation in services and 
programs” as soon as he took over.40 
As the GMP was finalized, the contours of Gateway became clear. Jamaica Bay 
was to be a hybrid space of humanity and nature; officials would not be able to keep 
one and get rid of the other. In spite of its designation as a recreation area, the efforts of 
Breezy Point and environmentalists forced the Park Service to make significant 
compromises with regards to Gateway’s mission, resulting in the park’s emphasis on 
preservation being even heavier than it had been in the early proposals, privileging the 
rights of property owners over access. 
 
Communicating the Gateway Concept: Interpretive Planning 
Arguably the most difficult component of planning Gateway, considering the type 
of spaces traditionally managed by the Service and the organization’s contemporary 
dilemmas, was creating a concept that united the park’s disparate parts into an 
ideologically coherent whole. Creating a Gateway concept was central to preparing the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!39 “Gateway Park Chief Given Regional Post,” New York Times, February 7, 1982. 40 Ibid. 
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park’s interpretative program. In the parlance of the National Park Service, interpretation 
refers to the ways in which resources are presented and explained to visitors; for this 
reason it can be seen as an imagining of space. Interpretation goes beyond mere 
education, being described by Freeman Tilden, author of the influential study 
Interpreting Our Heritage, as “provocation,” forcing visitors to think deeply about parks 
and their relationship to them.41 The Gateway concept was first articulated in the 
Interpretive Prospectus (IP), approved in 1978. The IP would be central to the initial 
interpretive planning efforts at Gateway.42 
 The Gateway concept developed by planners offered a radical solution to the 
conceptual dilemmas of past decades: instead of working with the administrative 
designations that maintained a sharp bifurcation between humanity and nature, 
planners completely discarded any pretense of the two being separate. Chief 
interpretive planner Clifford Soubier, with the blessing of Deputy Regional Director Denis 
P. Galvin, boldly declared in the IP:  
We stand on the threshold of a distinct new era with regard to the national park 
idea… the national park idea began in response to the needs of the time—
preserving American wilderness… Gateway is in response to the needs of 20th 
Century man—providing open space for ‘recreation’ within the boundaries of 
man’s everyday environment. Gateway hopefully will demonstrate that man is an 
integral part of the environment.43 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!41 Barry Mackintosh, Interpretation in the National Park Sevice: A Historical Perspective 
(Washington, DC: National Park Service, 1986), Chapter 4. 42 “Gateway National Recreation Area Interpretive Prospectus,” 1978, 1, Folder: 
Gateway National Recreation Area, Box 106, Friendship Hill National Historic Site to 
Gateway National Recreation Area, Records of Public Input Documenting Interpretive 
Planning Activities, 1955-1999, Division of Interpretive Planning, Record Group 79, 
Records of the National Park Service, National Archives. 43 Ibid., 12. 
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With the essential connection between humanity and nature emphasized, Soubier 
asked visitors to view Gateway’s spaces differently than traditional national parks: 
[Gateway’s sites] offer, not so much an escape from the city, in the larger sense 
of the world man has built, for better or worse. They offer mainly a perspective. 
Stand on Sandy Hook or Jamaica Bay. From here, space, water, sky, and 
morsels of the world that was here before it all began—these dominate. The City, 
magnificent still, inevitable, but less overpowering, waits in the distance for one to 
return, renewed.44 
 
Even though the plan conceives of humanity and nature—New York City and Jamaica 
Bay—as distinct things, with the almost mystical power of nature acknowledged, the 
plan was emphasizing the relationships between them. It was a step towards a different 
conception of space in Jamaica Bay, one more akin to that of the Broad Channel 
resident who thought of himself as being “of the bay”—thinking of his community as a 
hybrid space. 
Soubier asserted that the basic project of Gateway—to create a space of healthy 
natural systems that the urban masses could utilize in a sustainable way—spoke to one 
of the central dilemmas of contemporary life. The park was to be a model for “new and 
harmonious expressions of urbanism throughout the greater metropolitan area.” It would 
help to bring about the “value revolution” urged by the environmental movement: 
Soubier declared that “we stand at the threshold of a distinctly new era, when it is clear 
that there is no longer enough to throw out, and no place to throw it.”45 
The ethical perspective in the IP is a step towards the non-anthropocentric values 
found within certain strains of modern environmentalism. Earlier environmental 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!44 Ibid., 18. 45 Ibid., 5, 12, 18. 
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movements, conservationism and preservationism, from which the Park Service 
originally emerged, were primarily oriented toward ensuring future human use of 
nature—whether for resource gathering or spiritual nourishment. Although human 
concerns played a central role in post-World War Two environmentalism, concern for 
the non-human world for its own sake has nonetheless been an important though small 
part of the overall movement.46 The 1964 Wilderness Act demonstrates the influence of 
this perspective because the Act forced the Park Service to protect nature at the 
expense of human use.47 Soubier’s choice of language in describing Gateway’s sites 
hint at this orientation: he describes the “old buildings, deserted bunkers, garbage 
dumps and… polluted bay” as “the leavings of a throw-away society.” Choosing to 
rehabilitate them as part of the “value revolution” can imply that the discarded remnants 
have an inherent worth in and of themselves.48 
As tentative as it was, the interpretive program approved for Gateway was a 
departure for the park service, though still one firmly grounded in its basic dilemma. 
Preservation and use were still the paramount concerns, but Soubier’s approach 
discouraged the compartmentalization of the past. After assiduously working to protect 
the traditional conception of national parks in the face of congressionally mandated 
change, the Park Service had approved a plan that offered a radical reconsideration of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!46 Roderick Frazier Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989) is an important study of the role of 
non-anthropocentric concerns in modern environmentalism. 47 Foresta, America’s National Parks and Their Keepers, 104–107. Foresta and Miles 
both find that Park Service personnel resisted the Wilderness Act’s requirements 
because of this fact. 48 “Gateway National Recreation Area Interpretive Prospectus,” 12. 
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what national parks were and the values that justified their existence. Incorporating this 
perspective into the Gateway plans would prove difficult, yet it nonetheless would 
acquire a central role in the General Management Plan (GMP).49 
After decades of trying to base Jamaica Bay’s development on created 
representations of space, whether urban or natural forms, the conception of space 
animating Gateway was the first instance in Jamaica Bay’s history in which planners 
offered a complex, historically grounded vision that moved away from the human-nature 
duality towards the hybridity envisioned by its residents. This change emerged because 
planners were not seeking to erase and remake the bay, but rather to take an honest 
accounting in order to do justice to the bay’s natural and human residents and visitors. 
 
Putting the Concept in Action: 1979-1994 
The Gateway concept played a key role in interpretation, but it also shaped the 
basic operation of the park as outlined in the GMP. The document begins by noting 
Gateway’s significance: planners declared that “Gateway can become a national project 
to demonstrate the potentials of ecological reclamation in an urban setting…” being 
“proof that “modern man can work with nature and reclaim what has been impaired.” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!49!Historians have only begun to explore the Park Service’s experiences in urban areas 
in light of the organization’s larger history, with canonical works like Alfred Runte, 
National Parks: The American Experience, 4th Edition (New York: Taylor Trade 
Publishing, 2010) being mostly silent on this development. Ronald Foresta is still one of 
the few to have extensively considered urban national parks like Gateway, yet as a 
traditionalist he was extremely critical, describing ideas like Soubier’s as essentially 
window dressing: “Urban national parks which were to be more than merely local 
facilities demanded far greater creativity than did national parks in spectacular natural 
areas. In fact, perhaps they demanded too much creativity,” being unable to “take their 
planning cues from the site resources”: Foresta, National Parks and Their Keepers, 197. 
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The plan then noted its specific objectives, which fall into three broad categories: first, 
ensuring the sustainable use of park resources; second, meeting the needs of the 
diverse populations it served; third, bringing about the “value revolution” urged by the IP, 
stated less definitively in the GMP as “forg[ing] an effective link between the urban value 
systems that characterize the New York/New Jersey community and the natural 
systems at Gateway” and “provid[ing] for visitor appreciation of the important fish, 
wildlife, and other natural resources of Gateway (with particular emphasis on the 
Jamaica Bay Unit).”50 
To balance preservation and use, the plan created a number of different 
management zones with varying levels of public access. It is here that representations 
of space manifest and attempt to exert power over its use. The largest zone, constituting 
thirty-eight percent of the park, was “use-by-reservation,” which allowed “low-impact 
uses” like “nature study, environmental education, historical interpretation,” and “hiking, 
jogging, gardening and planting.” Thirty-three percent of the parklands allowed mostly 
unrestricted access yet the majority of these lands were planned to be used in a 
particular manner: “beach zone” comprised seven percent of lands, “structured 
recreation zone” six percent, and the “developed zone”—consisting of museums, 
program centers, and other such facilities—totaled eight percent; the “unstructured 
recreation zone,” where visitors had the most free reign over their activities, added up to 
only twelve percent of the park. The “Protection zone,” where no public access was 
allowed, comprised thirty percent of the park. In sum, these totals reveal the park’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!50 National Park Service, “Gateway National Recreation Area General Management 
Plan,” vii–x, 1–2. 
!! 190!
strong emphasis on preservation and environmental education at the expense of 
recreation.51  
The plan’s treatment of the park’s resources had a similarly intense focus on 
preservation. Ninety-five percent of the park’s wetlands were put into protection zones. 
With the help of “plant nurseries, fisheries, and areas for mariculture,” Service personnel 
would work to restore these areas back to health; other sensitive environments, such as 
those with endangered species, would undergo similar restoration. The plan also 
directed the Service to undertake “specific projects… towards pollution abatement in 
Jamaica Bay” in order to make its waters safe for swimming. The park’s cultural 
resources, primarily consisting of the historically significant Floyd Bennett Field, Jacob 
Riis Park, Fort Hancock, Fort Tilden, and Fort Wadsworth received similar treatment. 
The primary goal was to preserve “significant structures, sites, settings, and areas” to 
use for interpretation, education, arts, and recreational programming. Less significant 
structures were to be used for administration and housing staff. Only in rare cases 
would buildings be demolished.52 
The key concept devised for interpretation was the “Gateway village.” This was to 
function like a main visitor center, but as the choice of the word “village” indicates, the 
goal was to create “richer and more lasting relationships between the public and 
Gateway.” Gateway village was to operate on the assumption highlighted in the IP that 
“it is no longer constructive for those who consider themselves environmentalists to 
separate their concern for nature from their concern for the man-made environment, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!51 Ibid., 53–58. 52 Ibid., 60–65. 
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since the fate of the two are now seen as inseparably related.” Building off of “ecological 
principles,” the village was to demonstrate that “harmonious and mutually supportive 
relationships between people and nature are possible, even under conditions of 
intensive use.”53 
The main village was to be located at Floyd Bennett Field, serving as one of its 
chief attractions. It was envisioned as “a working exhibit and testing ground of the efforts 
of people to live in harmony with nature.” Situated in “restored and replanted natural 
areas,” there would be exhibits, classrooms, support facilities for training and housing 
rangers, spaces dedicated to commerce such as restaurants and open-air markets, as 
well as space for camping. Special efforts were to be made to cater to the diverse 
populations of the surrounding metropolitan region. In short, it was to be a model for an 
ecologically sustainable city, inspiring visitors to action within their own communities. 
Although idealistic, the plan was an excellent example of the ways in which Service 
personnel were creatively adapting to the challenges and limitations posed by the 
ultimate incarnation of Gateway.54 
 The plans for the specific units were very similar to those seen in the original 
proposal. Breezy Point was to be developed as the park’s primary recreational site in 
spite of the scaled-back visitation goals. Jamaica Bay was to remain a nature preserve, 
though its northern shore would be developed as a recreation area when pollution was 
finally abated. Floyd Bennett Field focused on environmental education. Sandy Hook, 
with its pristine beaches, was to be managed in a manner akin to Breezy Point, with an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!53 Ibid., 68–69. 54 Ibid., 68–75. 
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emphasis on sustainable recreation. Staten Island, the least “natural” of all of the units 
due to being located primarily on areas of fill, was also heavily tilted towards recreation. 
In sum, the overall composition of the park was in accord with the ideology of the 
Gateway concept through its particular balancing of preservation and recreation.55 
 As good as the plan may have looked on paper, funding shortfalls made putting it 
into practice difficult. From the beginning of its existence, Gateway received half as 
much money as was needed for capital improvements.56 Growing visitation and 
desperate pleas from Gateway’s superintendent failed to move lawmakers to allocate 
more resources.57 At various points in the 1970s and 80s, scathing reports on the 
deterioration of Gateway under Park Service management appeared in media, 
demonstrating that these shortfalls were having a noticeable impact.58 It was not until 
1991 that Congress allocated adequate funds to begin the restoration of structures such 
as Canarsie Pier and the historic bathhouse at Jacob Riis Park, yet the following year 
the superintendent was once again complaining about shortfalls.59 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!55 Ibid., 80–81, 96–97, 113–14, 132–34, 146, 156. 56 “1991 Gateway National Recreation Area Superintendents’ Annual Narrative Report,” 
Box 22, Fort Union Trading Post National Historic Site to Gateway National Recreation 
Area, Superintendents’ Annual Narrative Reports, 1980-2001, General Records, Record 
Group 79, Records of the National Park Service, National Archives. 57 “1983 Gateway National Recreation Area Superintendents’ Annual Narrative Report,” 
Box 22, Fort Union Trading Post National Historic Site to Gateway National Recreation 
Area, Superintendents’ Annual Narrative Reports, 1980-2001, General Records, Record 
Group 79, Records of the National Park Service, National Archives. 58 Gerald Gold, “U.S. Assailed on Care of Jamaica Bay Refuge,” New York Times, 
September 13, 1974; DePalma, “Gateway: Half-Fulfilled Dream.” 59 “1991 Gateway National Recreation Area Superintendents’ Annual Narrative Report”; 
“1992 Gateway National Recreation Area Superintendents’ Annual Narrative Report,” 
Box 22, Fort Union Trading Post National Historic Site to Gateway National Recreation 
!! 193!
 In spite of the funding issues, during the first ten years under the GMP, the 
Service successfully implemented the Gateway Village at Floyd Bennett Field. Although 
not achieving the ambitious development goals outlined in the GMP, the Village was 
nonetheless extensively utilized for educational programs. By 1981, it hosted an 
overnight camping program serving on average 4,000 students a year.60 Other 
educational programs included guided walks such as “Moon Prowls,” butterfly walks at 
migration time, astronomy programs, public lectures by ecologists and other experts, 
campfire programs, puppet shows, gardening classes, and guided tours of the park’s 
historic sites. By 1994, the Jamaica Bay unit was offering between six (during the 
winter) and fifteen (during the summer) programs a month. Other facilities available that 
year included a sports complex and a riding academy.61 
Pollution hindered the recreational development of the bay beyond Floyd Bennett 
Field. Despite the millions of dollars spent on sewage treatment, by 1994 the waters of 
Jamaica Bay were still not safe for swimming. The Spring Creek Auxiliary treatment 
plant ultimately proved to be inadequate, with raw sewage still pouring into the bay !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Area, Superintendents’ Annual Narrative Reports, 1980-2001, General Records, Record 
Group 79, Records of the National Park Service, National Archives. 60 “1981 Gateway National Recreation Area Superintendents’ Annual Narrative Report,” 
Box 22, Fort Union Trading Post National Historic Site to Gateway National Recreation 
Area, Superintendents’ Annual Narrative Reports, 1980-2001, General Records, Record 
Group 79, Records of the National Park Service, National Archives. 61 “Gateway National Recreation Area 1985 Summer Program Guide,” Gateway 
National Recreation Area Cultural Resources Library; “Gateway National Recreation 
Area 1985 Winter Program Guide,” Gateway National Recreation Area Cultural 
Resources Library; “Gateway National Recreation Area 1994 Summer Program Guide,” 
Gateway National Recreation Area Cultural Resources Library; “Gateway National 
Recreation Area 1994 Fall Program Guide,” Gateway National Recreation Area Cultural 
Resources Library; “Gateway National Recreation Area 1994 Winter-Spring Program 
Guide,” Gateway National Recreation Area Cultural Resources Library. 
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during storms.62 Officials also made the unwelcome discovery that a number of landfills 
ringing the bay contained dangerous levels of PCB’s from years of illegal dumping that 
had been overlooked by City officials. These chemicals leached into the bay through 
groundwater.63 Plans were made in 1994 to begin cleaning up the sites, but the 
complexity of the problem ensured that it would be a slow process.64 The only 
recreational use permitted within the bay in 1994 was boating: a marina at Floyd 
Bennett Field provided boat rentals to visitors. The bay also continued to host the 
Wildlife Refuge, which continued to run much as it did before the Service took over, 
offering hiking and educational programs.65 
 A number of recreational attractions were created at the Breezy Point unit. The 
most popular feature of the site was its beaches, but it also hosted a diverse variety of 
programs that focused on activities such as fishing (mandating strict catch limits due to 
pollution), biking, boating, and kite flying. It also hosted cultural events like concerts and 
ethnic festivals, and organized sports like volleyball and golf, in addition to races. By 
1994, new facilities included a pitch-and-putt golf course at Riis Park and numerous 
concession stands.66 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!62 Allan Gold, “Burst Pipe Spills Raw Sewage into Jamaica Bay,” New York Times, May 
9, 1991. 63 Ralph Ginzburg, “Report Says Landfill Imperils Estuary,” New York Times, February 
14, 1988. 64 Onishi Norimitsu, “Neighborhood Report: Jamaica Bay; Plans in Works for Restoring 
Jamaica Bay,” New York Times, October 16, 1994. 65 “Gateway National Recreation Area 1994 Winter-Spring Program Guide”; “Gateway 
National Recreation Area 1994 Summer Program Guide”; “Gateway National Recreation 
Area 1994 Fall Program Guide.” 66 “Gateway National Recreation Area 1985 Summer Program Guide”; “Gateway 
National Recreation Area 1985 Winter Program Guide”; “Gateway National Recreation 
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 In spite of its limitations, Gateway quickly became one of the most popular sites 
in the entire national park system, at least from a statistical point of view. In 1979, 8.3 
million people visited: excluding national parkways, it was the second most popular site 
in the entire system. Attendance peaked in 1983, when 10.3 million people visited, 
again making it the second most popular site. This number would gradually decline, with 
1994 seeing 4.1 million visitors—its lowest levels to date—yet it still remained among 
the top ten parks visited nationwide.67 
 Although analysis of visitors during the 1990s is not available, recent studies 
offer some insight into who was using Gateway. Statistics show that the use of Gateway 
by minorities was significantly less than what planners originally envisioned. William 
Kornblum and Kristen Van Hooreweghe’s 2010 ethnography of the Jamaica Bay 
watershed revealed over sixty percent of the population to be non-white, primarily of 
Hispanic and Caribbean origin, yet a 2003 Park Service study of Floyd Bennett Field—
one of the few comprehensive use studies available—found a very different profile of 
the site’s users: although the overwhelming majority of visitors came from New York, 
eighty-two percent of the visitors were white, fifteen percent were black, nine percent 
were Hispanic, and five percent were Asian. The most revealing statistic is the means of 
transport: while ninety-five percent of visitors used a private vehicle, only one percent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Area 1994 Summer Program Guide”; “Gateway National Recreation Area 1994 Fall 
Program Guide”; “Gateway National Recreation Area 1994 Winter-Spring Program 
Guide.” 67 “NPS Stats Report,” National Park Service, http://Irma.nps.gov/stats. 
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took busses or the subway, demonstrating the impact the failure to secure mass transit 
has had upon the park’s use.68 
 The 2003 study also provides insight into the ways visitors used Floyd Bennett 
Field and what they learned from their time in its space. The most popular activity 
engaged in was fishing, followed by walking and running, then gardening and model 
airplanes; seeing aircraft and historical buildings was popular as well, along with nature 
study. When asked by the study’s authors about what drew them to the park, three 
quarters of visitors cited “open space,” followed by “quiet,” and “natural views.” The 
study also attempted to find out what visitors learned during their visit: the most 
common answers were that they learned about history, gardens, and fishing; nature and 
preservation were low on the list, but when asked about what they would like to learn 
about on future visits, between one-fifth and one-third of respondents mentioned nature-
related topics like wildlife, environmental education, and botany.69 In sum, while the 
uses show that this part of Gateway was occupying a niche of providing open 
recreational space and supporting hobbies, the ambition to transform understandings of 
nature was probably not being met. One explanation is a lack of programming: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!68!William Kornblum and Kristen Van Hooreweghe, Jamaica Bay Ethnographic Overview 
and Assessment (Boston, MA: National Park Service Northeast Region Ethnography 
Program, 2010), iv, 156; “Gateway National Recreation Area—Floyd Bennett Field 
Visitor Study,” National Park Service, 
http://www.vanalen.org/gateway/sitebrief_downloadables/Primary_Sources/14_Visitor_
Use_Study_NPS_2003.pdf.!69!Ibid.!
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Gateway’s officials might take heart in the fact that visitors expressed interest in learning 
more about nature, suggesting the possibilities available from better funding. 70 
  This brief survey of Gateway’s usage and attempts to accommodate the public 
reveals a mixed legacy. The park’s strongly preservationist stance and limited 
transportation options has resulted in it not living up to the hopes of planners and 
politicians who sought to provide a space to serve the diverse populations of New York 
City. Millions of people nonetheless do make use of Gateway in activities ranging from 
enjoying its scenery to active recreation to hobbies, reflecting the ambitions of the 
planners who sought to provide a space that could accommodate a diversity of pursuits. 
This assessment is similar to that of historian Ronald Foresta in 1984, who noted that 
even though “it has fallen far short of its original goals… it is not obvious that those 
goals are unattainable”; Gateway “cannot be written off as [an] unambiguous failure.”71 
Gateway National Recreation Area is potentially on the eve of a new era in which 
its promise may be met. In 2012, after nearly thirty years of federal control, Mayor 
Bloomberg announced that the contours of a new partnership between the City and the 
Park Service to manage Jamaica Bay had been agreed upon. The two entities would 
henceforth work together to achieve goals of expanded access and restoration while 
jointly planning and running educational, recreational and research programs.72 The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!70!Ibid. Only five percent of respondents reported attending programs, although sixteen 
percent noted that they had taken advantage of programming in the past; sixty percent 
believed that ranger-led programs were at least moderately important, and over one-
third of respondents requested “special events” for future visits. 71!Foresta, America’s National Parks and Their Keepers, 282. 72 Lisa Foderaro, “City and Federal Officials Will Jointly Manage Jamaica Bay,” New 
York Times, July 17, 2012. 
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Park Service has also been working on a new General Management Plan, releasing a 
draft in 2013. It presenting three alternatives: “A,” which would be the same 
management regime as before; “B,” called “Experiencing Gateway,” emphasizing 
visitation and use, calling for greatly expanded facilities like new recreation centers—
many of which would take advantage of the new partnership with the City; and “C,” 
called “Experiencing Preserved Places,” which was to focus on the restoration of 
Gateway’s environments, with the visitor experience directed towards passive 
recreational activities and education. Soubier’s vision continued to influence planners—
particularly with option C—yet option B also took pains to demonstrate the park’s 
commitment to preservation even as it sought greater development of its resources. 73  
Whether or not Gateway will meet its potential or not largely depends upon funding, but 
the partnership with New York City will no doubt offer greater flexibility—an irony 
considering the fact that the City’s inability to fund recreation projects in the 1960s was 
a major impetus to seek federal help. 
 
Conclusion 
 Park Service officials managing and planning Gateway faced numerous 
difficulties, from recalcitrant neighbors, to pollution, to a severe lack of resources, yet it 
was within these limitations that the Gateway concept was found. For the first time in its 
history, Jamaica Bay’s administrators had committed themselves to an understanding of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!73!National Park Service, A New Vision For a Great Urban Park, Gateway National 
Recreation Area Draft General Management Plan (New York: National Park Service, 
July 2013), http://www.nps.gov/gate/parkmgmt/planning.htm.!
!! 199!
its space that sought to reconcile its unusual history and relationship with New York 
City. The conception of Gateway as a hybrid of city and nature was an attempt to 
accommodate the variety of uses and physical forms found within Jamaica Bay, 
emphasizing relationships over concrete forms in a way akin to the residents who 
thought of their space as Venice. This concept was a departure for the National Park 
Service, which had traditionally conceived of its lands as spaces of spectacular 
wilderness, but one that was necessary due to the increasingly untenable position the 
organization found itself in due to increasing pressures to provide mass recreation and 
strict nature preservation. Although Gateway National Recreation Area remains 
controversial, events like 2012’s Hurricane Sandy have demonstrated that the ethics 
behind Clifford Soubier’s vision are more important than ever in an era of climate 
change. 
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Conclusion: “A Tableau of Damage, Destruction, and Grief,” 
Hurricane Sandy and the Future of Jamaica Bay 
 
 From 1994 to 2012, life in the Jamaica Bay area carried on much like it had over 
the past twenty years. Broad Channel continued to contend with legal controversies. 
Breezy Point enjoyed its privacy. Gateway National Recreation Area remained a popular 
yet underfunded site. Just as the shock of 9/11 seemed to usher in a new era, New York 
City arguably lies on the cusp of a similarly momentous change with regard to its 
relationship with the natural world. Hurricane Sandy, striking in the final days of October 
2012, was the most significant natural disaster to hit modern New York City. Although 
the bay’s communities had experienced a number of episodes of severe weather over 
the twentieth century, with the 1938 “Long Island Express” hurricane, the hurricane of 
1944, and a particularly intense nor’easter in 1992 being among the most dramatic, 
Sandy’s effects topped them all, being the second-costliest hurricane in US history.1 
 On October 22, 2012, the tropical storm that would eventually become known as 
Sandy formed in the Caribbean Sea, intensifying to a hurricane by the 24th. Over the 
next three days, the storm would tear through the Caribbean before emerging into the 
open Atlantic. It briefly weakened to a tropical storm on the 27th, yet forecasters’ 
concerns were mounting. Meteorologists predicted that the storm would not behave like 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Liz Guarino and Dan Guarino, Images of America: Broad Channel (Mount Pleasant, 
SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2008), 9; “Report: Sandy Was USA’s Second-Costliest 
Hurricane,” USA Today, February 12, 2013. 
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most hurricanes, which typically veered into the North Atlantic to disintegrate; Sandy 
was expected to instead turn sharply westward and directly pass over the New 
York/New Jersey region due to the influence of an existing weather system. Particularly 
worrisome was the fact that the storm was slated to hit during a high tide intensified by a 
full moon.2 
 The worst-case scenario ultimately came to pass. On October 29, Sandy made 
landfall in New Jersey, beginning two days of destruction. The storm set a number of 
records: the central pressure was six millibars lower than the previous record, 946 
millibars, seen during the 1938 “Long Island Express.” Storm surge measured 13.88 
feet at the Battery, topping the previous record of 10.02 feet set by Hurricane Donna in 
1960. Finally, waves in New York Harbor reached as high as 32.5 feet, 6.5 feet higher 
than waves seen during Hurricane Irene in 2011.3 The storm crippled New York City, 
leaving, in the words of New York Times reporter James Barron, a “tableau of damage, 
destruction, and grief.” Flooding shut down subways, grounded flights, and left millions 
without power.4 Seventy-two people died throughout the United States, and the storm 
caused $50 billion worth of damage.5 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2 Willie Drye, “A Timeline of Hurricane Sandy’s Path of Destruction,” 
http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2012/11/02/a-timeline-of-hurricane-sandys-
path-of-destruction. 3 “Hurricane Sandy Fast Facts,” CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/world/americas/hurricane-sandy-fast-facts. 4 James Barron, “After The Devastation, A Daunting Recovery,” New York Times, 
October 31, 2012. 5 “Report: Sandy Was USA’s Second-Costliest Hurricane.” 
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Figure 12, Flooding in the Jamaica Bay Area, http://project.wync.org/flooding-sandy-
new. 
 
 Gateway National Recreation Area was significantly damaged by the storm. 
Debris and sand choked roadways—particularly at Sandy Hook, which was battered by 
the storm surge. Additionally, officials worried that the waters may have unearthed 
unexploded shells at a former artillery test site at the Hook’s Fort Hancock, prompting 
an extensive combing of the beaches with metal detectors. At the Jamaica Bay unit, 
both artificial freshwater ponds at the wildlife refuge were breached, flooding them with 
saltwater. Floyd Bennett Field served as a staging area for disaster relief, shutting down 
normal operations.6 
Broad Channel and Breezy Point were among the hardest hit communities in the 
entire City. In the Cooperative, floodwaters rose as high as six feet. As bad as this was, 
the effects of the flooding were compounded when fire broke out, likely stemming from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6 Lisa Foderaro, “Gateway Recreation Area, Most of It Still Closed After Storm, Faces 
Long Recovery,” New York Times, December 11, 2012. 
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an electrical problem in an empty house. Wind-driven flames engulfed dozens of homes 
as firefighters blocked by flooding helplessly watched. By the end of the night, over 100 
homes had burned to the ground.7 Broad Channel was one of the areas most severely 
flooded by the storm, with one reporter noting that not a single home escaped 
inundation.8 
 Sandy has prompted a reexamination of the wisdom of subsidizing people who 
live in flood-prone areas. The City has earmarked $22 million for building bulkheads and 
raising streets in Broad Channel, but groups like the National Resources Defense 
Council have questioned the wisdom of this type of action. Eric Goldstein, a lawyer with 
the Council, noted, "if sea levels rise and storm-level projections are accurate, this 
community may be surviving on borrowed time…. How much sense does it make to 
keep reinvesting taxpayer dollars in a community that is directly in harm's way?" Though 
many conservation groups have long desired getting rid of Broad Channel, making 
Goldstein’s perspective suspect, his point nonetheless remains an important 
consideration.9 
 Breezy Point prompted yet another set of dilemmas. Because the Cooperative 
had agreed to provide services and maintain infrastructure on its own rather than relying 
upon the City, agencies have had to grapple with the appropriateness of diverting public 
funds for rebuilding the community. Breezy Point’s residents still pay taxes, yet have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7 “Fire and Flooding in Breezy Point,” New York Times, December 24, 2012. 8 Maria Diamond, “Every Home in Broad Channel, Queens Affected by Sandy,” CBS 
New York Online, November 1, 2012. 9 Gregory Kia, “Where Streets Flood With the Tide, a Debate Over City Aid,” New York 
Times, July 10, 2013. 
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significantly greater autonomy over their property than most in the City.10 Being forced 
to rebuild may be the price of independence, yet the outpouring of sympathy for the 
community has been difficult to ignore, with numerous stories appearing in media 
highlighting the “resiliency” of the community, telling inspiring stories of loss, recovery, 
faith, and patriotism.11 
 Public officials have limited leverage over the inhabitants of flood-prone areas. 
New York State attempted to institute a buyout program for ravaged communities like 
Breezy Point, yet residents have been largely hostile towards these types of actions.12 
Considering the history of Breezy Point and Broad Channel, mistrust towards 
government is not surprising. Changes in the National Flood Insurance Program 
resulting from the 2012 Biggert-Waters Act requiring flood insurance rates to rise in 
areas that experience severe flooding have the potential to out price residents in middle-
class communities like Breezy Point and Broad Channel, but the measure has met 
intense hostility in the wake of Sandy.13 Overall, public officials will have to contend with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10 Joseph Berger, “Enclaves, Long Gated, Seek to Let In Storm Aid,” New York Times, 
November 27, 2012. 11 Rick Hampson, “A Year After Sandy, Resilience Defines Breezy Point,” USA Today, 
October 27, 2013 and John Dawsey, “Breezy Point’s Virgin Mary Statue to be Part of 
Sandy Rememberance,” Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2013, are representative. 12 “Hurricane Sandy Buyouts Cause Storm of Confusion, Worry From Politicians,” 
Gotham Gazette, http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/housing/4233-hurricane-
sandy-buyouts-cause-storm-of-confusion-worry-from-politicians. 13 Bryan Walsh, “The Hard Math of Flood Insurance in a Warming World,” Time, 
October 1, 2013. 
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the actions of private individuals whether they hamper efforts to “rebuild deliberately” or 
not.14  
Although officials recognize the threat of climate change, planning for it is still in 
its infancy. A 2009 panel predicted that over the next century New York City would face 
100-year floods every thirty-five years, sea level rise of one to two feet—potentially 
more—and more intense severe weather events.15 Apart from attempting to stop climate 
change, which remains politically difficult—there are two major approaches New York 
City can take to adapt. First, the City can attempt to build its way out of the problem by 
constructing floodwalls, sea gates, and other types of hydrological engineering. Second, 
it can better adapt itself to the natural landscape, for example restoring wetlands and 
marshes to absorb storm surge; one metaphor used to describe these types of activities 
is “softening” the edges of the city.16 So far, New York City has committed twenty billion 
dollars to both types of upgrades, but the process of adapting to changing climate and 
sea level rise is only just beginning.17 Transforming the bay’s natural spaces will need to 
be done carefully: similar attempts in the past have had serious consequences. The 
filling of the Moses era, done to create more “natural” parkland, played a major role in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14 “On Ravaged Coastline, It’s Rebuild Deliberately vs. Rebuild Now,” New York Times, 
December 21, 2012. 15 New York City Panel on Climate Change, Climate Risk Information (New York: New 
York City Panel on Climate Change, 2009), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2009/NPCC_CRI.pdf. 
16 “Vision 2020: New York City Comprehensive Waterfront Plan, Goal 8,” New York City 
Department of Planning, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/cwp/vision2020/chapter3_goal8.pdf. 
17 Lisa Colangelo, “State Pumps Money into Salt Marsh Restoration at Jamaica Bay,” 
New York Daily News, April 16, 2013; “Bloomberg Outlines $20 Billion Storm Protection 
Plan,” New York Times, June 11, 2013. 
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destroying marshland, making flooding worse for the area overall. Though ecologists 
now understand the importance of wetlands, the episode nonetheless reveals the perils 
of engineering nature according to cultural archetypes. Finding the proper relationship 
between city and nature will be a central dilemma going forward, as it was in the past. 
The history of Jamaica Bay reveals the diversity of ways in which activists, 
developers, officials, and residents understood the relationship between city and nature. 
Conventional conceptions like parks, ports, and suburbs formed the basis of elite 
approaches to developing the bay, but the residents approached the matter differently. 
Based on their experiences living and working within its space, they conceptualized the 
bay as the Venice of New York, a hybrid space of city and nature. Although Broad 
Channel became more conventionally suburban over time, the idea of the community as 
Venice continued, forming an important part of its identity as being “of the bay.” 
The struggles over Jamaica Bay were suffused with class-based tensions. While 
the Venice of New York was regarded with curiosity and admiration at first, changing 
understandings of nature based on conservationism led the bay’s elite managers to 
decry the stewardship of the bay’s working-class residents, even as New York City 
refused to provide infrastructure that would ameliorate growing pollution. The changing 
politics of the 1960s allowed the bay’s residents to reverse the dynamics of class, with 
Breezy Point invoking Richard Nixon’s politics of backlash against the activists and 
officials pushing for the creation of Gateway National Recreation Area. 
Although Gateway was successfully created, the residents of Jamaica Bay were 
allowed to keep their homes, requiring the National Park Service to approach the 
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conceptualization of their park in unconventional ways. As opposed to treating the bay 
as a space of wilderness, under the direction of Clifford Soubier, the Service committed 
themselves to a clear accounting of the complexities of the relationships between the 
City and the natural world in Jamaica Bay, and to manage the space in a way that 
benefitted both. The development of Gateway was hampered by a lack of funding and 
divisions among conservationists regarding its unconventional form, yet the park 
remains one of the most visited sites within the entire system. 
Soubier’s vision continues to be controversial, but its essential message is more 
important than ever in an era of climate change: officials and residents will need to be 
able to clearly conceptualize the relationships between city and nature going forward. 
They might also need to be willing to adapt to unconventional urban forms: ironically, 
the Broad Channel of the “Venice” era, though primitive, could probably have withstood 
Hurricane Sandy to a greater degree than the current community. It was City officials 
and developers that forced the community to become more conventionally urban, to 
undo its adaptations to the aquatic environment. Broad Channel’s residents understood 
that although they were part of New York City, nature didn’t end at the bulkhead wall.
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